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 This dissertation examines two aspects of morality: (i) normative 
“ought” claims and (ii) blame.  It is argued that these aspects of morality are 
compatible with “determinism,” the theory that all events are causally 
necessitated by prior events and the laws of nature.  No position is taken on 
the likelihood that the world is deterministic.  Instead, this dissertation rebuts 
arguments for incompatibilism and attempts to explain why determinism, if 
true, should not undermine these two aspects of morality.      
 Chapter One focuses on the intuitive, but controversial, proposition that 
moral “ought” claims imply “can” claims.  This principle can seem to entail that, 
if determinism is true, no one ought to do anything other than what he or she 
actually does.  Chapter One argues that “A ought to do X” implies only that A 
has the ability and the opportunity to do X, not the will to do X, and thus, that it 
can be true that a person ought to do something even if that person is causally 
determined to do otherwise.  
 Chapters Two and Three focus on blame and blameworthiness.  
Chapter Two reviews contemporary accounts of blame and offers an 
alternative account, on which blameworthiness involves a change in moral 
standing, including a loss of claims against certain forms of suffering and the 
acquisition of special obligations.  Blaming involves actually caring about these 
changes by treating a person with decreased moral respect and demanding 
that the special obligations are satisfied.   
Chapter Three addresses the idea that a person cannot be 
blameworthy for an action unless she could have done otherwise.  Many who 
believe that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism reject this 
principle on the basis of a counterexample developed by Harry Frankfurt.  
Chapter Three argues for a conception of moral responsibility that entails a 
more plausible principle about responsibility:  that to be blameworthy, it must 
be possible for the person to have behaved differently.  This weaker principle 
is not shown to be false by Frankfurt’s counterexample, it is necessary to 
support judgments about the desert of blame, and it does not lead to 
incompatibilism about determinism and moral responsibility.  
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The natural sciences tend to suggest—in their assumptions and as an 
inference from their success—that all events can be explained in terms of the 
behavior of matter and energy in accordance with natural laws.  Human 
actions are not exempt from such explanations.  Indeed, advances in 
neuroscience, physiology, and related fields consistently expand our ability to 
explain human action in terms of physical and chemical events occurring in 
accordance with natural laws.  These advances appear to support the idea 
that in principle all human actions could be explained as the effect of chemical 
and physical processes occurring principally within our brains. 
The possibility of a thoroughgoing explanation for human behavior in 
terms of physical events and physical and chemical properties of our brains is 
in tension with the way we view ourselves when we contemplate acting.  As 
we see it, what we do depends on what we think, what we care about, what 
we believe, and what we want.  All of these are attitudes that, unlike 
neurological events, we can experience through self-consciousness and are 
nowhere to be found in a brain scan or neurological diagram.  The thought that 
our behavior can be explained as the result of a complex series of brain 
processes — processes beholden to the laws of chemistry and physics and 
outside the scope of our self-consciousness — threatens our sense that our 
choices are dictated by thought, deliberation, and choice – processes of which 
we are, more or less, aware and which are subject, if at all, to norms such as 
 2 
logic, reason, “common sense,” and morality, not to natural laws.  Thus, we 
must ask whether our scientific understanding of the world can be squared 
with our conception of ourselves as agents.  
 This question can arise in different forms and deal with a number of 
different aspects of our conception of ourselves as agents.  Perhaps the most 
fundamental and far reaching of the problems evoked by the naturalistic, 
physicalist view of the world is the mind-body problem.  If there are physical 
explanations of our behavior, which make reference to neurons and brain 
chemistry, not beliefs, desires, and other mental attitudes, then we are left with 
the problem of explaining the very nature of these mental attitudes, how they 
relate to the physical world, and what role if any they play in causing or 
explaining our behavior.  Though these are fascinating problems, they are not 
the subject of this dissertation.  I must assume here that these problems can 
be resolved in a way that supports our natural tendency to speak of beliefs, 
desires and other mental attitudes as explanations of our actions.  Specifically, 
I assume that regardless of whether or not it is true to say that I did X because 
of the firing of certain neurons moments beforehand, it is also meaningful, and 
sometimes true, to say that I did X because, for example, I wanted Y and I 
believed that doing X was the way to get Y or because I had been intending to 
do X and I believed this to be a good opportunity to carry out that intention. 
 Assuming that our behavior can often be explained in terms of mental 
attitudes or mental events, we are still left with another set of problems.  For 
even if we may meaningfully and correctly speak of our actions as the product 
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of our beliefs, desires, values, principles, etc., it still may be that these 
attitudes and mental attributes themselves are determined by the physical and 
chemical events going on within our brains and bodies.  This possibility can 
seem to undermine our sense of freedom, control, and choice over what we 
do.  In short, the assumption that mental explanations are meaningful and 
potentially true does not allow us to ignore the physical explanations and the 
evidence that physical events have physical causes.  These physical 
explanations can make the control that we appear to have over what we do 
seem to be an illusion.  While it may seem to you that it is up to you whether to 
continue reading, stop for a break, or skip ahead, the scientific picture seems 
to suggest that what you do is settled by the behavior of physical and chemical 
particles within your brain, which has long been determined by natural laws.  
Thus, even assuming that there is a place for mental attitudes in the physical 
world, we are still left with the problem of explaining our sense that we are 
agents empowered with free wills.   
The scientific picture of the world raises the classic problem of freedom 
and determinism.  This problem might be expressed as an inconsistent triad:  
people sometimes act freely; the world is deterministic; and if the world is 
deterministic, then no one ever acts freely.  Expressing the threat to freedom 
as “determinism” means that we are supposing that the laws of nature leave 
no room for indeterminism and that the state of the world at any given 
moment, taken together with the laws of nature, is sufficient to determine the 
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state of the world at any later moment.1  This problem, like the mind-body 
problem, is also not the subject of this dissertation.  However, unlike the mind-
body problem, I need not assume a solution to this problem.  Instead, I will set 
the problem aside and consider a third set of issues that arise from the 
possibility of a deterministic physical world.   
The idea that we sometimes act freely is not the only aspect of our 
agency that is under threat from determinism.  If what we do can be explained 
entirely in terms of deterministic laws of physics and chemistry, then it can be 
hard to see how we can salvage our conception of ourselves as moral agents, 
agents who are subject to moral norms and who deserve blame and 
punishment or praise and reward for our performance relative to those norms.  
Determinism raises a number of questions about moral agency, including the 
following:  Can it be true that I ought to do X if the laws of physics and the 
history of the world entail that I cannot do X?  And how, in that case, could I 
deserve blame for not doing X?  These questions identify the two central 
problems of moral agency and determinism that are the subject of this 
dissertation.   
The problems that determinism raises for moral agency are not always 
separated from the problems it raises for free will.  It is common to assume 
                                                
1 Somewhat ironically, the natural sciences, which seem to raise the threat of 
determinism, may not in fact support a thoroughgoing determinism, at least not at the 
subatomic level.  As I understand it, quantum mechanics holds that there is an element of 
indeterminacy in the behavior of subatomic particles.  However, as I understand it, quantum 
indeterminacy does not carry over and create significant indeterminism in the behavior of 
atomic or “super”-atomic entities.  Therefore, I assume that determinism remains a real 
possibility for entities above the subatomic level and that this possibility is supported by the 
natural sciences and the advances in neurology from which I began. 
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that the problems are bound together and that moral agency simply stands or 
falls with freedom.  For example, Kant seems to have taken it as obvious that 
when we view the world as deterministic there simply is no room for moral 
claims of any sort.2  Kant takes the possibility that we are moral agents to be 
entirely dependent on the possibility of metaphysical freedom, and thus, 
defending that possibility is a central theme running through the first two 
Critiques and the Groundwork.  Kant is not alone.  It remains common to 
collapse the problems that determinism presents for morality into the problem 
of free will.  This is particularly true with respect to moral responsibility.  It is 
often assumed that freedom is necessary (if not also sufficient) for moral 
responsibility, and those concerned about moral responsibility therefore often 
focus on the question of whether freedom is compatible with determinism.   
In suggesting a departure from this approach, I do not claim that moral 
agency is entirely independent of freedom.  There may be a connection 
between the two.  Instead, I insist only that any dependence of moral agency 
upon free will is not obvious and not something that should be taken for 
granted.  More importantly, I argue that we can make progress in evaluating 
the compatibility of moral agency and determinism while setting the problem of 
freedom and determinism to the side.   
                                                
2 For example, see the Critique of Pure Reason (Kant (1781/1787)), at A547/B575, 
where, using “nature” to mean a specifically deterministic conception of the world, Kant says:  
“indeed, the ought, if one has merely the course of nature before one’s eyes, has no 
significance whatsoever.” 
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One reason to treat the problems of moral agency as distinct and to 
approach them on their own terms is that it helps us avoid a philosophical 
minefield.  It is an understatement to say that the ideas of freedom and free 
will are contested.  Intractable may be the best way to describe the 
disagreement about what it means to act freely.  From a tradition of 
philosophers and theologians running, at least, from Aristotle to Hume and 
Schopenhauer, we inherit a number of competing conceptions of freedom.  
This tradition distinguished a freedom that required only the absence of 
obstacles and thus the ability to do what we want (sometimes called the 
“liberty of spontaneity”) from one which requires the ability to choose among 
truly open alternatives and thus presupposes indeterminism (sometimes called 
the “liberty of indifference”).  Philosophers in this tradition have disagreed for 
millennia, about which, if either, of these senses of freedom should matter.  As 
far as I am aware, few now accept a simple version of either sort of 
conception, but the 20th and 21st century debate can still be seen as a 
continuation of the ancient one.  Harry Frankfurt’s view that freedom of the will 
consists in having a will that is consistent with one’s higher-order desires can 
be seen as a sophisticated, modern derivative of the position that it is the 
“liberty of spontaneity” that matters.3  Robert Kane, who defines free will as 
“the power of agents to be the ultimate creators (or originators) and sustainers 
of their own ends or purposes” and suggests that this means that it must be 
“truly up to us what we do” and that we must be “the ultimate, buck-stopping 
                                                
3 See Frankfurt (1971). 
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originator[s] of our actions,” can be seen as carrying forward the intuitions of 
those who insisted on the “liberty of indifference.”4  The persistence of this 
kind of disagreement about the very notion of freedom leaves me doubtful that 
we are likely to find enough common ground if we take the traditional, 
metaphysical approach to the problems of moral agency.   
Nearly half a century ago, in a statement that remains apt, P.F. 
Strawson summarized the result of approaching moral responsibility as a 
metaphysical question about freedom of the will: 
[Incompatibilists say] that just punishment and 
moral condemnation imply moral guilt and guilt 
implies moral responsibility and moral responsibility 
implies freedom and freedom implies the falsity of 
determinism.  And to this [compatibilists] are wont 
to reply in turn that it is true that these practices 
require freedom in a sense, and the existence of 
freedom in this sense is one of the facts as we 
know them.  But what ‘freedom’ means here is 
nothing but the absence of certain conditions the 
presence of which would make moral 
condemnation or punishment inappropriate. 
* * * 
[The incompatibilist,] being the sort of man he is, 
has only one more thing to say; that is that the 
admissibility of these practices, as we understand 
them, demands another kind of freedom, the kind 
that in turn demands the falsity of the thesis of 
determinism.5 
As Strawson illustrates, the move from moral responsibility to freedom tends 
only to generate a debate about which kind of freedom is required for moral 
                                                
4 Kane (1996) p.4. 
5 Strawson, P.F. (1962) pp.73-75. 
 8 
responsibility.   
Among those who focus on the compatibility of freedom and 
determinism, one occasionally encounters a tacit admission that the concepts 
of freedom and free will are unlikely to provide a toehold on issues of moral 
responsibility.  Recognizing disagreement about the concept of free will, they 
turn back to the concept of moral responsibility to find purchase.  For example, 
Al Mele explains: 
[Various uses of the term ‘free’] do not concern me.  
My interest is in what might be termed moral-
responsibility-level free action—roughly, free action 
of such a kind that if all the freedom-independent 
conditions for moral responsibility were satisfied 
without that sufficing for the agent’s being morally 
responsible for it, the addition of the action’s being 
free to this set of conditions would entail that he is 
morally responsible for it.6  
But if this is how one is supposed to get a grip on the concept of free action, 
then why should we who are concerned with morality and moral responsibility 
bother with the problem of free will?  It can seem as though we are told that if 
we want to know whether responsibility is possible in a deterministic world, we 
should ask whether freedom is possible, but if we point out that many different 
ideas are given the name “freedom,” we are told to rely on the concept of 
responsibility to identify the concept of freedom at issue.7  Thus, the traditional 
                                                
6 Mele (2006) p.17. 
7 My argument here is, admittedly, a bit quick.  Many would claim that there are ways 
of getting a grip on the relevant notion of freedom without simply circling back to responsibility.  
On one important approach, we might understand both freedom and moral responsibility by 
analyzing and developing a notion of “control” over one’s own actions.  There may be some 
promise to this approach, but it cannot be claimed that the notion of control at issue here is 
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approach that assumes freedom is the key to moral agency appears to be a 
potentially unnecessary detour through treacherous terrain.   
In addition, focusing on the problems of moral agency and determinism 
as independent problems allows us to keep these issues framed as, 
fundamentally, issues of moral theory, rather than metaphysics.  Above, I 
phrased the question of the compatibility of determinism and moral 
responsibility as a normative issue:  could anyone deserve to be held 
responsible if determinism is true?  And the question of whether it makes 
sense to say that I ought to do something, even if determinism is true, can 
similarly be phrased as a question about the nature and scope of our moral 
obligations:  to what extent do we have obligations to do things that we are 
unable to do?  On an approach that assumes that freedom is the essential 
condition for moral agency, these moral questions are easily supplanted by a 
metaphysical issue:  whether free will is possible in a deterministic world.  The 
approach I take here remains focused on these moral questions and examines 
the moral phenomenon at issue closely in order to help address these issues.  
This is appropriate, as we should not conclude that morality cannot be 
reconciled with determinism without looking closely at our moral judgments 
and practices and carefully examining their purpose and conditions. 
                                                                                                                                       
itself self-evident or safe from controversy.  Thus, it is not obvious that this approach avoids 
unnecessary disputes.  Moreover, unless we have a clear grip on what moral responsibility is 
and what its conditions are, we should not assume that “control” really is the relevant 
requirement for moral responsibility.  And even if it is, we should not assume we are in a 
position to develop the proper understanding of control without first clarifying the idea of 
responsibility.     
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Of course this does not mean we can or should avoid all metaphysical 
questions.  Ethics cannot be divorced from metaphysics entirely, particularly 
not in this area.  But I seek to keep the focus on the moral phenomena at 
issue and to delve into metaphysical questions about ability, choice, or control 
only where necessary to understand these moral phenomena.   
I cannot hope to address all of the questions that determinism raises for 
moral agency in this dissertation. Instead, I focus on two moral principles that 
raise central issues for the compatibility of determinism and moral agency.  In 
Chapter One, I address the principle that “ought” implies “can,” as this 
principle raises a clear problem about the compatibility of determinism and 
moral obligation.  This principle limits the scope of what we ought to do to the 
range of actions that we are able to perform.  Thus, when combined with 
determinism, it appears to drastically limit the scope of our obligations.  If 
determinism means that there is only one course of action open to us at any 
time, then the “‘ought’” implies “‘can’” principle and determinism appear to 
entail that it is never the case that we ought to do anything other than what we 
in fact do.  In other words, no matter how badly you act, it will never be true to 
say that you ought to have done otherwise.  If this is right, then at any given 
time, either there is nothing you ought to do or what you ought to do is 
whatever you will in fact do.  This conclusion would seem to undermine the 
entire point of moral beliefs by leaving us with little to say in terms of 
evaluating courses of action.  I argue that this is a consequence we can avoid.  
By focusing on the significance and purpose of normative ought claims and on 
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our intuitions about particular cases, we can not only understand the appeal of 
the idea that “ought” implies “can,” but also formulate a more precise version 
of that principle.  This version of the principle shows that determinism does not 
threaten the truth of common sense normative “ought” claims. 
The second principle that I address is the principle that responsibility for 
an action, particularly praiseworthiness and blameworthiness, depends on 
having the ability to do otherwise.  Given this principle, determinism appears to 
be incompatible with moral responsibility because determinism makes it 
impossible to do anything other than what we do.  I do not turn to a discussion 
of this principle until Chapter Three.  First, Chapter Two contains a discussion 
of the nature of blame and praise, including critical evaluation of various 
contemporary accounts of blame and argument in favor of my alternate 
proposal.  The analysis of blame and praise in Chapter Two places us in a 
better position to understand what must be the case in order for a person to 
deserve blame or praise.  Relying on this analysis, I argue that desert of blame 
and praise does not depend on the ability to do otherwise.  It requires less 
than this.  Praise or blame can be deserved just in case our actions reveal our 
moral quality, and this can be the case even where we cannot actually do 
anything other than what we do.  Therefore, in Chapter Three, I argue for a 
principle that is weaker than the principle of alternate possibilities, and which 
does not support incompatibilism about determinism and moral responsibility.   
These Chapters do not address every argument that might be taken to 
show that determinism is incompatible with moral obligations and with moral 
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responsibility.  However, they defuse two of the most important arguments for 
this incompatibilism, and they provide at least some explanation for why these 
moral phenomena are compatible with determinism.  At the end of Chapter 
Three, I close with some thoughts on the limits of this explanation and the 
possibilities for addressing its shortcomings. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
WHAT CAN OUGHT IMPLY? 
 
I. What a Person Ought to Do Depends on What She Can Do: 
Years ago, during a winter walk in one of Ithaca’s gorges, my dog 
Madison cut her paw rather severely.  Typically, I would have taken Madison 
to my friend, Sue, who is a local veterinarian, but at the time, Sue was on 
vacation.  She would not be back for a week.  So, Madison and I went to the 
local veterinary hospital.  The next time I saw Sue, I related the incident and 
complained about how much the hospital charged me.  I expected her to say 
something like,  “It’s too bad I wasn’t around.”  So, it was a bit of a surprise 
when she said, “You should have come to me.  I wouldn’t have charged you.”  
As it turned out there was a miscommunication.  I had mistakenly told Sue that 
the incident occurred in the prior week, rather than two weeks prior while she 
was gone.  But suppose for a moment that there had not been a 
misunderstanding of this sort.  It would have been hard to make much sense 
of her comment.  If she had been aware of the facts, and yet she still thought 
that I ought to have had her take care of Madison, then she would seem to be 
committed to the idea that although it was impossible8 for me to take my dog 
to her, I should have done so anyway.  This is an idea that strikes me as 
                                                
8  I am employing a non-technical sense of “impossible” for now.  Presumably there 
was nothing logically or metaphysically impossible about me taking Madison to see Sue.  In 
fact, it may have been merely impractical or self-defeating to try.  But let’s suppose that Sue 
was at an exclusive resort on a distant island country; that all affordable means of travel were 
sold out; and that I would not have been permitted to bring my dog into the country or into the 
resort where Sue was staying.  
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obviously false, so obviously false that it must reflect confusion about what it 
means to say someone ought to do something.  What sense is there in saying 
that a person ought to pursue some course of action that is not open to them? 
  I am inclined to see this example as an instance of a relationship 
gestured at by the phrase, “‘ought’ implies ‘can’.”  Certainly, this example 
alone does not prove that “ought” implies “can.”  But it does suggest that some 
forms of impossibility, or some kinds of obstacles to performing an action, 
make it false to say that an agent ought to perform that action.  Moreover, 
insofar as Sue’s claim would involve confusion about what it means to say that 
someone should have done something, it suggests that there is a conceptual 
relationship between some “should” or “ought” claims and some claims about 
what is possible.  It seems that, at least sometimes, what we ought to do 
depends on what we can do.   
At the same time, there are significant problems for any simple 
understanding of the principle that “ought” implies “can.”  As will be discussed 
below, there are a variety of counterexamples to the broader formulations of 
the principle.  In addition, when broadly stated, the principle seems to support 
an argument that would systematically undermine the truth of a huge class of 
common sense normative claims.  I will discuss these problems in depth 
throughout this Chapter, and I will defend a version of the principle that avoids 
them while capturing common sense intuitions like those that drive my 
example here.  
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II.   The Argument from Determinism: 
There is a simple argument that shows the importance of developing a 
proper understanding of the relationship between “ought” and “can.”  
According to this argument the truth of both determinism and the principle that 
“ought” implies “can” would make false a great number of highly plausible 
moral claims.  For now, take determinism to be the thesis that, at any point in 
time, only one course of events from that time forward is consistent with the 
laws of nature conjoined with a complete description of the state of the world 
at that time.  The argument can be put in the following way: 
1) If determinism is true (and people cannot 
change the laws of nature, and people cannot 
change the past in any significant way), then no 
person can ever do anything other than what he 
or she actually does. 
2) If a person ought to do something, then she can 
do that thing.  
3) So, if determinism is true, then it is never the 
case that a person ought to do something other 
than what she, in fact, does.9 
                                                
9  Something roughly like this argument has appeared in print a number of times, and 
a number of philosophers have endorsed versions of the reasoning it represents.  For 
example, both C.D. Broad and Ishtiyaque Haji seem to be committed to arguments of roughly 
this form.  In “Determinism, Indeterminism, and Libertarianism” (Broad (1952)), Broad 
endorses the idea that “ought” implies “can,” and uses it to argue that many moral “ought” 
claims are incompatible with determinism. Focusing on claims like “You did A, but you 
(morally) ought to have done not-A,” Broad argues that for such claims to be true, it must be 
the case that the agent was capable of doing not-A in a sense that is incompatible with being 
physically determined to do A.  So, though he never puts the argument in precisely the form I 
do, he seems to be committed to each of its premises, and its conclusion.   
Haji (1999) argues for a stronger conclusion than the one I am considering.  He 
believes that all moral ought claims, whether about actions one actually performs or not, are 
incompatible with determinism.  He endorses the following principle:  An agent has a moral 
obligation not to perform an action, only if she can refrain from performing it.  Haji (1999) 
p.183.  And he believes that if determinism is true and one does X then one cannot refrain 
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The argument appears to show that determinism is incompatible with a great 
number of claims that strike most of us as obviously true.  According to this 
argument, if determinism is true then it would never be true to say, “You really 
shouldn’t have lied to her like you did.”  It would never be true to say that a 
person who committed a heinous crime should have done otherwise.  And of 
course, if this argument stands, then the truth of determinism would falsify the 
overwhelmingly plausible claim that Nazis should not have run concentration 
camps.  This is an extraordinary and, at least to my mind, unacceptable 
conclusion.  So, I shall be assessing the idea that “ought” implies “can” with 
this argument in mind and with the aim of showing that its conclusion can be 
                                                                                                                                       
from doing X in the relevant sense.  Haji (1999) p.188.  So, he is committed to the conclusion 
that if determinism is true and an agent does X, then it is not true that she ought to have 
refrained from doing X.    
Paul Saka and Derk Pereboom also seem committed to the validity, if not the 
soundness, of something quite like this argument. Saka (2000) offers a modal-epistemic 
version of the argument above, but he uses it as a reductio of the principle that “ought” implies 
“can.”  While his argument differs from the one above, it requires that determinism and “‘ought’ 
implies ‘can’” entail the conclusion above. Pereboom (2001) discusses Haji’s argument from 
determinism and “‘ought’ implies ‘can.’”  There, he accepts the idea that determinism and 
“‘ought’ implies ‘can’” would undermine all sorts of central moral ought claims.  He discusses, 
but does not fully recommend the option of denying “‘ought’ implies ‘can.’”  Pereboom (2001) 
pp.147-48.  Instead, he seems to believe that he can regard these “ought” claims as false, 
while attempting to preserve the truth of judgments about goodness and badness, rightness 
and wrongness.  See Pereboom (1997).  It seems to me that “ought” claims and judgments 
involving other moral terms like “good,” “bad,” “right,” and “wrong” are too closely linked to be 
separable in this way, but that is a topic I cannot fully address here.   
Finally, there are others who do not state a clear argument, but who seem to take it as 
obvious that determinism would undermine moral ought claims.  In the first Critique, using 
“nature” to mean a specifically deterministic conception of the world, Kant says:  “indeed, the 
ought, if one has merely the course of nature before one’s eyes, has no significance 
whatsoever.”  Kant (1781/1787) at A547/B575.  According to Kant, “ought” claims do not apply 
to anything that is simply a part of a deterministic world.  This claim is certainly too strong.  We 
make perfectly sensible “ought” claims about all sorts of inanimate and apparently 
mechanistically determined objects (e.g., “The battery is charged, so the car ought to start”).  
The claim is a bit more plausible when restricted to what I describe below as “normative 
ought” claims, and I suspect that this is closer to what Kant had in mind.      
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avoided.10   
In what sense are these conclusions unacceptable?  I am confident not 
simply that the threatened moral claims are true, but that they are true whether 
or not determinism is true.  Whether or not we live in a deterministic world, the 
Nazis should not have run concentration camps.  And whether or not we live in 
a deterministic world, I should not have eaten so much last night.  For all I 
know, the world is deterministic, and I can imagine learning that scientists and 
philosophers have settled with near certainty that the universe is deterministic.  
But I cannot imagine that this should lead me to give up these normative 
beliefs.  Determinism or not, I simply cannot be persuaded that there is 
nothing I should have done differently.11  As a result, it will not do to protect 
claims about what people should have done by simply insisting that 
determinism must be false.  To defend these views, I believe it needs to be 
shown that the truth of determinism is not a threat to the “ought” claims we 
                                                
10  The argument from determinism sketched above also poses a significant problem 
for some of the claims made by those concerned about the relationship between determinism 
and moral responsibility.  Compatibilists and incompatibilists about determinism and moral 
responsibility often have views about how we ought to treat those who violate apparent moral 
(and legal and societal) norms if determinism is true.  For example, some incompatibilists are 
moved by the intuition that it is wrong to blame or to punish someone who could not have 
done otherwise.  But if the argument above is correct, and if determinism is true, then the 
incompatibilist cannot truly say that we should not have imprisoned or executed criminals, or 
that we should not have blamed people.  For if determinism is true, then we are or have been 
causally determined to blame and punish.  We were unable to do anything else.  And so, 
because “ought” implies “can,” it would be false to say that we morally ought to do something 
other than blame and punish.  There may well be other things that the incompatibilist might be 
able to say:  that those people do not deserve blame or punishment, for example.  But 
strangely this would not mean that we should have done anything differently.  Therefore, the 
argument I have presented should be of considerable interest to those interested in the 
connection between determinism and moral responsibility. 
11 Admittedly, this may not be an argument that these claims must be true, but it is at 
least a good reason for seeking to defend and explain them. 
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normally take to be true.   
In order to show this, we need to get clearer about the relationship 
between determinism and “can” and the relationship between “ought” and 
“can.”  As I shall argue here, there is a sense in which “ought” implies “can,” 
and there is a sense in which determinism implies “cannot,” but these are not 
the same senses of “can.”  This means that there is a reading of the argument 
from determinism on which this argument is valid, and there is a reading on 
which its premises are true.  But there is no reading on which it is sound.  In 
order to show this, I shall start with a quick clarification of the sense in which 
determinism makes it impossible for us to do otherwise.  I shall then turn to a 
longer investigation of the sense in which “ought” implies “can.”  
III.   How Determinism Limits What We Can Do: 
 Some may think that they can avoid the conclusion of the argument 
from determinism by rejecting the first premise, the idea that determinism 
makes it impossible for us to do anything other than what we actually do.  So, 
let’s briefly consider that first premise before turning our focus back to “ought” 
and “can.” 
According to the first premise, if determinism is true, then no person 
can do anything other than what she actually does.  Though true, this claim is 
sure to have some compatibilists balking.  Compatibilists, who believe that free 
action is compatible with determinism, often insist that even if a person were 
determined to act in a particular way, it may still be the case that she could do 
otherwise.  Incompatibilists, on the other hand, often insist that determinism is 
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incompatible with freedom because if a person were determined to act in 
particular way, then she could not do otherwise.  So, the compatibilist might 
complain that the argument from determinism depends on the controversial 
and unsupported assumption of an incompatibilist understanding of what it 
means to say that an agent can do otherwise. 
This compatibilist objection should be set aside.  The disagreement 
between compatibilists and incompatibilists is difficult to put to rest, in large 
part because both of their claims about the ability to do otherwise are true.  If a 
person were determined to act in a particular way, then it is true that she 
cannot do otherwise, but it can also be true to say that she can do otherwise.  
While this may sound paradoxical, it is a simple and acceptable consequence 
of the fact that terms like “can” and “cannot” can be used with differing 
degrees of stringency.  Thus, we can make the following, perfectly sensible 
statement:  “Well, I can, and I can’t.”  Compatibilists and incompatibilists make 
little progress by bickering about whether or not a person could do X in spite of 
the fact that she is determined to do not-X.  To make progress, they need to 
settle the issue of which sense of “can do otherwise” is relevant to free action.  
Similarly, what we need to do is carefully identify the sense in which it is true 
to say that a person in a deterministic world cannot do anything other than 
what she actually does.  Once we do this, compatibilists and incompatibilists 
alike should see that they can agree with premise 1 of the argument above.   
 The fact that “can” can be used with varying standards of stringency 
has been widely recognized.  David Lewis’s suggestion of a contextualist 
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account of “can” has had a lot to do with this.  Lewis briefly describes and 
makes a case for his view in the following passage: 
To say that something can happen means that its 
happening is compossible with certain facts.  
Which facts?  That is determined, but sometimes 
not determined well enough, by context.  An ape 
can’t speak a human language—say, Finnish—but 
I can.  Facts about the anatomy and operation of 
the ape’s larynx and nervous system are not 
compossible with his speaking Finnish. The 
corresponding facts about my larynx and nervous 
system are compossible with my speaking Finnish.  
But don’t take me along to Helsinki as your 
interpreter:  I can’t speak Finnish.  My speaking 
Finnish is compossible with the facts considered so 
far, but not with further facts about my lack of 
training.  What I can do, relative to one set facts, I 
cannot do, relative to another, more inclusive set.  
Whenever the context leaves it open which facts 
are to count as relevant, it is possible to equivocate 
about whether I can speak Finnish.12   
According to Lewis, then, when we say that an agent can do something we are 
saying that his doing that thing is compatible with a certain set of facts.  The 
precise significance, and the truth value, of a claim that an agent can do 
something will depend crucially on something typically left implicit, the set of 
facts with which the agent’s acting is being said to be compatible.  Lewis’s 
view is “contexualist” because he believes that the meaning of “can” on its own 
does not determine which set of facts is relevant, and instead, the relevant set 
is determined by the “context.”  So, for example, if we have been focused on 
discussing people’s basic athletic abilities, it might be true to say that Jane can 
outrun Rita.  But if someone takes note of the fact that Jane is wearing heavy 
                                                
12  Lewis (1976) p. 77. 
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boots and Rita is wearing track shoes, the context may make it false to say 
that Jane can outrun Rita. 
 We should separate two aspects of Lewis’s view.  First, Lewis suggests 
that to say that something can happen is to say that its happening is 
compatible with some set of facts and that which sorts of facts make up the 
relevant set may vary from one use of “can” to another.  That is to say that 
different uses of “can” share a common semantic element; they all express the 
idea of compatibility with a set of facts.  At the same time, this shared element 
does not provide the complete significance of a particular use of “can.”  The 
significance of “can” will vary from one use to another as the set of relevant 
facts varies.  The second element of Lewis’s view is that it is the “context” that 
determines the precise significance of “can.”  It does so by determining which 
set of facts is relevant.  The first element of Lewis’s view is that there is limited 
variation in the significance of “can.”  The second element is that it is context 
that determines the precise significance within that range.   
 It appears that these two elements of Lewis’s view can be evaluated 
separately.  One could believe that Lewis is right about the significance of 
“can” and its variability, while believing that he is wrong that context 
determines the precise significance of a particular use of “can.”  Of course, 
one could rule out this possibility by making the second element of Lewis’s 
view a definitional truth, i.e., by claiming that “contexts” consist of “whatever 
facts determine the precise significance of a use of the word ‘can’.”  But this is 
not an entirely natural suggestion.  Provided that one does not take this line, 
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then one might agree that “can” claims generally express compatibility with 
some set of relevant facts, but think that which set of relevant facts might be 
determined by something not naturally, or most usefully, described as the 
“context” of that use of “can.”   
 I point this out not to begin a discussion about the nature and 
plausibility of contextualism as a theory of what fills out the meaning of a given 
use of “can.”  Instead, my goal is to avoid this issue.  Discussion of what 
constitutes a “context” and how context determines the significance of a 
particular use of “can” would take us too far astray.  My point here is that we 
may accept Lewis’s views that “can” expresses compatibility with a set of facts 
and that the relevant set of facts may be different from one utterance to the 
next, but that need not commit us to any particular view about how, in general, 
the relevant set of facts is fixed.  A general theory of how the relevant set of 
facts is fixed is not necessary for our purposes.  Thus, I will feel free to speak 
of their being different senses of “can,” without meaning to suggest that this is 
Lewis’s view and without meaning to commit myself to any technical theory 
about meaning or “senses.”  
I take the first aspect of Lewis’s view about the meaning of “can” to be 
quite plausible.  His own examples seem to me to do a good job of supporting 
his view, but let me add another.  Suppose that a student is hired as a part 
time assistant to the administrators of a university department.  Imagine that 
his job provides him with access to the student records and grades on the 
university database.  So, it is possible for him to alter the grades, though it is 
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also fairly likely that if he does this he will be caught and subject to harsh 
sanctions.  Suppose that he tells a friend about the opportunity that this job 
presents him, not because he actually wants to take advantage of it, but just 
because the idea of it is novel.  Perhaps though, the friend asks him to change 
her grades.  He might naturally say, “I can’t do that.”  When she complains, 
“You just said you could,” he might reply, “Well, I can, and I can’t.”   
Lewis’s description of the significance of “can” does an elegant job of 
explaining this response.  The student can change the grades in the sense 
that his doing so is compatible with the facts about his access to the database.  
But the student cannot change the grades in the sense that doing so is 
incompatible with the facts about the consequences of getting caught, his 
interest in avoiding those consequences, and (we may hopefully add) his 
commitment to live up to the trust put in him and uphold academic integrity. 
 So, let us take it as established that “can” may be used with different, 
but very closely related senses.  In general, as Lewis suggests, phrases like 
“A can X” can be understood as saying that A’s X-ing is compatible with 
certain facts.13  Which facts are relevant depends on the sense and stringency 
with which “can” is used.  So, in which sense of “can” is it true that 
                                                
13  It is worth noting that this rough explanation of the meaning of “can” works not only 
when “can” is used to express what is possible, but also when it is used to express what is 
permissible.  “Can” may be used to say that something is or is permissible according to some 
set of norms or rules, as in “You cannot treat people that way.”  When it is used in this way, 
“can” expresses the compatibility of a certain event with what is required by moral norms (or 
whichever set of norms is at issue).  If one believes that these are not facts strictly speaking, 
then we might preserve the core of Lewis’s suggestion about the semantics of “can” by 
replacing his use of “facts” with “facts and apparently fact-like things that make up the content 
of morality, etiquette, rationality, etc.”  
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determinism limits what we can do? 
If determinism is true, then a thorough description of the state of the 
world at any point prior to our actions, together with the laws of nature, entails 
a precise description of what we will do.14  So, taking the distant past to be 
fixed, if determinism is true, then one would have to break the laws of nature in 
order to do anything other than what she will in fact do.  So, if determinism is 
true, then one is unable to do anything but what one actually does in the 
sense that, given our history, doing anything other than what one actually 
does would be inconsistent with the laws of nature.  In other words, if 
determinism is true, then it is nomologically impossible to do anything other 
than what one does, given the state of the world at any point prior to one’s 
action. 
It is important to see that the sense in which one cannot do anything but 
what one actually does is not that of metaphysical impossibility.  It is weaker 
than metaphysical impossibility in two ways.  First, what I am calling 
“nomological impossibility” may be different than metaphysical impossibility.  A 
                                                
14  There are, of course, some sticky issues that I am passing over quite quickly here.  
A thorough discussion would need to tell us more about what counts as a “thorough 
description of the state of the world at a time.”  We mean to say that the arrangement of the 
world at a given time together with the laws of nature determine what will happen in the future.  
They determine what will happen through the progression of causally linked events.  But if our 
description of the state of the world at a given time is too inclusive it may trivially entail what 
will happen in the future.  For example, if a description of the world at time includes 
descriptions of the temporal relations of objects to future objects and events (e.g., “At time t, 
there is a dog at location l, that is one minute away from falling asleep.”) then the descriptions 
of the state of the world will, by themselves, entail what will happen at later times.  We must 
suppose that the descriptions of the state of the world do not include these temporal relations. 
Saying more specifically what these descriptions of the state of the world would be like is a 
task that would take us too far astray.  For some further discussion of this issue, see Van 
Inwagen (1983) pp.59-60. 
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state of affairs or event occurrence is nomologically impossible, if it is not a 
constituent of any possible world with the same natural laws as the actual 
world.  So, in considering whether something is nomologically possible or 
impossible by thinking in terms of possible worlds, we consider only the 
possible worlds with the same laws of nature.  Those worlds may or may not 
make up only a proper subset of all of the possible worlds, depending on 
whether or not there are possible worlds with different laws. 
Second, the truth of determinism makes certain actions nomologically 
impossible only relative to the causally relevant features of our history.  
Determinism limits a person to what she actually does through a combination 
of the laws of nature and the relevant background conditions.  For example, it 
is not nomologically impossible for me to long jump 20 feet.  It seems that 
there is a possible world with our laws in which I jump 20 feet.  That world is 
one in which I have developed a good deal more of the right sorts of muscle 
than I actually have.  So, determinism would not threaten the nomological 
possibility of my jumping 20 feet.  Nonetheless, if determinism is true it may be 
nomologically impossible for me to jump 20 feet in any world with a history 
quite like our own.  In any actual situation in which I might attempt a long jump, 
my actual speed, strength, and size will be causally relevant to the results of 
my attempt.  Given the history that has led to these causally relevant features 
and given gravity as it actually is, if I attempt to jump, I will not jump 20 feet.  
So, when we say that determinism makes it impossible for me to do 
anything other than what I actually do, or when we say that I cannot, because 
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of determinism, do otherwise, we are saying that my doing otherwise is 
incompatible with the laws of nature taken together with all of the causally 
relevant facts about the past.  The sense of “cannot,” then, in the first premise 
of the argument is a sense expressing this sort of incompatibility.  The 
argument would involve no equivocation and would clearly be valid if the 
sense of “can” in “‘ought’ implies ‘can’” expresses compatibility with this same 
set of facts.  That is, the argument would be valid if premise two says that if a 
person ought to do something in a given situation, then she can do it in the 
sense that performing that action is compatible with the laws of nature and the 
causally relevant features of the past.  As we turn to an examination of the 
relationship between “ought” and “can,” we will see whether any such premise 
is plausible. 
IV.   Some Objections to “‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’”: 
 In what sense, if any, does “ought” imply “can”?  We will need to 
determine which uses of “ought” imply which uses of “can,” and we will want to 
know why.  Let us start that investigation by looking at a criticism of the idea 
that there is a logical or conceptual relationship between “ought” claims and 
“can” claims.  If it were successful, this criticism would allow us to avoid the 
argument from determinism by rejecting Premise 2.   
  Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has argued that “if ‘ought’ entailed ‘can’, an 
agent could escape having to do something simply by making himself unable 
 27 
to do it.”15  Suppose that I could do 20 pull-ups, if I trained steadily for 3 
months.  Suppose also that through some strange set of circumstances, it 
becomes the case that I ought to do 20 pull-ups on date D (3 months from 
today).  This “ought” claim is compatible with any common sense 
understanding of “‘ought’ implies ‘can’.”  But if “ought” does imply “can,” then it 
looks like it becomes false that I ought to do 20 pull-ups on D at the moment I 
no longer have enough time to get in shape.  If I simply decide I prefer a 
regimen of fatty snacks, reality TV, and heavy drinking, I will not be able to do 
20 pull-ups when the time comes.  In that case, it would literally take a miracle 
for my puny arms to lift my flabby body off the ground.  So, the supporter of 
“‘ought’ implies ‘can’” seems committed to saying, at the moment I stray too far 
from my training regimen, that it is no longer the case that I ought to do the 
pull-ups.   
One worry that this sort of case brings out is that this would make it too 
easy for us to get out of what we ought to do.  Sinnott-Armstrong worries that I 
can escape my duty by simply getting myself into a position where I could not 
possibly get into shape in time.16  I agree that this consequence would be 
intolerable.  Surely one cannot “escape” a duty by purposefully, or negligently, 
making oneself unable to fulfill it.  If this were actually a consequence, then 
any moral philosopher appealing to “‘ought’ implies ‘can’” would have made a 
terrible mistake.   But “‘ought’ implies ‘can’” does not have this consequence.  
                                                
15  Sinnott-Armstrong (1984) p.252. 
16  Id. 
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If “ought” implies “can,” it may well be false that I ought to X once I get into a 
position in which I cannot X, but that hardly shows I have “escaped” my duties 
in any morally significant sense.   
  To see why this is, consider Sinnott-Armstrong’s example: 
Suppose Adams promises at noon to meet Brown 
at 6:00 p.m. but then goes to a movie at 5:00 p.m.  
Adams knows that, if he goes to the movie, he will 
not be able to meet Brown on time.  But he goes 
anyway, simply because he wants to see the 
movie.  The theater is 65 minutes away from the 
meeting place, so by 5:00 it is too late for Adams to 
keep his promise.  Consequently, if ‘ought’ entailed 
‘can’, it would not be true at 5:00 that Adams ought 
to meet Brown.  Similarly, if Adams is still at the 
theater at 6:00, he cannot then meet Brown on 
time.  Consequently, if ‘ought’ entailed ‘can’, it 
would not be true at 6:00 that Adams ought to meet 
Brown.17 
Everything Sinnott-Armstrong says here is correct, but it is also 
unproblematic for the idea that “ought” implies “can.”  It does not show that 
Adams has somehow “escaped” his obligation, at least, not if “escape” means 
to have removed the obligation and responsibility for failing to meet it.  In the 
example, Adams had promised to meet Brown, and at that time he ought to 
fulfill his promise.  But in order to satisfy his whim, Adams makes it the case 
that he cannot meet Brown.  Suppose that “ought” does imply “can.”  Once it is 
5 p.m. and Adams can no longer fulfill his obligation to meet Brown, the claim 
that he ought to meet Brown becomes false.  This fact would be odd if it meant 
that Adams had somehow relieved himself of responsibility.  But nothing of the 
                                                
17  Id. 
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sort follows.  It is unstated in the example, but certainly true, that Adams ought 
not go to the theater.  So, it is still perfectly true, at 5 p.m., that Adams ought to 
have done what was compatible with meeting Brown, and at 6 p.m., it is also 
perfectly true that Adams ought to have met Brown.  So, we should maintain 
throughout that Adams had an obligation that he failed to satisfy, and that he 
is, all other things being equal, blameworthy for this failure.  In short, holding 
that “ought” implies “can” does not force one to think that a person can, in any 
significant sense, “escape” obligations simply by making himself unable to 
perform them. 
But we may not yet have avoided what is most problematic about cases 
of self-imposed impossibility.  Sinnott-Armstrong has a linguistic argument, as 
well as a moral argument.  As Sinnott-Armstrong goes on to point out, 
someone holding that “ought” implies “can” may have to deny a number of 
very intuitive “ought” claims that could be made in a case like the one above.  
He writes: 
If Adams calls Brown from the theater at 6:00, it 
would be natural for Brown to say, “Where are 
you? You ought to be here (by now),” even though 
Brown knows that Adams cannot be there.  
Brown’s statement seems true, because Adams did 
promise, the appointment was never mutually 
cancelled, and the obligation is not overridden.  
Thus, there is no reason to deny Brown’s 
statement except to save the claim that ‘ought’ 
entails ‘can’, and that reason would beg the 
question.  Furthermore, if Adams calls at 5:00 and 
tells Brown that he is at the theater, Brown might 
respond, “Why haven’t you left yet? You ought to 
meet me in an hour, and it takes more than an hour 
to get here from the theater.” Again, Brown’s 
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statement seems natural and true.18 
In this passage, Sinnott-Armstrong shows that it is sometimes natural to say 
that something ought to be the case even though it has become impossible for 
a person to make that thing happen.  Adams ought to be at his meeting as 
promised, but it has become impossible for him to be there.  So, Sinnott-
Armstrong feels that he has a counterexample to the idea that “ought” implies 
“can.” 
People often object to the idea that “ought” implies “can” by finding 
some “ought” claim that seems to be true and showing that if we replace 
“ought” with “can” we get an intuitively false claim.  They suppose that if 
“ought” implies “can”, than every claim involving the word “ought” implies a quit 
similar claim with the “ought” replaced by “can.”  As we have just seen, it is not 
difficult to come up with counterexamples if one takes this broad formulation of 
“‘ought’ implies ‘can’.”  But we have not yet committed ourselves to any 
specification of the general idea that “ought” implies “can.”  So, when 
confronted with these counterexamples, we must ask whether they show that 
we were wrong to think that “ought” implies “can” or, instead, that “‘ought’ 
implies ‘can’” should be more carefully stated as the principle that certain kinds 
of “ought” claims imply certain kinds of “can” claims.  Here at least, I believe 
that the latter is the case.     
Let me make clear what I have in mind.  I have just suggested one not 
too subtle understanding of the phrase “‘ought’ implies ‘can.’”  On this 
                                                
18  Id. 
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understanding, which I shall call the Broad Formulation, the phrase is taken to 
mean that any sentence using the term “ought” as a predicate implies a similar 
sentence with the word “can” replacing the word “ought.”19  So, from “I ought 
to keep working,” we may infer “I can keep working.”  From “I ought to be on a 
sandy beach with a drink in my hand,” we may infer that “I can be on a sandy 
beach with a drink in my hand.”  And also, from “there ought to be a law 
against that,” we may infer “there can be a law against that.”  Contrast this 
Broad Formulation with the second premise of the argument from 
determinism.  That premise reads:  If a person ought to do something, then he 
or she can do that thing.  Premise 2 differs from the Broad Formulation 
because it concerns “ought” only when it is used to connect agents and ways 
of acting.  It concerns the implications of saying that an agent ought to do 
something.   
There are all sorts of uses of “ought” that do not say that an agent 
ought to do something:   there ought to be food on every plate; there ought to 
be more love in the world; you ought to be home by now.  These “ought” 
claims are relevant to the issue of how agents ought to act, but typically it 
takes more information to get from these claims to any informative claims 
concerning the courses of action that agents ought to pursue.  There ought to 
be more love in the world, but that does not entail that I ought to do anything in 
particular to bring about more love.  Perhaps there are other things that it is 
                                                
19  To reiterate:  According to the Broad Formulation, “Blah blah ought yada yada” 
entails “Blah blah can yada yada” no matter what we substitute for “blah blah” and “yada 
yada.”    
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more important for me to focus on.  Or it may be that I ought to be somewhere 
else, supporting a friend say, but if I cannot get there in time, nothing follows 
about what I ought to do.  Perhaps I should try to be there as soon as I can.  
Perhaps I should simply stay put and call instead.  So, though Premise 2 
expresses a relationship between some “ought” claims and some “can” claims, 
it does not commit us to a view about the implications of all “ought” claims.20   
We have two formulations of the principle that “ought” implies “can,” the 
Broad Formulation and Premise 2.  Of course, we might come up with others, 
but these two are enough to allow us to evaluate Sinnott-Armstrong’s 
counterexamples.  There are two “ought” claims that Sinnott-Armstrong sees 
as problematic here:  “You [i.e., Adams] ought to be here (by now),” and “You 
[i.e., Adams] ought to meet me [i.e., Brown] in an hour.”  Each of these claims 
strikes Sinnott-Armstrong as natural and true, though Adams cannot be there 
and cannot meet Brown (on a common sense interpretation of “can”).  Indeed, 
Sinnott-Armstrong suggests that the only reason we would have for denying 
these “ought” claims is the question-begging reason of trying to uphold the 
idea that “ought” entails “can.”21   
First, consider the claim that Adams ought to be there, at the agreed 
meeting place, now.  This claim does strike me as undeniable.  He promised 
to be there.  Nothing overrode or dissolved this commitment.  So, he ought to 
                                                
20  The relationship between claims about what ought to be the case and claims about 
what agents ought to do is discussed in greater depth in the next section of this Chapter. 
21  Sinnott-Armstrong (1984) p.252 
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be there.  In addition, let us grant that it is also true, at the same time, that he 
cannot be there.  While we should grant all of this, we should also be clear that 
nothing follows about what Adams should do now.  Perhaps he ought to make 
an attempt to get there as soon as possible.  But if Brown is not willing or able 
to wait, then this attempt would be pointless.  So, it is just as likely that he 
ought to apologize and set up a new meeting time.  What he ought to do 
depends on facts that Sinnott-Armstrong never even considers.  In any case, 
whatever it is that he ought to do, we have no reason to think that it is 
something he cannot do.  So, while Sinnott-Armstrong might have identified a 
counterexample to the Broad Formulation, it is not a counterexample to 
Premise 2, the principle that if an agent ought to do something, then he or she 
can do that thing. 
Consider the second problematic claim, the claim that Adams ought to 
meet Brown.  This one is not so clear-cut.  Meeting someone is something that 
an agent might do.  “I am meeting a friend” is a perfectly good answer to the 
question, “What are you going to do tonight?”  So, if Sinnott-Armstrong is right 
about the claim that Adams ought to meet Brown, then we may have a 
counterexample not just to the Broad Formulation, but also to the narrower 
Premise 2.  However, it is not so clear that Sinnott-Armstrong is right.  Premise 
2 is a principle concerning what an agent ought to do, a principle concerning 
which courses of action he ought to pursue.  It concerns claims that are 
potential answers to the question, “What should this agent do?”  While I do not 
find it absurd or unnatural to say that Adams ought to meet Brown in the 
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conversation that Sinnott-Armstrong describes, I do find it to be an 
inappropriate answer to the question, “What should Adams do?”  As noted 
above, it looks like Adams should go meet Brown, only if, among other things, 
doing so is still possible for Adams and desirable for Brown.  Otherwise, going 
to the meeting place would be a waste of time, and Adams ought to apologize 
and the two should determine how best to proceed.  So, as an answer to the 
question, “What should Adams do?”, the truth of the suggestion that Adams 
ought to meet Brown does depend on whether or not Adams can meet Brown.   
I am conceding that it might be conversationally acceptable to say that 
Adams ought to meet Brown, even though Adams cannot meet Brown.  But I 
insist that that statement is false if it is meant to say what course of action 
Adams ought to pursue.  It might be conversationally acceptable simply 
because it is close enough to expressing a true statement like “You [Adams] 
ought to be meeting me [Brown]” or “You were supposed to meet me” or, of 
course, “You ought to have met me.”  These claims all can be true without 
violating Premise 2, even though it has become impossible for Adams to make 
it to his meeting.  
In sum, Sinnott-Armstrong’s examples do not convince.  This 
relationship between “ought” and “can” does not make it possible for agents to 
escape their duties.  And the counterexamples we have looked at do not work.  
One is unconvincing in general, and the other is a counterexample only to the 
Broad Formulation of the principle.   
Limiting the principle to “ought to do” claims also disarms a separate 
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objection:  that we often ought to feel a certain way or ought to believe 
something even if we cannot.  We do not have the same control over our 
feelings that we suppose we have over our actions.  We may feel jealous of a 
person even though we know we should like him.  In the short term, we may 
not be able to prevent these feelings of jealousy from arising even though we 
should not feel them.  We might also find it difficult to rid ourselves of beliefs or 
prejudices even after we have come to recognize that we should not hold 
them.  These are not counterexamples to the principle that if a person ought to 
do something, then the person can do that thing.  If we feel something that we 
should not feel, or if we hold a belief that we should not hold, then we ought to 
do what we can to change those feelings or beliefs.  This may mean not acting 
on those beliefs or feelings, and it may mean taking steps that will gradually 
result in change.  None of this is inconsistent with the principle that we ought 
to do only what we can. 
Of course, it is one thing to note that we can avoid counterexamples to 
“‘ought’ implies ‘can’” by adopting a limited version of the principle.  It is 
another thing to explain why this more limited version makes sense.  Sinnott-
Armstrong’s counterexample does provide us with a challenge.  We must be 
able to provide a clear account of the distinction between different kinds of 
“ought” claims, and we must be able to explain why one kind implies “can,” 
while others do not. 
V. The Many Ways of Using “Ought”: 
 This section takes up the challenge of explaining which “ought” claims 
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imply “can” and why.  A number of philosophers have attempted to distinguish 
the uses of “ought” that imply “can” from the uses that do not by identifying 
different “senses” of “ought.”  If “ought” has what philosophers like to call 
different “senses,” then this may provide the explanation of why different 
“ought” claims have different logical relations to claims about what is possible.   
But the suggestion that “ought” has distinct senses can lead us to 
underemphasize the common semantic contribution made by all uses of 
“ought.”  In general, we use “ought” to say that an event, action or state of 
affairs is favored or supported by some set of relevant facts and 
considerations.  Earlier, we saw that, though the significance of saying that 
something can be the case may vary, “can” has a common core meaning or 
function across its various uses.  The same is true of “ought.”  When we use 
“ought,” we make reference (often implicitly) to some set of considerations, 
and we say that those considerations support the event, action or state of 
affairs that we are saying ought to be.  This is true whether we are using 
“ought” to make a claim about how we expect things to actually happen, as in, 
“Because he left an hour ago, John ought to be home by now,” or to make a 
claim about how it would be good for things to happen, as in, “Because he 
promised, John ought to be home by now.”  In both cases, we suggest that 
John’s being home by now is supported or favored by some set of relevant 
considerations.   
 A.  Predictive Oughts and Normative Oughts 
 While suggesting that there is a common, core meaning to the term 
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“ought,” I also suggested in passing that there is a distinction between two 
broad kinds of claims involving “ought.”  Allow me to clarify this distinction.  We 
have theories about how the world or suitably small parts of it tend to work and 
to behave.  These may be theories of the grand scientific sort, or they may just 
be groups of pretty mundane beliefs.  For example, I believe that my coffee 
maker, a filter, coffee grounds, and water combined in a certain way reliably 
lead to a fresh pot of coffee.  (In my house at least, this is the extent of much 
of the theorizing that happens early in the morning.)  We also have theories 
about the way the world, or some suitably small part of it, is arranged at a 
particular time.  For example, I believe that things are combined in the coffee-
making way, i.e., the grounds are in the filter, which is in the coffee maker; 
water is in the water chamber; and the power is on.  With some of our uses of 
“ought,” we refer implicitly to these two sorts of considerations, as in:  “There 
ought to be a fresh pot of coffee soon.”  A statement like this is typically meant 
to indicate that our theories about the arrangement and behavior of this part of 
the world support the presence of coffee in the pot.   
 The connection to our theories regarding the arrangement and behavior 
of the world is not always left implicit.  We tend to make the connection explicit 
when things do not go as we expect:  “I put the grounds and the water in 
there, and I turned it on.  So, there ought to be coffee.  Why isn’t this 
working?”  We might also make the connection explicit when we are testing 
the relevant theory or when we are not yet confident in the theory.  For 
example, biologists may say things like:  “According to our model, we ought to 
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find more fish in the colder, shade-covered sections of the stream.”   
 When “ought” is used to express the support of theories intended to 
capture how things actually are and how they actually tend to behave, it is 
used to express a either a prediction or an expectation based on empirical 
evidence.  One mark of this “predictive ought” is that when things do not turn 
out to be as we say they ought to be, this gives us a reason to believe that our 
theories are incomplete or incorrect.  The lack of coffee is a reason for me to 
suppose that things are not arranged as I thought they were or that there is 
some other relevant factor that my theory of coffee maker behavior 
overlooks.22  Or if the biologists just mentioned fail to find more fish in the 
colder parts of the stream, they may scrap their theory altogether or decide 
that it needs to be modified to incorporate some additional variable that also 
affects the distribution of fish populations.  
 Of course, many “ought” claims are not like this.  Many “ought” claims 
are based not on theories that are intended to capture the actual behavior of 
our world, but on theories about what is good or what is right.  They are based 
on our theories about what is moral, rational, or polite, for example.  They can 
also be based on considerations about what is legal or what would comply 
with the rules and goals of a game.  Suppose that I am expecting guests, and I 
                                                
22 It is possible that my expectations of coffee might have a normative element as 
opposed to a predictive element.  I might, for example, feel that there ought to be coffee 
because Sears and/or Mr. Coffee should have sold me a good coffee maker, not one that is 
defective or difficult to operate.  I do not think this must be so, but to avoid confusion, assume 
that I found the coffee maker used and discarded, and that I only believe that it should work 
because, looking it over, I cannot find any significant problem with it.   
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am thinking about what I will need to do to be a good host.  I might say to 
myself, “I ought to provide coffee” or “There ought to be coffee in the morning.”  
I am not making a prediction.  I am not even saying that there is any basis for 
such a prediction.  After all, I might go on:  “But there’s no chance I’m going to 
the store to buy beans tonight.”  All that I am saying is that it would be good, 
considerate, or polite of me to provide coffee.  These “ought” claims express 
the support of my theories about what guests enjoy and about what good 
hosts do.  Good hosts try to meet the reasonable demands of their guests, and 
coffee is a likely and reasonable demand of many guests.  So, I conclude that 
I ought to have coffee available.   
Of course, when we use “ought” to express the support of a theory 
about what would be right, good or appropriate, we often find that the world 
does not conform.  People act immorally and irrationally; people break laws 
and flout the rules of games.  In contrast to the “predictive ought” we do not 
take this non-conformity to suggest that the relevant theories are wrong or 
incomplete.  Consider an example.  Suppose that the wealthy ought to do 
more than they actually do to help the poor.  It follows trivially from this that 
things are not as they ought to be.  With the predictive use of “ought,” when 
things are not actually as they ought to be this is a reason to suspect that our 
theories are wrong, but in this case, it is a reason to suppose that people are 
behaving wrongly.  For lack of a better term, I call uses of “ought” that express 
the support of theories about how it would be good or appropriate for things to 
be “normative” uses of “ought.” 
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 When people suggest that “ought” implies “can,” they do not typically 
have the predictive “ought” in mind.  “‘Ought’ implies ‘can’” is typically taken to 
be a principle about either normative “oughts” in general or some sub-category 
thereof.  But I see no reason to suppose that there is no entailment 
relationship between the predictive “ought” and “can.”  In fact, it seems that 
there is a pretty obvious relationship.  When we use “ought” predictively, we 
suggest that certain considerations provide support for the actuality of a 
particular state of affairs.  Of course, if these considerations support that state 
of affairs, then they are also compatible with it.  The facts and considerations 
that support the existence of coffee in the pot are also compatible with 
existence of coffee in the pot.  The “can” claim seems only to be weaker than 
the predictive “ought” claim, and therefore it is entailed by the “ought” claim.23   
 Nonetheless, when people suggest that “ought” implies “can,” they do 
                                                
23  Of course, there are cases in which we want to say that there ought to be coffee in 
the pot, in the sense that we would expect coffee to be there, but nonetheless, there is no 
coffee there.  In this case, we presume that there is an explanation for the lack of coffee, and 
so, we presume that there is some fact that is incompatible with the presence of coffee in the 
pot.  This fact causally explains the absence of coffee.  Once we accept that there is such a 
fact, we can say that there cannot be coffee in the pot; something is preventing it.  In this 
case, it is both true that there ought to be coffee in the pot and that there cannot be coffee in 
the pot.  This can be explained without giving up on the idea that the predictive “ought” implies 
“can.”  In this case, the set of facts relevant to the “ought” claim differs from the set of facts 
relevant to our “can” claim.  When we say that there ought to be coffee in the pot (but there is 
not), we have good reason to believe that our coffee-making theory fails to capture all of the 
coffee-relevant considerations.  Nonetheless, we can say that there ought to be coffee in the 
pot if we mean, “Given what I know about coffee making and the way things are in this kitchen 
(i.e., given my coffee making theories), there ought to be coffee in that pot.”  Once we insist 
that there ought to be coffee, even though there is not, we are implicitly restricting the support 
for the existence of coffee to our admittedly incomplete theory and not to a general and 
accurate description of the facts.  If we keep the focus restricted to that set of considerations, 
then that use of “ought” surely does imply “can.”  The incomplete theory of coffee making 
supports the presence of coffee.  So, surely it is also compatible with the presence of coffee.  
When we say that there cannot be coffee in the pot, something is preventing it from being 
there, we are taking into consideration some facts and considerations that are left out by our 
incomplete coffee-making theory. 
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not generally have in mind the rather boring thought that if a set of empirical 
considerations supports something, then that set is compatible with that thing.  
Instead, they have in mind some form of the rather interesting thought that if a 
thing is supported by a theory of what is right or what is good or what is 
appropriate, then that thing is compatible with the way the world actually is and 
the way it actually operates.  In other words, they mean that a normative 
“ought” implies a predictive “can.”  So, let us now focus our attention on the 
normative “oughts.” 
B. A Supposed Distinction Between Moral and Other Normative 
Oughts 
It is common to distinguish different normative “oughts” based on the 
kinds of evaluative or normative considerations that are salient.  Many 
philosophers distinguish between the “oughts” of morality, prudence and 
etiquette, for example.  The “moral ought” is used when moral considerations 
are relevant, the “prudential ought” is used when prudential considerations are 
relevant, and so on.  While drawing such distinctions may be helpful for some 
purposes, I shall not do so for a couple of reasons.  First, I can give no good 
account of the differences between these different sorts of considerations.  
Surely, we can see that murder is morally wrong, not merely impolite and 
unwise.  Similarly, whether or not to R.S.V.P. does not usually bring up a 
moral issue.  But between these extremes there is a whole set of issues that 
defy easy categorization.  We may cause offense to people in all sorts of 
ways, some of which are merely impolite, others of which are quite seriously 
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disrespectful.  That there would be a clear line dividing the immoral from the 
impolite, rather than a spectrum connecting them, seems implausible to me.  
And of course, the idea of a clear line between the moral and the prudential, 
and between the moral and the rational, is also challenged by a range of rich 
ethical theories.24   
 More importantly, whether an “ought” claim is based on considerations 
of morality, rationality, etiquette, or what have you, does not seem to have a 
significant bearing on that claim’s relations to claims about what is possible.  
The “‘ought’” implies “‘can’” principle is usually discussed as a principle of 
moral philosophy, but this alone is no reason to suppose that its applies only 
to true moral issues.  The example that began this Chapter, involving Sue the 
veterinarian, did not concern a moral issue, but it is as clear an example of 
“ought” implying “can” as any I can think of.  If we want to know what a person 
ought to do, i.e., which actions the balance of evaluative or normative 
considerations weighs in favor of, then it seems that what that person can do 
will be relevant in the same ways, whether the most salient reasons are moral, 
prudential, or whatever else.  So, we should at least start from the assumption 
that, whatever differences there are between moral, rational, and prudential 
considerations, these differences do not affect the relationship between 
“ought” and “can.” 
                                                
24  I have in mind here broadly Aristotelian theories according to which being virtuous 
is part of a flourishing or truly happy human life; rational egoism or Hobbesian theories 
according to which moral and political duties are shown to be a requirement of enlightened 
self-interest; and broadly Kantian theories that suggest that morality is a certain kind of 
rationality.   
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 C. Prima Facie Oughts and All Things Considered Oughts 
 One note of caution is needed here.  When discussing the “predictive 
ought” we saw that we may qualify an “ought” claim by adding (implicitly or 
explicitly) something like “given this model of how things behave” or “given 
what we know about this topic.”  When we qualify a predictive use of “ought” in 
this way, we do not imply that what ought to happen actually can happen, all 
things considered.  We acknowledge that there may be some important, 
relevant considerations that will prevent things from being as we would expect 
them to be.  The same thing may occur with normative “ought” claims.  We 
may say, “According to the rulebook, the referees ought to confer and decide 
who had the best perspective on the play,” or, “Legally speaking, you should 
not have done that.”  When we (implicitly or explicitly) make these sorts of 
qualifications, we are acknowledging that other factors may be relevant to 
what “ought,” in the normative sense, to be the case, all things considered.  It 
may be that, according to the rulebook, the referees ought to confer, but if the 
coliseum is collapsing, then the referees ought, all things considered, to get 
themselves to a safe place, not waste their time conferring about the play.  
Now, when we qualify a normative “ought” claim in the way that I am 
suggesting, that is, when we implicitly or explicitly suggest that we are not 
focusing on all of the relevant normative considerations, then our “ought” claim 
may not imply “can.”  Going back to the referees’ rulebook, it quite likely 
makes no exception for cases in which the referees are bound, gagged and 
thereby unable to confer.  So, at least on one strict reading, it may be true that 
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according to the rulebook, the referees ought to have conferred even though it 
was impossible for them to confer.   
This is not a serious problem for the idea that “ought” implies “can.”  
When we qualify a normative “ought” claim by saying that we are taking only a 
limited range of normative considerations into effect, we are often saying, 
“According to this limited set of considerations, this is what a person ought to 
do, but this may not really be what you ought to do.”  We may also think of 
these qualified “ought” claims as implicitly conditional in form.  “According to 
considerations 1, 2, and 3, agent A ought to X” means “If 1, 2, and 3 were the 
only relevant considerations, then agent A ought to X.”  Of course, conditionals 
like this may be true while it is false that A ought to X.  Once qualified “ought” 
claims are understood in this way, then it is not surprising that they do not 
imply “can.” 
In what follows, I shall focus on “all things considered” normative 
“ought” claims.  When we mean to suggest that the balance of all relevant 
normative considerations supports a certain event, action or state of affairs, 
then it seems to me to make no difference whether the salient considerations 
include the law, morality, prudence, grammar, or anything else of the kind.  If, 
all things considered, a person ought to do something, then it seems intuitive 
that it must be the case that this person can do that thing. 
D. The Ought to Do and the Ought to Be 
 Now we are prepared to turn to the distinction that I relied on in the 
previous section:  the distinction between claims about how agents ought to 
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act and claims about how things ought to be.  I have suggested that it seemed 
intuitive that if an agent ought to do something then that agent can do that 
thing, but that it did not seem intuitive that if things ought to be a certain way, 
then things can be that way.  My aim now is to give a principled explanation of 
this intuition.  
 First, let us rule out a possible misconception.  To say that there is a 
distinction between “ought to do” and “ought to be” could be taken to mean 
that what matters is the wording of such claims.  It could suggest a view along 
the following lines.  Though an “ought to do” claim rarely involves the precise 
phrase “ought to do,” it will contain the phrase “ought to x” where x is replaced 
by some verb connoting action.  An “ought to be” claim, on the other hand, 
contains the phrase “ought to x” where x is replaced by some tense of the verb 
“to be,” or perhaps “to have” or some other suitable verb.  This will not do.  
This difference in wording does not track any real distinction.  One can 
express precisely the same idea with phrases on either side of the distinction 
just described.  Consider “John ought to tell her the truth about X” and “John 
ought to be honest with her about X”; or “The most worthy candidate ought to 
win” and “The most worthy candidate ought to be victorious”; or “Sonia ought 
to judge your case impartially” and “Sonia ought to be impartial in judging your 
case.”  On the suggested account of the distinction the first of each pair is an 
“ought to do” claim, and the second of each pair is an “ought to be” claim.  But 
this is surely wrong.  If we want to think of the distinction as one between 
“ought to be” and “ought to do,” we should not be led into thinking it is a 
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distinction that can be tracked by the wording of “ought” claims.  Instead, we 
should take the distinction between the senses to coincide with the distinction 
between saying, by whatever words, that an agent ought to pursue a course of 
action and saying that the world ought to be a certain way.  
Others have suggested that some such distinction is relevant to the 
“ought” implies “can” principle, and some have at least gestured at rationales 
for this distinction.  For example, G.E. Moore said that the distinction between 
“ought to do” and “ought to be” is closely related to a distinction between “rules 
of duty,” on the one hand, and “ideal” moral rules, on the other. 25  He claims 
that the “ought to do” sense of “ought” is used to express a “rule of duty.”  It is 
used to tell us what people have a duty to do.  The “ought to be” sense of 
“ought” is used to express something more “ideal.”  It tells us how it would be 
good to be, ideally speaking.  Such ideal rules and the related “ought” claims 
do not imply that we have a duty to do something in particular.  Instead, they 
simply say what the ideal is.  It appears that the fact that an “ought to do” 
expresses a “rule of duty” is supposed to figure into the explanation of why an 
“ought to do” implies “can,” though Moore does not explain precisely how.   
Similarly, Michael Zimmerman has claimed that the “ought to do”/“ought 
to be” distinction is best explained in terms of a “binding” and a “non-binding” 
sense of “ought.”26  “Ought”, he has said, is used in its “binding” sense when it 
expresses an obligation.  It is used in its “non-binding” sense when it 
                                                
25  Moore (1922) pp.315-22.  
26  Zimmerman (1996) pp.2-5. 
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expresses the idea that something would be good or ideal, but not that 
someone has an obligation.   
These suggestions do not explain the differing implications of the “ought 
to do” and the “ought to be.”  I am interested in distinguishing the “ought” 
claims to which the “‘ought’ implies ‘can’” principle does apply from those to 
which it does not apply.  But that distinction is not the supposed distinction 
between “duties” and “ideals” or between “binding” and “non-binding” uses of 
“ought.”  Suppose that Maude is generally a very good-natured person.  
However, she has certain pet peeves that can put her into a somewhat foul 
mood.  They do not make her especially mean or nasty, only a bit less kind 
and a bit more easily annoyed than normal.  On the infrequent occasions that 
Maude is affected by her pet peeves, she tends to do a good job of not taking 
this out on undeserving people.  So, on the whole, people who know Maude 
thinks she is a wonderful person, and many of them even strive to emulate 
her.  Perhaps, though, there are certain steps that Maude could take to 
overcome her pet peeves and to become even more consistently kind.  
Suppose that a therapist could help her to be less annoyed by them.  Now, I 
think that it is plausible that Maude morally ought to go see the therapist since 
this would help her to be a more consistently virtuous person, but I suppose 
also that she has no strict obligation or duty to do so.  After all, she is already 
an exceptionally good person, and the therapy, let us suppose, would be 
rather long and difficult work.  So, Maude ought to see the therapist, if she is to 
approach the moral ideal, but she is not blameworthy if she does not.  Now, it 
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is not exactly clear what Moore means by the “ideal” sense of “ought” or what 
Zimmerman means by the “non-binding” sense, and that in itself is a problem.  
But it seems to me that the claim that Maude ought to see the therapist is 
plausibly described as “ideal” and “non-binding.”  This is a problem.  First, it 
looks like “Maude ought to see a therapist” is, on the one hand, “ideal” and 
“non-binding,” and on the other hand, a claim about what Maude “ought to do.”  
Thus, it is not clear that the “ideal”/“rule of duty” distinction, whatever that 
distinction is, lines up with any intuitive notion of the “ought to be”/“ought to do” 
distinction.   
Furthermore, the “ideal” claim that Maude ought to see a therapist does 
imply that Maude can see the therapist, and it seems to do so for quite the 
same reasons that a binding “ought” claim would imply “can.”  After all, 
suppose that Dr. Brown, the only therapist capable of the appropriate 
therapeutic techniques, suddenly retires and refuses to see any more patients.  
At this point, it becomes false to suggest that Maude ought to see Dr. Brown 
(or any other therapist) for treatment.  She cannot see Dr. Brown, or anyone 
else, for treatment.  My intuitions about this do not change whether we take 
the case as it is or whether we imagine that Maude’s problem is more serious, 
giving her a much more serious and binding reason to see the therapist.  
Given that she cannot see a therapist, it makes little sense to suggest that this 
is what she ought to do.  So, the suggestion that the “ought to do” is “binding” 
or related to “rules of duty” does not seem to explain why the “ought to do” 
would imply “can,” and the suggestion that the “ought to be” is “non-binding” or 
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“ideal” does not explain why it does not imply “can.” 
Maude’s case might appear to be contrived, but I suspect that 
something analogous is extremely common.  We often feel that we ought do 
things that we are not strictly obligated to do.  For example, we should support 
our family and friends by attending their significant life events, their 
performances, their parties, etc.  For any such event, it may be true that I 
ought to attend, but that I am not bound or obligated to do so.  I may miss 
some of these events, sometimes because of conflicting obligations, but 
sometimes simply because I am tired and want some time to myself.  
Nonetheless, when I truly cannot attend a particular event, it would be bizarre 
to say that I ought to attend.  Therefore, the supposed distinction between 
“ideal” and “binding” uses of “ought” does not explain a distinction between 
“ought to be” and “ought to do.” 
Gilbert Harman offers a suggestion that provides a better start to 
explaining the difference between the “ought to do” and the “ought to be.”  In 
The Nature of Morality, Harman notes that an “ought to do” implies that an 
agent has a reason to perform an action, whereas an “ought to be” evaluates 
a state of affairs and does not by itself imply that any particular agent has a 
reason to contribute to bringing about that state of affairs.27  This seems to me 
to be a first step towards explaining why “ought to do” implies “can,” while 
“ought to be” does not.  It is intuitive that one does not have reason to perform 
actions that one cannot perform.  So, the claim that an agent ought to do 
                                                
27 Harman (1977) pp.84-87. 
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something expresses the fact that she has a reason to do that thing, and this 
in turn implies that she can do that thing.  In contrast, we can make sense of 
evaluating states of affairs that are, for all practical purposes, impossible.  For 
example, we do say that it would be good if I could be in such and such place 
now, even if I cannot be there now.   
However, things are a bit more complicated than this.  It is not as 
though “ought to be” claims bear no relation to an agent’s reasons for action.  
Claims about what ought to be the case do imply that agents have reasons of 
some sort.  When we say that something ought to be the case, we say that 
normative considerations speak in favor of that thing’s being the case.  In 
other words, we say that it has a certain sort of value.  If a state of affairs has 
value according to the balance of normative considerations, then any agent to 
whom those normative considerations apply has some reason to act in ways 
that respect the value of that state of affairs.28  Often this will make little 
difference to a person’s actual behavior because, for many valuable states of 
affairs, there will be little that the agent could do that would either show 
respect or disrespect for those states of affairs.  But still, the agent has at least 
                                                
28  The phrase “any agent to whom those normative considerations apply” is meant to 
leave open the question of who ought to be moral, rational, etc.  For some sets of normative 
considerations, it may be up to the agent whether or not they are binding on him.  In the 
Kantian terminology that some have adopted, these normative considerations may underwrite 
only “hypothetical imperatives.”  To take an example, though a doubtful one, the fact that 
something would be polite might only be relevant to agents who care about being polite.  
Additionally, an agent’s nature may make it the case that only some normative considerations 
can apply to it.  There are things that non-human animals ought to do, in the normative sense.  
We might quite reasonably say that wild animals ought to do specific things that will help them 
to survive, and that working animals (e.g., herding dogs, work horses, pack mules, etc.) ought 
to perform particular tasks.  But because as far as we know most non-human animals cannot 
grasp and apply ethical principles, moral considerations do not apply to them.   
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some reason to avoid behaviors that would fail to respect the value of a state 
of affairs that ought to be the case.   
So, in order to be careful about the relation between normative “ought” 
claims and reasons for action, we should note that there is a close connection 
not only between reasons and claims about what agents ought to do, but also 
between reasons and claims about what ought to be the case.  Having noted 
this though, we may still maintain that the two relationships are different:  If an 
agent ought to do something, X, then that agent has a reason to do that thing, 
X, but if something, Y, ought to be the case, then agents to whom the relevant 
considerations apply have a reason to act in ways that respect the value of Y.  
Does this difference permit an explanation of why only the “ought to do” 
implies “can”?   I believe it does. 
I suggested above that the relationship between normative “ought” 
claims and reasons for action might explain why the Broad Interpretation is 
false, while Premise 2 is true.  It would help to explain this on the assumption 
that an agent has a reason to do something only if she can do that thing.  Let 
us grant this assumption for a moment.  If an agent ought to do something, 
then that agent has a reason to do that thing, and this in turn implies that that 
agent can do that thing.  On the other hand, if something, Y, ought to be the 
case, then agents to whom the relevant considerations apply have a reason to 
act in ways that respect the value of Y, and this in turn implies that those 
agents can act in ways that respect the value of Y.  Notice though, agents 
might be able to act in ways that respect the value of a certain state of affairs 
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even though that state of affairs is, in some important sense, impossible.  
Recall Adams, who can no longer make his meeting with Brown.  Even after it 
has become impossible for Adams to meet Brown, it ought to be the case that 
Adams meets Brown.  Though the state of affairs in which Adams and Brown 
meet has become impossible, Adams can still act in ways that respect the 
value of keeping his promise to meet.  For example, he can apologize for not 
making the meeting, he can try to make it up to Brown, and he can take his 
appointments more seriously in the future.  As this illustrates, people can act in 
ways that respect the value of states of affairs that intuitively cannot be the 
case, and thus, they can have reason to act in these ways.  So, there is no 
route, via our assumption about reasons for action, from the claim that 
something ought to be the case to the claim that it can be case.  But there 
does seem to be a route, via reasons for action, from the claim that an agent 
ought to act in some particular way to the claim that she can act in that way.  
So, Harman’s suggestion appears to provide one way of explaining why 
“ought to do” claims have a special connection to connection to claims about 
what an agent can do.   
However, the foregoing explanation depends on the assumption that an 
agent can have a reason to do something only if she can do that thing, and we 
might quite reasonably wonder whether or not this is true.  As stated, the 
principle about reasons is subject to an objection.  Surely I can have some 
reason to do something that I cannot do.  I have a friend that I would like to 
visit in California now, so I have a reason to go to California.  This seems true 
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even though my budget and my commitments here in New York make a trip to 
California practically impossible.  I would still have this reason to travel to 
California even if there were a warrant out for my arrest in California, or if I 
were already imprisoned in New York, or if all means of transportation to 
California shut down.  So, it seems that I can have a reason to do something 
that I cannot do. 
But we are entitled to appeal to a more plausible principle about 
“oughts” and reasons.  I am focusing on the implications of all things 
considered normative “ought” claims.  The claim that an agent ought, all things 
considered, to act in a particular way implies more than the claim that the 
agent has a reason to act in that way.  It implies that the agent has most 
reason to do that thing.  And it is more plausible to suggest that what an agent 
has most reason to do could only be something that she can do.  I have a 
reason to go to California, but if there are obstacles that would make it difficult 
or impossible for me to go to California, then it seems to be the case that this 
is not what I have most reason to do.  If it is truly impossible for me to get to 
California, then it seems fairly certain that I have more reason to do something 
else, something that I actually can do.  So, we can explain the difference in 
implications between “ought to do” and “ought to be” by appealing to the 
principle that what an agent has most reason to do is something that the agent 
can do.29   
                                                
29 It should be noted that although I have made use of Harman’s suggestion, and 
although his suggestion is phrased in terms of two senses of “ought,” nothing in the 
explanation above depends on the idea that the sense of “ought” differs in “ought to do” and 
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So, I have just suggested that the principle, “what an agent has most 
reason to do is something that that agent can do,” provides us with an 
explanation of why claims that an agent ought to do something, all things 
considered, imply “can,” even while claims that something ought to be the 
case, all things considered, do not imply that this thing can be the case.  This 
is not meant as a defense of the principle that “ought implies “can.”  It seems 
to me that the principle about reasons I am relying on stands or falls with the 
principle that if an agent ought to do something, all things considered, then 
that agent can do that thing.  At this point, I have only been trying to establish 
the contours of a plausible “ought”-“can” relationship and, in particular, to show 
that one who thinks that “ought to do” implies “can” has a good, principled 
reason for resisting the idea that “ought to be” implies “can.”30 
Finally, there may be another way of supporting the idea that “‘ought’ 
implies ‘can’” should apply only to claims that say what an agent ought to do.  
When we use “ought” to express the support of normative considerations, we 
are presumably evaluating something from among a range of alternatives.  
Whether we are saying that an action is one that ought to be performed or that 
a state of affairs ought to be the case, we are saying that it has more 
                                                                                                                                       
“ought to be” claims.  Perhaps the sense differs, and this is why “ought to do” claims have a 
different relationship to claims about what agents have most reason to do.  On the other hand, 
we may suppose that the sense of “ought” is consistent, and that it is what “ought” is being 
applied to that determines the nature of its relationship to “has most reason to.”  I do not see 
any overwhelming reason to favor one view over the other, although I do suppose that there is 
something to be said for not unnecessarily multiplying senses.  For my purpose here, nothing 
important hinges on which view you take. 
30 Streumer (2007) defends the idea that we cannot have reasons to do that which we 
cannot do.  For discussion of his arguments, see the Postscript at the end of this Chapter. 
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normative support than its alternatives.  Now, a claim that says an agent ought 
to do something is forward-looking in a certain way.  It is a claim about how 
the agent ought to proceed from the point at which the judgment applies.  So, 
an “ought to do” claim expresses support for a way of proceeding, for a more 
or less specific course of events from a more or less specific point in time.31  It 
expresses support for one of a range of ways of proceeding in time.  Claims 
about what ought to be the case do not seem to be forward-looking in this 
way.  They may be claims about how the world ought to be in the future, but 
they are often claims about how the world ought to have been, how the world 
ought to be right now or how the world ought to be at any time.  They may 
even express timeless support for one of a range of various arrangements of 
the world.   
It makes sense that, when evaluating ways in which an agent might 
proceed, we would count as most favorable only one or more of the ways in 
which the agent can proceed, i.e., only one or more of the ways in which it is 
open to him to proceed.32  The claim that an agent ought to do something is 
an answer to a question about whether it is better for the agent to proceed in 
                                                
31  Obviously, we want this explanation for past tense claims, claims about what an 
agent should have done, and there is a very clear sense in which these judgments are not 
“forward looking.”  Nonetheless, they express support for what was, at some point in the past, 
a way of proceeding into the future.  In this sense, they are what I am somewhat vaguely 
calling “forward looking.”  We can avoid difficulties by thinking of claims of the form “A ought to 
have done φ” as true if and only if at some point in the past a claim of the form “A ought to do 
φ” was true.  So, these past tense “ought” claims are closely related to present tense “ought” 
claims, which are less problematically seen as forward looking. 
32  “One or more” because there may be more than one equally good option.  It may 
be a matter of indifference whether one becomes a pediatrician or geriatrician, as long as one 
does one or the other. 
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one way or another.  It seems reasonable to suppose that it is always better 
for him to proceed in a way that is open to him, practically speaking, as 
opposed to one in which he will inevitably fail.  But when evaluating ways in 
which the world might be arranged, I see no similar reason to limit ourselves to 
the way in which the world currently is arranged or even to the ways it could, 
practically speaking, be made to be.  The claim that things ought to be a 
certain way is an answer to a question about whether it would be better for the 
world to be arranged in one way or another, and it seems perfectly sensible to 
say that it would be better for the world to be arranged in certain way, even if 
no one could make it so.  There may be limitations on the range of alternative 
arrangements of the world that we could coherently favor.  It might be absurd 
to suggest that a logically impossible arrangement of the world would be better 
than some possible world.  But when comparing and evaluating arrangements 
of the world we may have good reason to compare not only the ways the world 
can be, intuitively speaking, but also the ways in which the world might have 
been, intuitively speaking.   
 To sum up, I have argued, following Harman, that there is good reason 
to interpret the principle that “ought” implies “can” as saying only that all things 
considered, normative claims about what an agent ought to do imply “can.”  In 
what follows we will consider whether this limited version of the principle is 
plausible, and in particular, what sense of “can” could make it plausible. 
VI.  Irresistible Urges:  When We Cannot Help Ourselves. 
 Section IV presented an objection to the idea that “ought” implies “can,” 
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and it forced us to get clear about which “oughts” imply “can.”  In this section, 
we will consider a different sort of objection, and it will force us to get clear 
about which “cans” are implied.  An example of this second sort of objection 
can also be found in Sinnott-Armstrong’s “‘Ought’ Conversationally Implies 
‘Can.’”  There, Sinnott-Armstrong mentions, but chooses not to focus on, the 
following example:  “I ought not to laugh at my boss’s new haircut, but I can’t 
help myself.”33  It is unfortunate that Sinnott-Armstrong does not develop this 
example, because it belongs to a family of interesting and instructive cases.  
To see that, we will have to flesh it out a bit for ourselves.   
Suppose, first of all, that Sinnott-Armstrong really means it when he 
says that he cannot help himself.  Uses of the phrase “I can’t help myself” 
often involve some exaggeration.  When people break their diets, they often 
say things like, “I know I should not eat cake, but I could not help myself.”  
Normally, we should probably take this sort of claim with a grain of salt.  In the 
case at hand, though, we should suppose that Sinnott-Armstrong really is 
making every effort not to laugh, but that the urge to laugh is literally 
overwhelming.  Secondly, let us suppose that, as the phrase suggests, the 
problem is simply one of controlling oneself.  We are not supposed to assume 
that this person cannot refrain from laughing for the sort of reason that he 
cannot fly, viz. because he lacks the proper anatomy for the task.  This person 
is, in general, physically capable of not laughing.  After all, he spends most of 
the day not laughing, and in many other cases, he does successfully resist the 
                                                
33  Sinnott-Armstrong (1984) p.251. 
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urge to laugh.  The problem is that, at the moment he sees his boss, an urge 
to laugh literally overpowers whatever resistance he can muster up.  Given 
this description, I am inclined to agree with Sinnott-Armstrong.  A person 
should not laugh at someone else’s expense, even if he literally cannot help 
himself.   
 The situation just described is not that uncommon.  It involves a normal 
person, generally in control of himself, but occasionally overcome by a 
momentary, irresistible urge.  But we should also consider the possibility of 
agents who have more serious problems with self-control.  Consider an 
example.  Winona has the means to pay for the clothes she picks out at Saks, 
and there is a teller there ready to accept her money.  But Winona, let us 
suppose, is a kleptomaniac. She is overcome by a compulsive desire to take 
some sweaters without paying.  In general, one ought to pay for the clothes 
one takes from a store, and Winona is no exception.  She ought to pay for the 
sweaters she takes, even though she cannot bring herself to do so.  A 
compulsive disorder drives her to try to steal the sweaters instead.34 
                                                
34  Cases of kleptomania, or other similar compulsions, have been considered in 
connection with the “ought” implies “can” principle on a number of occasions in the literature, 
prompting differing reactions in different authors.  For example, Peter Vranas has suggested 
that these cases are not counterexamples because, as a matter of fact, it is not impossible to 
resist these compulsions.  Vranas (2007) pp.183-84.  Alternatively, Vranas asserts that if 
these compulsive disorders truly made it impossible to avoid the compelled behavior then their 
subject would be “in a certain respect akin to a malfunctioning robot:  the concept of obligation 
does not apply to her.”  Id. at 184.  (Query why she is like a malfunctioning robot, and not 
simply like a robot.)  In contrast, Peter Graham suggests that he believes that the 
kleptomaniac provides a counterexample to the principle, but that the availability of Vranas’s 
response can rob the example of its “dialectical punch.”  Graham (2011) p.340.  
I do not pretend to know a thing about the pathology of actual kleptomaniacs.  I am 
skeptical that even an expert could know whether these compulsive desires are resistable or 
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 This example is different than Sinnott-Armstrong’s laughing example in 
a way that might lead some to think that it is not a counterexample.  The 
person who is overcome by an urge to laugh might have little warning that 
something will prompt this overwhelming urge.  He might have been given no 
warning that his boss has a ridiculous haircut, and he might not have reason to 
                                                                                                                                       
irresistible on particular occasions where they are not in fact resisted.  But I do not believe it 
matters.  I see no difficulty in imagining a truly irresistible compulsion and asking what our 
moral intuitions are about such cases.  As indicated above, I have a strong intuition that the 
kleptomaniac, real or imagined, ought not to steal.  Therefore, I find Vranas’s first response to 
miss the point, and regarding his second response, our moral intuitions appear to differ.  I 
attempt to make the case for my intuition above.   
Likewise, Graham seeks to support the idea that people with irresistible urges may 
have an obligation to resist them.  Graham argues that we can find support in cases where an 
action supposedly becomes permissible because of another impermissible action.  In one of 
his examples, I make a promise to you not to tell Melissa where you are.  Graham suggests 
that it becomes permissible for me to break this promise when I learn that you have stolen 
Melissa’s wallet and that she is looking for you in order to retrieve it.  Graham argues that the 
best explanation of this fact is that you have violated an obligation not to steal Melissa’s wallet.  
Finally, Graham contends that this remains true even if we add the assumption that you were 
compelled, like a kleptomaniac, to steal Melissa’s wallet.  In other words, I may still break my 
promise, because, regardless of the fact that you are a kleptomaniac, you were obliged to not 
steal her wallet.  You ought not to have stolen it.  
Much of Graham’s paper is dedicated to defending the idea that your obligation is the 
best explanation of why my act becomes permissible.  I believe he fails.  There is a much 
better explanation that does not depend on your obligation or on the wrongness of your action.  
I may break my promise—in some cases, I must break my promise—because (a) Melissa has 
a right to retrieve her wallet regardless of whether your act was wrong, (b) you have no right to 
keep it, and (c) Melissa’s right trumps my promise.  After all, it could become permissible for 
me to break the same promise if you took Melissa’s wallet by accident and you are not even 
aware that you have it.  If the wallet had sufficient value or she had sufficient need, then her 
right to retrieve her wallet could trump my promise regardless of whether you stole or 
accidentally acquired it.  (Similarly in Graham’s organ harvesting example, which I will not 
explain here, the innocent victims have a right to protection from the organ harvesting surgeon 
regardless of whether or not the surgeon is a moral agent who is subject to moral reasons and 
obligations.)   
This is not the place to explore Graham’s argument any further.  The reader can judge 
for himself or herself whether Graham can defend his claims.  It should be noted though that 
Graham presents this argument in an effort to show that “ought” does not imply “can.”  
Because Graham’s examples all rely on the fact that people who cannot help but X may still 
have an obligation not to X, they provide no counterexample to the version of “‘ought’ implies 
‘can’” that I defend in the remainder of this Chapter.  Instead, if they could be defended, they 
would support my version of the principle.   
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suspect that there would come a time that he wouldn’t be able to hold back an 
inappropriate laugh.  So, it is not hard to imagine that there was nothing this 
person could have done to avoid laughing at his boss’s haircut.  But people 
with more serious and systematic motivational disorders, people who suffer 
from pathological desires and fears, may be quite aware of their problem, and 
so, they may be able to do what they ought to do by taking special measures 
to avoid situations in which their compulsion would affect them.  So, one might 
think that what Winona really ought to do, all things considered is avoid 
clothing stores and have someone else do her shopping.  In so far as she can 
do that, she can pay for her purchases and avoid stealing.   
It is true that Winona’s situation is different than Sinnott-Armstrong’s in 
important ways, but Winona’s situation provides a related counterexample 
nonetheless.  First, though it is true that Winona ought to avoid situations in 
which she will be tempted to steal, it is still true that once she is in those 
tempting situations, she should not steal.  Indeed, she ought to avoid tempting 
situations precisely because she should not steal.  Second, though there are 
steps that she can take to avoid those situations, and thus avoid stealing, 
none of the acceptable measures she might take are foolproof.  So, we can 
easily revise the example a bit to show that Winona was not only unable to 
resist the urge to steal once she was at Saks, but also unable to avoid being at 
Saks.  Suppose that she were brought there against her will, and then set free 
to do as she pleases.  Once set free, she cannot manage to leave without 
slipping a sweater into her handbag.  In this case, she ought to leave the store 
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without taking anything or she ought to pay for what she takes.  Unfortunately, 
she cannot bring herself to do either of these things.   
 One might feel some resistance to the idea that the kleptomaniac ought 
not steal because one supposes that we cannot blame the kleptomaniac for 
her stealing.  The kleptomaniac is not freely choosing to steal; she is the pawn 
of a desire that is beyond her control.  And so, we might reasonably suppose 
that it is too harsh to hold her accountable for her stealing.  But we should be 
careful to separate our intuitions about what Winona ought to do from our 
intuitions about whether or not she should be blamed, punished or otherwise 
held responsible.  Responsibility for actions will be discussed in greater depth 
in the following Chapters.  For now, suffice it to say that people are not always 
blameworthy when they fail to do what they ought.  It is quite plausible that a 
person with a compulsive desire to steal sweaters, who is brought, against her 
will, to a store filled with nice sweaters, deserves little blame if she steals a 
sweater.  Whether she was dragged there or not, surely her level of blame is 
mitigated by the fact that her actions stemmed from a pathological 
psychological disorder.  But none of this changes the fact that she should not 
steal the sweaters.  Stealing is morally wrong and often imprudent.  Stealing is 
not “morally wrong unless you cannot resist the desire to steal.”  Moral 
principles with exceptions of this kind would surely be too lenient.   
 We can generate countless more examples roughly like Winona’s:  
people with anger management issues should not lash out, but they may not 
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ought to concern themselves with more important matters, but they cannot 
bring themselves to do so; claustrophobics might find themselves in situations 
where they really ought to ride the elevator, though they cannot bring 
themselves to walk through its doors; and smokers and drug addicts ought to 
kick their habit even if they lack the will power to do so.  Of course, these are 
all examples that involve more extreme problems than Sinnott-Armstrong’s 
laughing case.  They involve agents with more serious problems of control.   
 There is also a range of situations that are less extreme than Winona’s, 
without involving a problem as momentary and fleeting as Sinnott-Armstrong’s.  
Many people find that strong emotional connections make them unable to do 
what they ought to do.  They recognize that they ought to end a relationship or 
change its normal patterns in some way, and yet they feel that they cannot 
help but repeat these patterns.  While the claims that lovers make are often 
not literally true, it would be a mistake to think that people affected by love or 
despair always have full control of their actions.  I am not thinking only of 
young romantics driven to do things that seem silly to an impartial observer, 
but also of overly faithful spouses and mourning parents.  What a spouse who 
has been wronged, a parent who has lost his child, and an unrequited lover 
ought to do is highly dependent on the details of the situation, and even when 
such details are provided, people are sure to disagree about what ought to be 
done.  Nonetheless, it is plausible that, sometimes, people who are 
heartbroken or mourning get to a point where they ought to take steps toward 
“moving on,” though they are literally unable to bring themselves to do so.  We 
 63 
need not think of these people as suffering from a psychological disorder.  
They are in the grip of emotions that are beyond their control, though the 
emotions are ones we can understand and respect.35   
One might be tempted to conclude that the various examples we have 
been discussing show that, even when limited to normative, all things 
considered “ought to do” claims, “ought” does not imply “can.”  But before we 
give into that temptation, we should note that these examples are all of a kind.  
They are all cases in which people have the physical capacity and the 
opportunity to do what they ought.  Their bodies can generally perform the 
motions that are required.  In general, the angry guy’s mouth and hands are 
capable of being at rest, the claustrophobic person can walk through 
doorways, and the abused spouse is physically able to pack bags and drive 
off.  In addition, nothing in their environment constitutes an insurmountable 
obstacle between them and what they ought to do: a mad scientist is not 
forcing the angry man to yell, nothing is blocking the claustrophobe’s path to 
the elevator, and no one is physically restraining the abused spouse.  These 
people are unable to do what they ought to do solely because they are 
compelled by overwhelming psychological and motivational forces.  They are 
cases in which it is impossible for the agent to do what she ought because she 
lacks sufficient motivation or control needed for doing what she ought. 
                                                
35 Graham mentions an example that fits along these lines:  “I really ought to put my 
dog to sleep, but I just can’t.”  Graham (2011) p.357.  In many cases, a person saying this 
would probably be more honest if he said “but I won’t” or “but I really don’t want to.”  
Nonetheless, I am inclined to agree with Graham that this statement might be truly said by a 
person with an emotional attachment that makes it truly impossible to euthanize his dog. 
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 Moreover, we treat cases of this sort differently than those in which the 
agent’s inability has some other source.  When a person lacks the physical 
strength, the skill or the know-how for something, we take this as a reason for 
rejecting the idea that he ought to do that thing.  It is false to say that a person 
who has never learned to swim ought to swim to the rescue of a drowning 
person.  Similarly, when some external obstacle or some feature of the 
person’s situation makes it impossible for a person to do something, this is a 
sufficient reason for rejecting the claim that he ought to do that thing.  If a 
trained, but off-duty, lifeguard is too far from the water to be of any help to a 
drowning swimmer or if he is being held at gunpoint, then it is not the case that 
he ought to save the drowning person.   
 Given that the cases we have been discussing are all of this one kind, 
we should not take these cases to show that there is no interesting connection 
between what a person ought to do and what she can do.  Instead, these 
cases suggest that we need a more carefully limited version of the principle.  
Inabilities that do not stem from motivational problems do seem to be relevant 
to the truth of an “ought to do” claim.  So, what these cases actually suggest is 
that if a person ought to do something, then she could do that thing provided 
she were sufficiently motivated and sufficiently in control.  Or, in other words, if 
a person ought to do something, then she has the physical and mental ability, 
the skill, and the know-how needed and she is in circumstances appropriate 
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for doing that thing but she may or may not have the will to do it.36   
In the next two sections, I develop and defend this idea.  First, I develop 
a way of categorizing the various factors that make it possible for an agent to 
do something.  This will make it possible to formulate a clear version of the 
principle that treats motivation and control based inability separately from 
other kinds.  Second, I argue that this principle is the correct version of the 
principle that “ought” implies “can.”  It not only avoids counterexamples; it also 
has the support of certain theoretical considerations. 
VII. The Conditions for Action:  A Folk View 
 We will be able to draw the distinctions we need if we first develop a 
simple theory of how agents are able to act.  The view I shall be relying on is 
deeply rooted in common sense, but it is not normally made very precise.  We 
shall have to develop and clarify each of its elements if we are to have a 
theory that is rigorous and precise enough for our purposes.   
 We often pay attention to three different kinds of causal factors that, 
together, make action possible.  Agents have abilities, and if they are in the 
right circumstances and sufficiently motivated, the exercise of these abilities 
leads to action.  According to this simple sketch of action, agential action is 
made possible by a confluence of three factors: an agent’s abilities, his 
                                                
36 It has been called to my attention that a similar interpretation of “‘ought’ implies 
‘can’” has been suggested by Derek Parfit.  See Parfit (1984) pp.15 & 506-08.  Parfit proposes 
that, “In the doctrine that ought implies can, the sense of ‘can’ is compatible with 
Psychological Determinism,” and that “cannot” entails “ought not” only where “cannot” means 
“that acting in this way would have been impossible, even if my desires and dispositions had 
been different.”  Id. at 15.  Parfit does not explain why this should be so, although in a footnote 
he does argue that this interpretation is consistent with certain cases and examples that are 
taken to support the idea that “ought” implies “can.”  Id. at 506-08.   
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circumstances or opportunities, and his motives or choices.  This common 
sense conception allows room for luck as well.  With some difficult tasks, we 
think that an agent can have a strong ability, a good opportunity and the 
needed motivation, but still fail from time to time.  A basketball player who is a 
great free throw shooter will still get unlucky sometimes and miss.  In his case, 
the three factors combine only to make it highly likely that he will make his 
shot.   
The picture of action here is rooted in common sense, but it involves 
concepts – “ability,” “opportunity,” and “sufficient motivation” – that require 
further analysis.  In this section, I shall clarify and support this folk view of 
action by getting clear about each of the crucial concepts in it.  There are 
surely puzzles about some of these concepts that I will not be able to discuss, 
but I hope to do enough to show that a properly developed version of this view 
of action can be used to articulate, coherently and helpfully, the causal 
conditions for action. 
 Let us start with the notion of an ability.  Ascriptions and denials of 
abilities often serve the same purpose as claims involving “can,” “able,” and 
“capable.”  In some situations, we use “I cannot do that,” “I am unable to do 
that,” and “I do not have the ability to do that,” interchangeably.  But “ability” 
has one specific usage that suits it for the role it plays in the folk view of 
action.  In this usage, the grammar and structure of ability ascriptions differs 
from that of claims involving “can” and “able.”  This reflects the fact that when 
we attribute (or deny) an ability to an agent we do not merely say that it is 
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possible for the agent to do something, we do so by ascribing a property to the 
agent.  We say that an agent has an ability.  So, abilities are properties of 
agents.37  Now we need to know more about what sort of properties they are 
and when we say that agents have them. 
 Abilities are closely related to causal powers.  They are properties that 
make it possible for agents to do certain things (in the right circumstances).  
So, when an action comes about through the exercise of an agent’s ability, we 
believe that the agent has made a causal contribution to that event.  She has 
made something happen.38  This brings out another way in which attributing 
an ability is different than saying that something can happen or that something 
is possible.  Abilities are abilities to do things.  So, while it makes sense to say 
that a person can, say, be hit with a water balloon, it would be quite strange to 
say that a person has the ability to be hit by a water balloon.  Similarly, people 
                                                
37  To be clear, we also attribute abilities to many inanimate and non-sentient entities.  
A truck might have the ability to haul a load, and a wall might have the ability to withstand a 
blow.  But I restrict my analysis here to the abilities of agents, or more precisely, sentient and 
purposive agents.  The notion of an “agent” in contemporary philosophy seems to me to be 
largely restricted to that of a sentient and purposive being, and sometimes even further 
restricted to that of a potentially rational or autonomous agent.  In common parlance, “agent” 
applies more broadly, even to such things as “cleaning agents”—the chemical products, not 
hygienists or janitors.  While I think that this restriction might sometimes warp our vision, it is 
one that I am following here. That is, I am using “agent” as shorthand for “sentient and 
purposive agents.”   We attribute abilities to many things that do not fit the philosophical notion 
of an “agent,”  but I shall be focusing on the abilities of agents in this philosophical sense.   
38  I am not claiming here that something that should be described as “agent 
causation” happens when an agent exercises an ability.  A handful of philosophers have 
special conceptions of “agent causation,” and I have no interest in debating the significance of 
this term here.  For a fairly thorough discussion of “agent causation” see O’Connor (2000).  
Nor am I claiming that when an agent makes something happen by exercising an ability, the 
buck stops there.  Just because the agent makes something happen and is, thereby, 
intuitively, the cause of that thing, this does not mean that the agent is the ultimate cause of 
that thing.  It does not mean that there is not a causal chain stretching back into time that also 
causally explains the occurrence of the event. 
 68 
can get sick, but they do not have abilities to get sick.39   
 Among philosophers who have discussed the notion of an ability, most 
have suggested that the truth conditions of an ability ascription can be 
expressed in terms of a conditional.40  The folk view of action makes this 
suggestion seem overwhelmingly plausible.  According to that view, when an 
agent has the ability to do something, φ, has a good opportunity to φ, and is 
sufficiently motivated to φ, the agent will φ, or at least be quite likely to do so.  
So, it seems to follow that the agent has the ability to φ just in case it is true 
that if the agent has an opportunity to φ and sufficient motivation to φ, then the 
agent will (be quite likely to) φ. Of course, this sort of conditional account is 
only informative if we also have a grip on what it is to have an opportunity and 
to be sufficiently motivated.  Otherwise, it is little more than a restatement of 
the folk view of action that we are trying to clarify.  We could give similar 
conditional accounts of opportunity and sufficient motivation, but we would be 
none the wiser for having done so.  We still need to know more about what it is 
to have an ability. 
 Abilities, I have said, are properties of agents.  Opportunities on the 
other hand are constituted by agent’s situations.  So, having an ability is a 
                                                
39  Anselm of Canterbury made a point similar to the one I am making here.  He 
suggests that though Hector can be conquered by Achilles, it would not make sense to say 
that Hector has the power or the ability to be conquered by Achilles.  When ascribing a power 
or an ability it only makes sense to say that Achilles has the ability to conquer Hector.  See 
Anselm of Canterbury (1998) p.163.  Thanks to Scott MacDonald for bringing this passage to 
my attention. 
40  For some examples of conditional accounts, see Gert and Duggan (1979) p.201 
and (1967) p.128, and Vihvelin (2000) p.142.   
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matter of having a certain causal power, while having an opportunity is a 
matter of being in certain sort of situation.  These facts make it seem natural to 
think that we have abilities in virtue of being intrinsically constituted in a certain 
way, and that we have opportunities in virtue of our relations to things around 
us.  While the simplicity of this suggestion is tempting, it is not borne out in our 
actual attributions of abilities.  Some of our abilities are grounded in our 
(seemingly) intrinsic properties.  I have the ability to wiggle my finger just 
because of how I am anatomically constituted.  I might lack the opportunity to 
do so because my hand is momentarily caught under the wheel of a car, but 
as long as the relevant parts of my body remain as they are intrinsically, I 
should think that I would maintain the ability to wiggle my finger.  But we also 
have abilities that we could only possess in virtue of certain kinds of extrinsic 
properties.  I have the ability to buy clothes, for example, only because there is 
money in my bank account or credit on my credit card and a generally 
accepted system of accepting money or credit as payment for goods.  A sitting 
president has the ability to veto a bill only because he occupies the office, and 
the U.S. Constitution grants that power to the president.  I lack the ability to 
write a note to my wife because I am unmarried.  So, intuitively plausible ability 
attributions suggest that abilities can depend not only on our intrinsic 
constitution, but also on some of our extrinsic properties.  This fact 
complicates matters.  We cannot distinguish abilities and opportunities in 
terms of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction.  However, with a better 
understanding of how extrinsic factors can ground abilities and how they 
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contribute to opportunities, we can properly distinguish ability from opportunity. 
I have stressed that the abilities I am concerned with are abilities to do 
things.  But when we do something, it is never the case that there is only one 
way of describing what it is that we do.41  Suppose that Obama, while grasping 
a pen, made a certain motion with his hand.  Suppose that in doing so, he 
signed his name.  And in doing so, he made a bill into a law.  And in doing so, 
he authorized the overhaul of financial regulation.  What the President does 
depends not simply on the changes in his intrinsic state, but also on his 
extrinsic properties.  He may make the same motion with a pen in many 
circumstances.  Sometimes when he does this, he will be making a law, and 
other times he will be signing a check.  If he were to make the motion on the 
last day of his term, he might be signing a bill into law, but if he were to wait 
until the following day, he certainly would not be doing this. 
    Now, let us focus on the most basic description of the action that 
Obama performs.  What I mean by this is that we may describe what Obama 
does simply in terms of the changes to his intrinsic state.  This will involve 
simply the movements of his bodily parts, and perhaps, some of his mental 
activities.42  Let us call Obama’s action, so described, “moving his hand just 
                                                
41  Some disagree about whether there is one action here, described in different ways, 
or many distinct actions.  I follow Davidson in speaking of this as one action that has many 
different descriptions, but nothing I say should depend on this.  The proponent of the multiple 
action view should be able to accept the point that I am going to make, given the necessary 
changes in wording.  For discussion of this issue, see Davidson (1971) and (1967). 
42  If externalism about mental content is right, then many simple mental activities will 
depend not only on one’s intrinsic properties, but also on one’s relations to the environment.  
The ability to think about water, for example, will depend on one’s having been properly 
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so.”  It seems to me that Obama has the ability to move his hand just so in 
virtue of his intrinsic properties alone.  His muscles, ligaments, nerves, and 
such are configured in a certain way, and, through training, his brain and body 
has become configured so that, when he chooses to move his hand in this 
way and when there are no abnormal obstacles, he does move his hand just 
so.  Abilities to perform actions that are basic in this sense are abilities that 
agents have just in virtue of their intrinsic nature.  Let us call them “basic 
abilities.” 
 Of course, describing actions in these basic terms is a good way to 
miss out on much of the significance of what we do.  Much of what we do 
simply is not captured by these basic descriptions of the motions of our bodily 
parts, but instead must be captured in non-basic descriptions of our actions.  
Which non-basic descriptions apply to our actions depends not only on the 
things that we do with our body, but also on the social and environmental 
setting of our body.  And so, I shall argue, our abilities to perform actions of 
these kinds are dependent on or grounded in our relations to our physical and 
social environment. 
 Before I can make this fully clear, there is one other feature of abilities 
that we need to note.  Ability ascriptions typically involve what are sometimes 
described as “incomplete predicates.”43  We say that people have abilities 
such as the ability to run a 4-minute mile, or to jump 6 feet, or to type 80 words 
                                                                                                                                       
related to a watery environment.   
43  See, for example, Prior (1985) pp.6-8. 
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per minute.  But the explicit wording of our ability ascriptions does not usually 
say precisely the kind of action that we are saying that the agent is able to 
perform.  When we say that someone has the ability to run a 4-minute mile, we 
do not mean that they can do so in any circumstances whatsoever.  Even the 
select few who have the ability to run a 4-minute mile can do so only in a very 
limited range of circumstances.  The fact that they cannot run a 4-minute mile 
while wearing hiking boots or on uneven ground or just after eating dinner 
does not show that they lack the ability to run a 4-minute mile.   
This might tempt one to say that when we ascribe the ability to run a 4-
minute mile we mean that the person has the ability to run a 4-minute mile in 
favorable circumstances.  But this is not very helpful.  “Favorable 
circumstances” could mean nearly anything.  I can run a 4-minute mile in 
circumstances where I have rocket-propelled shoes or in circumstances where 
the muscles in my legs have been altered.  The moon would provide me with a 
favorable circumstance for jumping high enough to dunk a basketball, but the 
fact that I can dunk in such favorable circumstances does not show that I have 
the ability to dunk a basketball.   
When we say that someone has the ability to do something, like run a 
4-minute mile or dunk a basketball, we mean something more specific than 
what we say explicitly.  In most cases, the full content of the ability we ascribe 
to a person is given implicitly by the context and by our shared understanding 
of the normal conditions for the activity explicitly mentioned.  So, when I say 
that someone has the ability to run a 4-minute mile, what I mean is something 
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more like the following:  he has the ability to run a 4-minute mile, given 
adequate rest and health, on a track surface that meets the modern standard, 
while wearing suitable clothing and footwear, while not held back by any 
physical restraints or weights, while being affected by the Earth’s gravity, and 
while breathing clean air with oxygen concentration roughly similar to that at 
sea level.  This is closer to an accurate and explicit statement of the property 
that I mean to be attributing to the agent, but it is no doubt still incomplete.  It 
is not clear that we could ever state explicitly the full and specific content of 
the ability that we mean to ascribe or deny to an agent.  Fortunately, we do not 
need to, since, most of the time, we share a common understanding of many 
features of the content.   
Sometimes we do go out of our way to make some part of the content 
of an ability explicit.  We do so when we mean to ascribe an ability that differs 
from what we would otherwise expect people to understand.  So, someone 
might have the ability to run a 4-minute mile on a slight downhill, but not on a 
flat.  Or, someone might have the ability to type 80 words per minute on a full-
size keyboard, but not on a smaller laptop keyboard.  In these cases, much of 
the content of the ability is still given implicitly by our shared understanding, 
but it is modified by the explicit qualifications and changes to that normal 
expectation.  I shall say that the implicit and explicit qualifications on the 
content of an ability provide us with the fully specified content of an ability. 
The two points just covered—the fact that actions admit of different 
descriptions and the fact that the full content of ability predicates typically 
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involves a great many implicit qualifications—allow us to draw a distinction 
between what it is to have an ability and what it is to have an opportunity and 
to see when abilities are grounded in an agent’s extrinsic properties.  Take any 
standard ability predicate, like “the ability to φ.”  The fully specified version of 
this predicate is given by “the ability to φ in circumstances that meet 
conditions, C,” where C is the long list of conditions and qualifications that 
specify the sort of situation which we normally understand to be appropriate 
for φ-ing.  Having an opportunity to φ, or having an opportunity to exercise 
one’s ability to φ, is simply a matter of being in a situation where those 
conditions, C, are met.   
It may help to clarify if we take a look at a specific example.  Consider, 
again, the ability to run a 4-minute mile.  I suggested an approximation for the 
fully specified content of this ability.  Given that specification, what I am 
suggesting now is that a person has an opportunity to run a four minute mile 
when she is adequately healthy and rested, on a track surface that meets the 
modern standard, wearing suitable clothing and footwear, not held back by 
any physical restraints, affected by the Earth’s gravity and breathing clean air 
with normal oxygen content.  The considerations that fill out the content of a 
fully specified ability are the factors that determine whether or not someone 
has the opportunity to perform the relevant action.  So, what counts as an 
opportunity to do something is given by the, typically implicit, conditions that 
make up the fully specified content of an ability. 
The multiplicity of action descriptions is important as well.  Sometimes, 
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when a person runs a 4-minute mile, it is also true that he wins a race.  
Whether or not running a 4-minute mile is also winning a race depends on a 
number of factors that are extrinsic to the agent.  It depends most obviously on 
whether the agent is running in a race and on how fast the other racers run.  
Now, we may want to know whether or not the agent has the ability to win a 
particular race.  I believe that we will say that he has this ability when he has 
the ability to do something else, like run a 4-minute mile (in the circumstances 
C), and he is extrinsically such that his doing this other thing amounts to, or is 
reasonably likely to amount to, winning the race.  His ability to win the race 
depends on his ability to run at a certain speed over a certain distance as well 
as the fact that there is a race going on and the other runners are not very 
likely to run any faster than him.   
Let us generalize this suggestion.  A person has certain basic abilities 
(e.g., abilities to engage in certain bodily movements) in virtue of his intrinsic 
properties.  He has an opportunity to exercise one of these basic abilities 
when his circumstances meet the conditions given by the fully specified 
content of that ability (e.g., when external restraints do not prevent the relevant 
bodily motions).  When a person exercises one of these basic abilities and 
performs a basic action, he may also do something else that is not basic in this 
way.  So, for example, repetitively placing one foot in front of the other at a 
pace sufficient for covering a mile in four minutes and doing so for four 
minutes may also be, in the right circumstances, winning a race.  Whether or 
not performing the basic action also amounts to performing a non-basic action 
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will depend on the circumstances that the agent is in.  So, an agent has an 
ability to perform a non-basic action, NB, when she is intrinsically such that 
she has the ability to perform some basic action, B, and she is extrinsically 
such that doing B is, or is reasonably likely to be, doing NB.    
Given this, we may propose the following accounts of abilities: 
An agent, A, has a basic ability to perform a basic 
action, φ, if and only if A is intrinsically such that if 
A were sufficiently motivated to φ and A had an 
opportunity to φ, then A would be relatively likely to 
φ (taking into account the difficulty of φ-ing). 
An agent, A, has a non-basic ability to perform an 
action, φ, if and only if: 
1) A has certain basic abilities to perform certain 
basic actions φ1, . . . , φn; and  
2) A is extrinsically such that by performing an 
appropriate subset of these basic actions, φ1, 
. . . , φn, in an opportunity to φ, A is relatively 
likely to h; and  
3) if A were sufficiently motivated to φ, A would 
attempt to do so by exercising some 
appropriate subset of her abilities to φ1, . . . , φn.    
I will clear up a few of the details of this account in a moment.  First, let me 
offer the following account of an opportunity. 
An agent, A, has an opportunity to perform an 
action, φ, if and only if A’s circumstances are such 
that they meet the conditions given in a full 
specification of the ability to φ.  
This account of opportunities applies whether we are talking about a basic or a 
non-basic ability.  
The account of abilities just given relies on a notion of being “sufficiently 
motivated.”  Thus, the account depends on cashing this notion out in the right 
way.  I say that an agent is sufficiently motivated to φ when her motivation to φ 
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is sufficient to determine her will and result in her trying to φ in spite of any 
motivation she has to not-φ and, more generally, any psychological resistance 
she has to φ-ing.  So, an agent will be sufficiently motivated to φ when she 
wants to φ more than anything else (or when she wants to φ at least as much 
anything else and she makes an arbitrary choice to φ) and she does not suffer 
from any weakness of will.  This account of sufficient motivation does not 
depend on setting some “amount” of motivation as the minimum threshold.  
Indeed, it does not depend on the possibility of quantifying motivational forces.  
A person who whimsically walks onto an elevator, but could have been quite 
content to wait for the next one, seems to be subject to a weaker motivational 
force than the claustrophobic person who is struggling unsuccessfully to 
overcome her fear.  The claustrophobe may be setting all the force of her will 
against her fear, but she is still insufficiently motivated.  Meanwhile, it may be 
that the whimsical person would have lost interest in riding the elevator given 
the slightest distraction, yet because this does not happen, he counts as 
sufficiently motivated.44 
The account above also makes use of probability language.  It claims 
that there is a probabilistic connection between ability, opportunity and 
                                                
44 Because my account relies on a counterfactual which hinges on the agent’s 
motivation, one might suppose that my account of abilities fails in Frankfurt scenarios or their 
analogues, i.e., in cases in which an intervener stands ready to prevent the successful 
exercise of a certain ability, say the ability to run, whenever the agent becomes sufficiently 
motivated to run.  This would be a worrisome objection only if we would consider such cases 
to be ones in which the agent has an opportunity to exercise the ability in question.  But it is 
clear that Jones does not have an opportunity to run if Black stands ready to shoot or to tackle 
Jones anytime he becomes motivated to do so.  I see no reason to think that the case would 
be any different if Black produced the same result by installing some sort of device in Jones’s 
brain, as in the typical Frankfurt scenario.   
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motivation, on the one hand, and success, on the other.  It would be a clear 
mistake to tie ability and success too closely.  People have all sorts of abilities 
that do not guarantee them success even in the best of conditions.  The 
clearest examples come from sports.  Take free throw shooting in basketball.  
When he was an active player, the Knicks’ Allan Houston was one of the best 
free throw shooters in professional basketball.  He consistently made over 
90% of his free throw attempts, which is to say he consistently missed almost 
10%.  It is not plausible to say that these misses can be accounted for by a 
lack of opportunity or a failure to try.  The conditions of his free throw shooting 
are extraordinarily consistent.  His shots took place in the context of a 
sanctioned National Basketball Association game, with a regulation ball and at 
a regulated distance from a regulation hoop.  His missed shots were also more 
or less regularly interspersed among his attempts.  So, it is unlikely that they 
were due to a temporary lack of health or a lack of interest or motivation.  
Instead, it is much more plausible to say that he has a very strong ability to 
make free throws, but that given the difficulty of making free throws, people 
with the ability will miss from time to time.   
This last example is consistent with the idea that ability, opportunity and 
motivation do not guarantee success, but they make it highly probable.  
However, even this would be too restrictive.  Consider baseball players for a 
moment.  The very best home run hitters in baseball actually hit home runs in 
very few of their chances at bat.  Alex Rodriguez, for example, has been one 
of the best home run hitters in major league baseball.  He was on pace to 
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surpass the career home run record.  In short, there can be no denying that he 
has the ability to hit home runs.  Yet, he turns only a very small minority of the 
pitches he sees into home runs.  To be fair, not every pitch is hittable.  But 
even if we restrict our attention to pitches that provide him with a reasonable 
opportunity for hitting a home run, say, pitches in the strike zone, he still hits 
only a very small minority of them for home runs.  Hitting a home run in 
professional baseball is a difficult thing to do, and so, even people with the 
ability to hit home runs will succeed fairly rarely.   
These two examples suggest that the rate of success (given opportunity 
and motivation) associated with having an ability depends upon the difficulty of 
the task at hand.  For some very easy tasks, it may be roughly one hundred 
percent, but for very difficult ones, it may be far below fifty percent.  There is 
no general formula that will tell us how often a person with the ability to φ 
should succeed.  We can simply say that it should vary with the difficulty, and 
that at a minimum, having an ability to φ must make a positive contribution to 
the likelihood of φ-ing.   In other words, a person with the ability to φ should be 
more likely to succeed at φ-ing than someone lacking the ability, someone 
who is relying purely on luck.  So, even if one has a weighted coin that has a 
90% chance of landing tails, one does not have the ability to make it come up 
tails as opposed to heads.  For one cannot make any positive contribution to 
its odds of coming up tails rather than heads.   
 The examples just discussed suggest that we should not expect too 
close of a connection between the exercise of an ability in the right 
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circumstances and success.  However, the mere fact that people exercising 
abilities exhibit success less than one hundred percent of the time does not 
show that the connection between ability and success is accurately or helpfully 
captured in terms of probability.  The presence (or absence) of an ability is 
often equally apparent in a person’s successes and his failures.  When Alex 
Rodriguez hits a foul ball or misses a pitch altogether, he still displays 
evidence of his ability to hit home runs.  He approaches batting in a certain 
way, carefully discriminates between good and bad pitches, and swings with 
form and timing that are, in general, apt to lead to home run hitting.  A 
competitor who has gotten the better of his opponent in each of their meetings 
may still be aware that his opponent has the ability to best him; he can know 
this because even in failure, his opponent displays some properties that serve 
as indicators of his ability.  An account that simply says exercising an ability in 
the right circumstances makes success relatively probable might seem to offer 
very little by way of an explanation of these facts.  One might suggest that the 
mark of an ability to φ is not the fact that a person is reasonably likely to φ 
when he tries in the right circumstances, but that he displays some state that 
is appropriately linked with successfully φ-ing.   
 There are two points to make in defense of the probabilistic account 
that I have suggested.  First, it is not clear how to cash out this talk of 
“displaying a state that is appropriately linked with successfully φ-ing” except 
in probabilistic terms such as, “displaying a state that is likely (relative to some 
context sensitive standard) to result in successfully φ-ing.”  If this is an 
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accurate way to understand the suggestion, then there will be very little 
difference between my account and an alternative along these lines.  It will 
remain true that when a person with the ability to φ, tries to φ in the right 
circumstances, she is relatively likely to φ.  Second, my account does an 
adequate job of explaining the fact that there can be clear evidence of an 
ability even in failed attempts to exercise the ability.  For basic abilities, my 
account makes explicit that the conditional—if an agent with the ability to φ is 
sufficiently motivated to φ and has an opportunity to φ, then she is relatively 
likely to φ—holds in virtue of how the agent is intrinsically.  Thus, it suggests 
that the agent is in some intrinsic state that makes it the case that he is 
reasonably likely to φ, whether or not he does succeed in φ-ing.  When one 
exercises a non-basic ability to ψ, one does so by exercising a basic ability to 
φ that is likely but not guaranteed to result in ψ-ing.  So, for example, when 
Alex Rodriguez attempts to hit a home run, he does so by exercising more 
basic abilities such as the ability to swing the bat in a certain way that is apt to 
produce home runs.  When Allan Houston missed a free throw, he still typically 
coordinated his movements in a way that constitutes good form for shooting 
free throws.  According to my account, he has the ability to make free throws 
in virtue of having this more basic ability to coordinate a number of bodily 
movements in a certain way, and he can successfully exercise this more basic 
ability whether or not he thereby makes his free throw.  So, at worst, my 
probabilistic account can track the truth of ability ascriptions just as well as the 
alternative suggestion, but it seems that, better than that, my account does a 
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good job of explaining the evidence of abilities in both successes and failures.   
 This, I believe, is enough to conclude that the folk view of action can be 
developed into a coherent and principled way of articulating the causal 
conditions of action.  The view that I have developed distinguishes three 
distinct kinds of factors needed to produce action:  ability, opportunity, and 
motivation.  In the next section, I use this account to give a precise version of 
the principle that “ought” implies “can,” a version that is supported by the 
intuitions explored by the previous section, and I develop arguments to 
support this version of the principle. 
VIII.  Why “Ought” Implies Ability and Opportunity, Not Motivation: 
  In Section VI, we saw that when a person is unable to do something 
because she lacks the ability or the opportunity to do that thing, we are 
inclined to reject the idea that she ought to do that thing, but when a person is 
unable to do something because she is unable to overcome motivational 
obstacles to her doing the right thing, i.e., when she is not sufficiently 
motivated to do that thing, we do not take this to undermine the fact that she 
ought to do that thing.  In Section VII, we drew distinctions between abilities, 
opportunities, and motivation.  These distinctions allow us to offer a principle 
that reflects these intuitions:   
If, all things considered, a person ought to do 
something, φ, then that person has the ability to φ 
and an opportunity to φ.   
Now we need to consider what can be said in favor of this principle.   
 In addition to the support of the cases we have discussed, the principle 
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above has the support of the following conceptual argument.  The ethical thing 
for a person to do in a particular situation just is the thing that she would do in 
that situation were she sufficiently motivated by the relevant ethical 
considerations.  Similarly, the rational thing for a person to do in a particular 
situation just is the thing that she would do in that situation, if her will was 
determined by rational considerations.  The equivalences here can be 
generalized:  all things considered, the proper thing for a person to do in a 
particular situation just is the thing she would do in that situation, if she were 
sufficiently motivated to act in accordance with the balance of all applicable 
normative considerations.  So, what a particular person ought to do, all things 
considered, in a particular situation is the thing that she would do if she were 
motivated in accordance with the balance of all applicable reasons.   
What would a particular person do in a particular situation if she were 
sufficiently motivated in accordance with the balance of all applicable 
reasons?  To answer this question, we should imagine a situation that is as 
close to the actual scenario as possible, while making only the adjustments 
required by the antecedent of the conditional.  In other words, to answer this 
question, we should hold fixed this person’s abilities and opportunities, but 
imagine that she is motivated in accordance with the balance of reasons that 
apply to her and then consider what she would do.  Anything that she would 
do would have to be something that she actually has the ability and 
opportunity to do, but it may be something that, in the actual scenario, she is 
not sufficiently motivated to do.  So, for any way of acting, φ, if our person 
 84 
ought to φ, then she must have the ability and opportunity to φ. 
This argument is, to my mind, compelling.  It depends on a plausible 
conceptual connection between what a person ought to do and what that 
person would do if she were properly motivated.  The existence of this 
connection is clearly demonstrated by the useful role that the idea of an agent 
who is idealized in just this way can play in our practical reasoning.  People 
who hold a wide variety of moral theories, or who hold no particular moral 
theory at all, frequently rely on character models to aid their thinking about 
what they ought to do.  Even those who do not choose to rely on this sort of 
device should admit that, provided we pick the appropriate model, it is a valid 
way of answering the question, “What should I do?”  They should also agree 
that the proper role model is one who is not significantly different in terms of 
abilities and circumstances, but who has the right sort of character and, thus, 
is properly motivated. 
 The principle that I am recommending reflects a reasonable conception 
of the role and purpose of claims about what one ought to do.  These claims 
are or should be practical and action guiding while also promoting value.  A 
theory that suggested that an agent ought to do things that go beyond his 
abilities or that are impossible in his circumstances would be an impractical 
and unreasonable theory.  It would underwrite impossible demands and offer 
little in the way of guidance.  At the opposite end of the spectrum, a normative 
theory that suggested that a person ought to do something only if she can 
actually work up the motivation to do it would be nearly pointless.  It would not 
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demand that we act virtuously.  Instead, it would make the demands of 
morality and rationality depend on what the agent already cared about and on 
how stuck the agent is in her ways.  This would offer us little in the way of 
guidance because it would demand too little.  Instead of either of these 
alternatives, the demands of a moral theory should be reasonable, prescribing 
only actions that agents have the ability and opportunity to perform, but they 
should also be demanding, expecting us to be better people than we often are.    
It might be thought that “ought” claims are stronger than this:  that they 
are not merely practical and action guiding, but that they place some stronger 
form of obligation or demand upon an agent, and as such it would be unfair to 
impose them without being more sensitive to how an agent could possibly be 
motivated.  But it is not clear what this stronger sense of “ought” is supposed 
to be.  Linking this sense with obligations does not help to make it clear, for 
the practical, action guiding “ought to do” claims I have in mind very often 
express obligations.  Winona, for example, has an obligation not to steal, and 
so she ought not to do so.  The only sense in which “ought” could express 
some stronger normative claim, one for which it might be unfair to fail to 
consider motivational obstacles, is one that is tied to blameworthiness, such 
that “A ought to ϕ” more or less entails that A would be blameworthy if he 
failed to ϕ.  This is not a use of “ought” that I am familiar with or that I find 
particularly useful.  Recall that I am inclined to say that Winona ought not 
steal, but that she may not be blameworthy if she does.  Separating what an 
agent ought to do from what she would be blameworthy for doing reflects the 
 86 
fact that there are excuses, i.e., considerations that may mitigate or entirely 
remove blame without implying that the act in question can be justified.  And if 
we need a term that tracks whether or not an agent would be blameworthy for 
ϕ-ing, I prefer “would be blameworthy for ϕ-ing.”  Of course, if one 
understands and sees a use for stronger “ought” claims of this sort, they may 
use them.  I am concerned with “ought” in its action-guiding use, which I 
believe includes its obligation-imposing use.  What I have argued is that this 
action-guiding usage should guide our will, not be guided by the will that we 
already have. 
There is one final complication that must be addressed.  I have been 
arguing that some fairly basic considerations about the nature and point of a 
normative theory suggest that, in determining what an agent ought to do, it is 
appropriate to set motivational considerations aside.  But I must also admit 
that it would be too much to set all motivational considerations aside.  After all, 
I noted earlier that normative reasons only apply to an agent that has some 
capacity to appreciate the force of those reasons.  A cat does not have a 
moral duty to respect the rights of human beings, because a cat is not capable 
of appreciating and guiding her actions in accordance with moral 
considerations.  At least part of what the cat is lacking is a capacity to be 
motivated to act on moral reasons.  And it seems that just in virtue of this it is 
always false that a cat ought to do something for moral reasons.  So, we might 
wonder why, if we are supposed to set aside the motivational limitations of, 
say, a kleptomaniac and say that the kleptomaniac should not steal, we should 
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not set aside the limitations of a cat and say that the cat ought to respect the 
rights of persons by not scratching them.   
The first thing that we need to do is get clear about this proposed 
restriction on what an agent ought to do.  It is intuitive to suppose that for an 
agent to have reason to do something, φ, she must at least be capable of 
coming to appreciate the reason.  She must, at least, have the potential to 
appreciate the relevant reasons.  This does not mean that it need be easy for 
anyone to make her appreciate and care about those reasons.  Depravity may 
make it extremely difficult to get a person to see moral reasons as legitimate 
reasons, but this is not enough to show that the depraved person should not 
act morally.  If the depraved person retains the capacities that would make it 
possible for her to care about moral considerations (or, for example, to see 
people, among other things, as deserving a certain kind of respect), that is all 
that is required.   
In order to have a reason to φ, an agent must have the potential for 
appreciating that reason.  Of course, having the potential for appreciating a 
reason must not amount to actually appreciating the full force of that reason 
and being motivated in accordance with that reason’s weight.  Requiring this 
would run afoul of our intuitions that the kleptomaniac ought not steal. Our 
examples of people who, because of motivational obstacles, cannot do what 
they ought to do were all meant to be examples of people who could 
appreciate the considerations that supported what they ought to do.  But, while 
they have the capacity to appreciate these kinds of considerations and while 
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they may have some motivation to act on them, they do not because they are 
driven by some stronger motivational force. 
   What we should require is the following.  In order for an agent to have 
a reason to φ, and so, in order for it to be the case that this agent ought to φ, it 
must be the case that this agent could, in principle, come to care about that 
sort of reason, though this might require extensive education, training, 
conditioning, intellectual persuasion, and exposure to the value underlying that 
reason.  This may only be possible “in principle” because, for example, in 
particular cases there may be no one around who has the resources, the 
skills, or the motivation to provide the kinds of education that would be 
necessary.  All that is required is that the agent has the basic intellectual and 
emotional faculties such that the right sort of education would be effective in 
producing appreciation for the relevant reasons.  When this is the case, an 
agent has a sufficient potential or capacity to appreciate a reason. 
Applying this suggestion, we might say the following.  People of 
reasonable intelligence can in general come to appreciate and care about a 
wide range of reasons:  moral, prudential, etc.  They can come to appreciate 
the value not only of themselves and others who are similar to them, but also 
of people very different than themselves, of animals, of natural areas, of 
aesthetic beauty, and many other kinds of things.  Intelligent people who suffer 
from weakness of will, from compulsive desires, from pathological fears, and 
so forth, can still come to appreciate and care about this full range of reasons.  
They simply have difficulty controlling their actions in accordance with these 
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considerations.  On the other hand, there are other people who lack the 
potential to appreciate certain kinds of value and certain kinds of reasons.  
Insanity, senility, or a mental defect may make a person incapable of 
appreciating a wide variety of reasons for action.  There might be no amount 
of moral education that could prompt a mentally incompetent person to 
appreciate moral value.  Similarly, non-human animals may only be capable of 
appreciating a limited range of reasons.  Some animals can be made, through 
training, to see that violence towards humans is not in their own interests.  But 
it seems doubtful that even the most intelligent animals can come to 
appreciate what we might call “moral reasons” for not acting violently.  So, I 
suppose that if it is true that a dog ought not bite, it is not for moral reasons.   
 So, it seems that if an agent ought to do something, then she must not 
only have the ability and opportunity to do that thing, but also the potential for 
appreciating the reasons why she ought to do that thing.  She must also have 
some capacity that would make it possible for her, given the right sort of 
education, to feel the force of the relevant reasons.  This is problematic in so 
far as it prompts one to wonder why, if the truth of “A ought to φ” requires that 
A has this potential to feel the force of the relevant reasons for φ-ing, it should 
not also require that A is actually motivated by them.  The considerations I 
have been relying on, concerning the role of a normative theory and the 
importance of the concept of an agent who is properly motivated, are sufficient 
to answer this question.  A normative theory must respect the equivalence 
between what an agent ought to do and what a properly motivated version of 
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that agent would do.  Of course, the properly motivated version of that agent 
must still be a version of that agent.  It should be like that agent except that its 
will is in proper order.  But to imagine a version of the agent that appreciates 
reasons that the actual agent does not even have the potential to come to 
appreciate is not to imagine the agent with its will in proper order.  It is to 
imagine the agent with an entirely different kind of will, a will that is susceptible 
to considerations that the actual agent could not possibly see as reasons at 
all.  A normative theory should demand that the agent be properly motivated, 
relative to that agent’s potential.     
 The considerations presented in this section suggest that if a person 
ought to do something then she has the ability and the opportunity to do that 
thing, and that she has the potential to appreciate the reasons that support 
doing that thing.  In general, when we focus on normal, healthy human agents, 
the last condition can be ignored.  We can safely assume that normal, healthy 
human agents can be taught to appreciate the full range of considerations that 
we are aware of:  moral, prudential, grammatical, etc.  But normal, healthy 
humans vary a great deal in their abilities and their circumstances.  In so far as 
they do differ, the things that they ought to do will also differ.  What an agent 
ought to do is what she would do if she were an ideally motivated human 
agent who had to cope with the actual agent’s limited abilities and 
opportunities.   
IX.   The Argument from Determinism Revisited: 
 Let us return to the Argument from Determinism and evaluate the worry 
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that if “ought” implied “can,” then determinism would imply that none of us ever 
do something we should not do.  The argument that supported that conclusion 
ran as follows: 
1) If determinism is true (and people cannot 
change the laws of nature, and people cannot 
change the past in any significant way), then no 
person can ever do anything other than what he 
or she actually does. 
2) If a person ought to do something, then he or 
she can do that thing.  
3) So, if determinism is true, then it is never the 
case that a person ought to do something other 
than what he or she, in fact, does. 
 
In discussing this argument and in discussing the meaning of “can,” we saw 
that we must interpret Premise 1 as saying that if determinism is true then no 
person can do anything other than what he actually does in the sense that 
doing anything else would be incompatible with the laws of nature and a full 
description of the state of the world at any point prior to that person’s action.  
Alternatively, according to Premise 1, if determinism were true, then doing 
otherwise is incompatible with the laws of nature and a full specification of the 
range of causally relevant features, even prior to the agent’s making a 
decision.   
 There are two questions to ask now.  Have I argued in this paper that 
Premise 2 is true, that if a person ought to do something, then she can do that 
thing?  And if so, is it true in a sense that makes this argument valid?  If we 
take Lewis to be right about the meaning and use of “can,” then I think we 
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should say that I have defended Premise 2 in this paper.  Recall that Lewis 
suggested that we use “can” to say that something is compatible with some 
range of relevant facts.  I have here argued that if an agent ought to do 
something, then doing that thing is compatible with the agent’s abilities and 
opportunities.  There is no reason to suppose that in saying that an agent can 
do something, we could not use “can” with a focus only on considerations 
about the agent’s abilities and opportunities.  What I have argued is that if an 
agent ought to do something, then she can do that thing in the sense that 
doing that thing is compatible with her abilities and her opportunities.  Of 
course, I have also argued that doing that thing need not be compatible with 
considerations about the agent’s motives.  So, while it is true that “ought” 
implies “can,” it is not true in the same sense that determinism implies 
“cannot.”  Determinism implies that doing otherwise is incompatible with the 
full range of causally relevant features of a situation.  “Ought” implies only that 
performing the relevant actions is compatible with ability and opportunity, not 
with one other crucial, causally relevant feature, motivation.  So, “can” is used 
with different significance in Premises 1 and 2, making the argument invalid. 
 It may be helpful to provide one quick example that shows how the 
argument fails.  Suppose that I find a misplaced wallet containing a significant 
amount of cash and a valid drivers license, and suppose I pocket the cash 
before turning the wallet over to the police.  If determinism were true, then 
there is a clear sense in which I could have done nothing else.  Doing anything 
else would have been incompatible with the laws of nature and the state of the 
 93 
world at anytime in the past.  But it remains the case that I ought to have left 
the cash in the wallet and made sure that the wallet made it back to its rightful 
owner.  Doing that was certainly compatible with my abilities.  I had the ability 
to simply close the wallet and walk it to the police directly, and I had a clear 
opportunity to do so.  I took the money because I was motivated by greed.  If I 
had been motivated differently, if I had been sufficiently motivated to do the 
right thing, then I certainly would have left the cash in the wallet.  I could have 
left the cash in the wallet in the sense that it was compatible with my abilities 
and opportunities (though not compatible with my will).  So, in spite of being 
deterministically caused to take the money, there does not seem to be a 
reason to deny that what I should have done, what would have been the right 
thing to do, was to leave the money.  
 So, we may maintain that “ought” implies “can” without being driven to 
think that determinism would undermine the truth of a whole range of plausible 
“ought” claims.  And this, of course, is one last thing to be said in favor of the 
idea that “ought” implies “ability and opportunity.”  It is not plausible to suppose 
that if the world happens to be deterministic, then it is never the case that we 
ought to do something other than what we in fact do.  Surely, I should not 
have drunk so much the other night.  Surely, I should not have been so critical 
of my roommate yesterday.  I am certain of both of these facts.  But certain as 
they are, they do not seem to me to be the right kind of facts to support any 
position on the truth of determinism.  To assume that determinism is false on 
these grounds would be to make a metaphysical assumption, without any 
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metaphysical basis, simply to uphold our moral intuitions.  Instead, we should 
prefer an explanation of these normative claims that does not make them 
dependant on indeterminism, and that is what my account provides. 
X. Postscript 
 In the years since this Chapter was written a number of articles have 
been written on the principle that “ought” implies “can” and related topics, one 
of which merits some attention here.  In “Reasons and Impossibility,” Bart 
Streumer argues that a person cannot have a reason to do something that he 
cannot do, and that this is the reason why “ought” implies “can.”  His central 
thesis is similar to the claim I make in Section V above to explain why the 
“ought” implies “can” principle should be limited to “ought to do” claims.  There, 
I suggested that all things considered “ought to do” claims entail claims about 
what a person has most reason to do, and that a person cannot have most 
reason to do something that he cannot do.  Streumer makes a stronger claim, 
that a person cannot have any reason to do something that he cannot do.  
This is a claim that I reject in Section V.  However, Streumer also 
acknowledges that he may have to abandon this stronger claim and concede 
that it is sufficient for his purposes if a person cannot have “a reason to 
perform an action that is not outweighed by other reasons if it is impossible 
that this person will perform this action.”45  I take this idea to be roughly 
equivalent to my claim in Section V, and thus, if correct, his arguments should 
support the claim I make there. 
                                                
45 Streumer (2007) p.359. 
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I do not want to evaluate Streumer’s arguments in detail.  There are 
reasons to quibble with each, and they do not necessarily entail his 
conclusion.  But they each have some persuasive force, and I have little to 
add to his defense of them.  I would be inclined to simply point the reader to 
them for further support of my claims here.  However, Streumer does not 
recognize that the sense of “can” in “ought” implies “can” is one that refers to 
having an ability and an opportunity, not necessarily the motivation.  Thus, 
Streumer believes that his arguments lead to the conclusion that a person 
cannot have reason to do something he cannot be motivated to do.  Indeed, 
Streumer even accepts that if a psychotic murderer cannot resist the urge to 
murder, there cannot be a reason for him to stop murdering.46  I find this to be 
highly implausible, as my argument in this Chapter should indicate.  Therefore, 
I simply want to explain that even  if his arguments succeed, they do not 
require this implausible conclusion.  They are perfectly compatible with my 
version of “ought” implies “can.” 
Streumer’s first argument, which he calls the “Argument from Crazy 
Reasons,” is that unless a person’s reasons are limited by what he or she can 
do, then people would have reasons to do all sorts of bizarre and impossible 
things, like travel back in time to single handedly stop the Crusades, or jump 
30,000 feet in the air to single handedly repair a jet’s failing engines, or invent 
cures for diseases even though one cannot grasp the science required to do 
so.  Tellingly, all of Streumer’s examples of implausible reasons are reasons to 
                                                
46 Id. p.370. 
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perform actions that are not within our abilities and opportunities, not actions 
that we simply lack the motivation to perform.  There is nothing implausible 
about having a reason to do something that we are unmotivated to do.  It may 
be “crazy” to say that a person has reason to jump 30,000 feet up in the air, 
but there is nothing “crazy” about suggesting that a kleptomaniac has reason 
not to steal or that a person standing in the road paralyzed with fear has 
reason to move.    
Streumer’s second argument, the “Argument from Tables and Chairs,” 
is that when a person cannot perform a particular action, that person is “in the 
same position with regard to this action that a table or chair is in with regard to 
all actions.”  Thus, Streumer argues that, like the table or chair, the person has 
no reason to perform that action.  Of course, tables and chairs lack abilities to 
perform any actions.  Moreover, they are not simply unmotivated to perform 
actions, they are entirely incapable of appreciating any normative 
considerations or becoming motivated by them.  Thus, while a person who 
lacks the ability or opportunity to perform a particular action might be said to 
be in some manner akin to a table or chair with regard to that action, it does 
not follow that a person who does have the ability and opportunity to perform 
the action in question and who has the general capacity to appreciate reasons 
is in any manner akin to a table or chair.  Unlike a table or chair, this latter sort 
of person would perform the action (or would try and be reasonably likely to 
succeed) if he appreciated and was sufficiently motivated by a reason to do 
so.  Therefore, this argument does not suggest that a person cannot have a 
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reason to do something if he is pathologically motivated to do otherwise. 
Finally, Streumer’s third argument, the “Argument from Deliberation,” is 
that if we could have reason to do something impossible, then rational 
deliberation would be pointless because it would almost always lead to the 
conclusion that we have most reason to travel back in time to prevent serious 
atrocities that involved huge amounts of death and suffering, such as the 
Crusades, slavery, and the two World Wars.  Deciding what we have most 
reason to do would be pointless if we were constantly led to the conclusion 
that we have most reason to do things that we clearly lack the ability or 
opportunity to do.  Is the same true if deliberation sometimes leads us to the 
conclusion that we should do things that we cannot successfully motivate 
ourselves to do?  Would it be pointless if it led the kleptomaniac to the 
conclusion that she has most reason not to steal?  Perhaps the normal 
conclusion of deliberation would not have the same point that it has where one 
has no problem becoming motivated to do what one ought.  If the 
kleptomaniac recognizes that she is unable or unlikely to follow the result of 
her deliberation, she will not yet know what to do.  She will need to deliberate 
further about what she should do instead, such as avoiding circumstances in 
which she will be tempted to steal.  But this does not make the initial 
deliberation or its initial conclusion pointless.  Concluding that she ought not to 
steal supports her further deliberation and conclusion that she ought to find a 
way to avoid situations in which she might steal.  In addition, for all we know, 
the conclusion that she ought not steal may have some effect over the long 
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term, even if it is not effective in the immediate instance.   
There is nothing unusual about concluding that we really ought not to 
do something, then recognizing that we do not fully trust ourselves to avoid the 
temptation, and so coming up with a plan to avoid the temptation.  It may be 
that I have most reason to go to a particular café to do my work.  Suppose that 
it is within walking distance and therefore I could work there while loaning my 
car to a friend who would like to borrow it.  But it may also true that if I tried to 
do so, I would probably end up wasting time using their free internet 
connection.  In that case, I may come to the conclusion that I should keep my 
car and drive to my office instead, even while recognizing that this is a 
suboptimal solution.  This does not make deliberating about what I have most 
reason to do pointless.  Thus, Streumer’s Argument from Deliberation may 
show that in order for deliberation to be useful our reasons must be limited in 
accordance with our abilities and opportunities, but it does not show that our 
reasons should be limited in accordance with our wills.    
Therefore, I conclude that Streumer’s arguments are consistent with the 
position that I have argued for here, and that, to the extent they are 
persuasive, they support my position. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
GETTING REAL ABOUT MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 
 
I.  Introduction 
In Chapter One, I argued that determinism would not undermine the 
truth of common sense normative claims about what people ought to do.  
However, discussions of determinism and morality often focus not on that 
issue, but instead on whether it makes sense to think of ourselves as morally 
responsible if determinism is true.  It is natural to ask how it could be 
appropriate to blame, to resent, to shun, and to punish, or even to praise and 
reward, a person for an action that was determined by past events that were 
entirely beyond that person’s control.  These worries about moral responsibility 
are sometimes put in terms of a supposed inability to do otherwise:  how could 
a person be morally responsible for an action if she could not have done 
anything else?  But they need not be put this way.  We might simply ask how a 
person could be responsible for an action that is the inevitable unfolding of 
events beyond the person’s influence or control.  
In this Chapter, to begin addressing these questions, I focus on some 
preliminary questions:  what does moral responsibility involve and on what 
grounds might it be deserved?  This chapter presents a descriptive account of 
blame and blameworthiness and of praise and praiseworthiness for actions 
and omissions.  By a descriptive account, I mean one that is primarily intended 
to capture the essence of our actual attitudes or practices and our actual 
usage of terms like “blame” and “blameworthy.”  An account of blame and 
praise is, of course, not a full account of moral responsibility.  We hold each 
other responsible in many ways.  A full survey of these practices would be 
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long and unwieldy, and I suspect, an illustration of diminishing returns.  The 
bulk of my focus shall be on blame, and as we shall see, it is difficult enough 
to get a grasp on that.  This focus is appropriate. Blame is particularly 
important because, I shall argue below, it provides a foundation for some of 
the other ways we hold people responsible for bad behavior.  In particular, if 
we can show that blame is justifiable, we will have gone some ways towards 
showing that retributive punishment could be justifiable as well, and if we 
cannot support blame and praise, then I see no way of supporting many of the 
other ways in which we hold people responsible for bad behavior.    
II.   Strawson’s Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility 
A clear account of blame, and of moral responsibility more generally, is 
essential to identifying the conditions that make blame and moral responsibility 
appropriate.  As a result, such an account is also crucial in trying to 
understand whether determinism (or anything else) would make those 
conditions unsatisfiable.   
To illustrate this point, consider Galen Strawson’s argument for his 
position that “true moral responsibility” is “impossible.”  According to Strawson, 
“it makes no difference whether determinism is true or false.  We cannot be 
truly or ultimately morally responsible for our actions in either case.”47  
Strawson states his argument for this conclusion as follows: 
1) Interested as we are in [action for which a 
person could be responsible], we are 
particularly interested in actions that are 
performed for a reason (as opposed to ‘reflex’ 
actions or mindlessly habitual actions). 
2) When one acts for a reason, what one does is a 
function of how one is, mentally speaking.  . . . . 
                                                
47 Strawson, Galen (1994) p.212. 
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3) So, if one is to be truly responsible for how one 
acts, one must be truly responsible for how one 
is, mentally speaking—at least in certain 
respects. 
4) But to be truly responsible for how one is, 
mentally speaking, in certain respects, one 
must have brought it about that one is [that 
way].  And it is not merely that one must have 
caused oneself to be [that way].  One must 
have consciously and explicitly chosen to be 
[that way], and one must have succeeded in 
bringing it about that one is that way. 
5) But one cannot really be said to choose, in a 
conscious, reasoned[] fashion, to be the way 
one is mentally speaking, in any respect at all, 
unless one already exists, mentally speaking, 
already equipped with some principles of 
choice, ‘P1’—preferences, values, pro-attitudes, 
ideals—in the light of which one chooses how to 
be. 
6) But then to be truly responsible, on account of 
having chosen to be the way one is, mentally 
speaking, in certain respects, one must be truly 
responsible for one’s having the principles of 
choice P1 in the light of which one chose how to 
be. 
7) But for this to be so one must have chosen P1[ ] 
in a reasoned, conscious, intentional fashion. 
8) But for this, i.e. (7), to be so one must have 
already had some principles of choice P2, in the 
light of which one chose P1. 
9) And so on.  Here we are setting out on a 
regress that we cannot stop.  True self-
determination is impossible because it requires 
the actual completion of an infinite series of 
choices of principles of choice. 
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10) So, true moral responsibility is impossible, 
because it requires true self-determination, as 
noted in (3).48   
In the initial steps of the argument, Strawson suggests that when one 
acts for reasons, one does so because of one’s mental constitution, including, 
I would suppose, one’s mood, values, beliefs, desires, and other mental traits 
and attitudes.  This seems fair enough.  If I steal when presented with an 
opportunity, it may be because I am greedy, or because I feel desperate and 
believe that I have no other options, or because I believe there is nothing 
wrong with stealing.  The circumstances present me with (what I take to be) a 
reason for stealing only because I am “mentally speaking” one of these (or 
other similar) ways.  Similarly, if I take a very slight provocation as a reason for 
lashing out, it could be because I am, “mentally speaking,” irritable, short-
tempered, and lacking in perspective.  Others who are calm and even-keeled 
might disregard or be only mildly perturbed by a similarly slight provocation.  
So, I see nothing controversial in supposing that what we take to be reasons 
and which of those reasons we act on generally depends on what we believe, 
what we care about, how we feel, and more generally, our state of mind.   
But consider the next steps in Strawson’s argument,  premises 3 and 4, 
which propose that in order to be responsible for action, one must be 
responsible for this underlying state of mind and, more specifically, that one 
must have consciously and explicitly chosen it.  Strawson seems to be 
claiming that if I do lash out in response to slight provocation because I am 
irritable, I am responsible for doing so only if I “consciously and explicitly” 
chose to be irritable.  These premises 3 and 4 are each substantive 
                                                
48 Strawson, Galen (1994) pp.212-13. 
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assumptions in Strawson’s argument.  They do not follow as inferences from 
premises 1 and 2.  They are Strawson’s assertions about the conditions of 
moral responsibility.  Do we have any reason to accept them?   
We can develop a case to test whether premises 3 and 4 are consistent 
with our intuitions about blameworthiness.  Suppose that I am riding a 
crowded subway, and I am jostled and bumped by the other commuters.  I 
become annoyed that my fellow commuters seem more concerned about 
clearing space for themselves than they are about jostling me.  Suppose that 
on this particular hot and crowded day, I become annoyed enough to lash out 
at a fellow rider who I believe has been inconsiderate.  Perhaps he stepped on 
my foot without apologizing and then continued to lean into me in an effort to 
give himself extra space.  Rather than politely ask him to move, I lose my cool 
and give him a firm shove followed by an aggressive and angry stare.  
Assume that the situation defuses. Perhaps he is cooler-headed than I am, 
and soon afterwards one of us leaves the train, preventing any further 
interaction.  As I calm down, I realize that the rider I shoved may not have 
meant to do anything wrong.  He may not have even been aware of how his 
presence was imposing upon mine.  In any case, my response was excessive 
and inappropriate.  I also figure that the best explanation of why I lashed out is 
that I was unusually stressed and irritable as a result of things having nothing 
to do with him or with my commute.  I took his conduct to be a reason for 
shoving him at the time only because of this stress and irritation, but I later 
realize that it was not a good reason at all.  
As we are testing the plausibility of Strawson’s assumptions, we need 
not yet accept the conclusion of his argument.  So, assume for a moment, 
contra Strawson, that we are sometimes blameworthy.  If we are, then the 
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foregoing incident seems to be a case in which I am.   Shoving strangers and 
glaring at them for no good reason is not conduct I should be proud to tell 
others about.  Instead, I should feel ashamed of this behavior, and I should 
seek to avoid behaving in this way in the future.  In addition to blaming myself, 
I believe that I would deserve to be blamed and looked upon badly by those 
who witnessed or heard about my conduct.  If I have the opportunity, I should 
apologize.  Moreover, if I had happened to knock my fellow commuter over 
and cause some significant injury, I could rightly be held financially 
accountable, I might deserve some reasonable sort of criminal punishment, 
and I could not rightly complain if the victim or a bystander reported my assault 
to the authorities.  
This poses a problem for Strawson’s argument.  In premise 4, Strawson 
assumes that in order to be blameworthy I must have “consciously and 
explicitly chosen” the state of mind that led me to act in this way.  But my 
sense that I am blameworthy in my subway case does not depend at all on 
whether I ever chose, much less “consciously and explicitly” chose the 
stressed and irritable state of mind that led me to lash out in that way.  Indeed, 
the very idea of such a choice can seem bizarre (“I have decided how I shall 
be:  irritable and short-tempered.”).49  In my example, the act of lashing out 
might even be the first clear piece of evidence that makes me aware that I 
have, without ever thinking about it, become so irritable and easily provoked.  
If so, that might mitigate my blameworthiness, but it hardly absolves me of all 
responsibility.  However I came to be irritable and short-tempered, the fact that 
                                                
49 Perhaps Strawson would claim that irritability is not the sort of mental state he has 
in mind.  He might instead point to my belief that this fellow rider was being inconsiderate and 
that such inconsiderateness warrants aggressive retaliation.  But these fleeting beliefs were 
certainly not consciously and explicitly chosen by me.  They were the product of my irritation 
and stress.   
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I did not consciously and explicitly choose to be that way in no way prevents 
me from deserving blame and even punishment for what I do as a result.   
There is nothing peculiar or unusual about the case I have described.  
Similar examples could be developed involving other common mental states 
that lead us to do things for which we may be blamed, including 
absentmindedness, distraction, jealousy, and many others.  Few, if any of us, 
ever choose to be absentminded, distracted, or jealous, but we can deserve 
blame when these mental traits lead us to act badly.  Thus, when applied to 
blameworthiness and blame, Galen Strawson’s argument depends on 
assumptions about the conditions of moral responsibility, that are unmotivated 
and contrary to common sense intuitions about responsibility.50   
The case I have described most clearly belies premise 4, but it also 
indicates that premise 3 is dubious as well.  Without premise 4 to elucidate its 
meaning, premise 3 is problematically vague.  If premise 3 is meant to say that 
                                                
50 One might counter by proposing a different premise 4:  though I need not choose to 
be short-tempered, it must be that I could have chosen not to be so.  This proposal helps 
Strawson’s argument only if we can make sense of this counterfactual requirement and only if 
we can generate a similar regress by focusing on that counterfactual choice.  But it is not clear 
that we can do either.  First, any proponent of this response owes us an account of the sense 
of “could have chosen” at issue here.  Identifying an adequate and plausible sense of “could 
have chosen” seems particularly difficult here.  As suggested above, it is possible that I 
gradually became short-tempered without realizing it or ever meaning to become that way.  
Without awareness of this shift, it is not clear what kind of choice I ever really had about it.  
And even if we can identify some weak sense in which I did have a choice, it is not clear how 
the existence of that kind of choice helps explain why I am blameworthy.  Second, the final 
steps of Strawson’s argument seem to falter on this counterfactual approach.  Strawson’s 
argument generates a problematic regress because each of the choices required is a choice 
that must actually have been made.  There is no objection that any one of the choices is 
impossible.  It is only impossible for all of them to be made.  And it is the fact that each must 
actually be made that means that all of them must actually be made.  But on the 
counterfactual approach, at each step we would only require that a prior choice could have 
been made.  Each of these counterfactual requirements may be satisfied:  for principles of 
choice C1, I could have chosen not-C1; for principles of choice C2 relevant to that prior 
choice, I could have chosen not-C2; etc.  We do not generate an impossible result if it is 
required that I could have chosen otherwise at each level.  We generate an impossible result 
only if it must be that I could have made all of these other choices in the same counterfactual 
scenario.  I cannot imagine any basis for this shift from each to all. 
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one must be morally responsible for the mental state that causes or explains 
the action, I take no position on its truth.  In the cases I have described, I am 
uncertain but I suppose that I might be morally responsible for being irritable 
and short tempered even if I did not choose to be that way.  But if premise 3 is 
meant to suggest that I must be causally responsible, that I must have 
affirmatively done something to bring about that mental state, then the case I 
have just described suggests that premise 3 is implausible as well.    
So, why would Strawson think that premises 3 and 4 can bear any 
weight?  Strawson’s consistent use of “true” as a prefix to “moral 
responsibility” is a signal that his argument is targeted at a strong, and 
perhaps idiosyncratic, conception of responsibility.  Strawson explains that 
conception here:   
What sort of ‘true’ moral responsibility is being said 
to be both impossible and widely believed in?   
. . . . As I understand it, true moral responsibility is 
responsibility of such a kind that, if we have it, then 
it makes sense, at least, to suppose that it could be 
just to punish some of us with (eternal) torment in 
hell and reward others with (eternal) bliss in 
heaven. . . . The story of heaven and hell is useful 
simply because it illustrates, in a particularly vivid 
way, the kind of absolute or ultimate accountability 
or responsibility that many have supposed 
themselves to have, and that many suppose 
themselves to have.51  
Strawson’s target matters.  Though I am not prepared to endorse his 
argument as applied to heaven and hell, his problematic assumptions certainly 
become more plausible if we are talking about desert of heaven and hell.  To 
see this, we need to consider the special significance of heaven and hell.  
                                                
51 Strawson, Galen (1994) p.216. 
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Eternal punishment and reward are not merely longer or more intense forms of 
responsibility than their human-imposed counterparts.  They differ in kind.  
Human-imposed forms of responsibility come to an end.  There comes a point 
at which the blameworthy or praiseworthy person has received her due.  There 
may also come a point at which the person has shown through remorse or 
relevant changes in character, for example, that she no longer deserves to be 
held responsible for a past act.  In contrast, the boundlessness of hell means 
that there is no point at which the wrongdoer will have properly paid for his sin.  
There is no point at which he will have suffered enough and the punishment 
should stop, and there is no point at which the wrongdoer will either deserve or 
receive a chance to redeem himself.  Similarly, an eternity in heaven means 
that there is no point at which the person will have to show her moral worth 
again.  As a result, heaven and hell have a kind of finality and conclusiveness 
that no form of human-imposed responsibility can have.52   
Because eternal bliss and eternal torment are final and conclusive 
responses to human choices, they convey, and their propriety depends upon, 
a final and conclusive assessment of a person’s “fundamental” moral worth.  
This is not a claim of religious doctrine, but of substantive moral theory.  One 
cannot believe that a person deserves eternal torment unless one believes 
that the person is fundamentally bad and that there will be no need to revisit 
this assessment in the future or to provide that person with a new opportunity 
                                                
52 Capital punishment and imprisonment for life may seem to have a degree of finality.  
Without admitting that I am bound to defend these particular practices here, I would note that 
even these most final of human-imposed punishments come to an end.  It is quite possible to 
suppose that, when they end, the person has been punished enough and has paid his due.  
Moreover, the lives of the people subjected to these punishments can always be reevaluated 
from a moral perspective (regardless of whether the law permits an opportunity for release or 
clemency).  Finally, if we believe in an afterlife, we typically believe that their fate will be 
judged anew by a less fallible authority.    
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to prove whether he has changed.  If one supposes that the assessment 
should be revisited at some point in the future, then one believes that the 
person deserves torment until that time, at which point he may or may not 
deserve further torment. 
These considerations provide some support to Strawson’s argument as 
directed at heaven and hell.  My subway case suggests that we can be 
blameworthy for behavior caused by mental states that we did not choose.  
But this sort of blameworthy behavior does not, on its own, support 
condemnation to hell.  An isolated instance in which irritability gets the better 
of me does not show that I am fundamentally a bad person who deserves 
eternal torment.  My behavior might have been an aberration, the unusual 
result of an unlikely circumstance.  The fact that I am susceptible to such 
behavior is significant, but it may be less indicative of who I truly am, than my 
normal, much more decent behavior or my nearly immediate feelings of 
remorse and shame.  It could be that my short-temper and irritability are faults 
that I do not approve of and that I have been diligently striving to correct.  
Whether I am surprised at my behavior or not, the behavior may reflect traits 
that I am, in a sense, merely subject to, rather than revealing whether I am 
fundamentally good or bad.  A final or conclusive assessment that could 
support eternal punishment requires behavior that reveals who I truly am, not 
behavior that reveals a disposition or desire that simply affects me or that I 
have not had an opportunity to master.  Thus, my subway example does not 
appear to provide a very compelling counterexample to Strawson’s argument 
when the argument is directed at heaven and hell.  Instead, when dealing with 
desert of  heaven and hell, the need to make a final and fundamental 
judgment pushes us to look for mental causes that are not merely given to us, 
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whether by deterministic cause or by indeterministic chance, but instead that 
have some deeper connection to our true character.  Strawson’s premises 3 
and 4 arguably identify one way in which we might seek to assure such a 
connection.  Choice is a natural proposal for establishing that the mental 
causes of our actions flow from and reflect who we truly are, rather than some 
merely given influences.53   
This is not to say that I endorse Strawson’s argument once it is directed 
at eternal torment and eternal bliss.  It is not clear to me that choice is the only 
condition that could establish an adequate connection between the mental 
causes of our actions and our fundamental nature (assuming that there is such 
a thing as a fundamental nature).  Nor is it clear that, if choice is an 
appropriate condition, it must be the sort of choice that generates Strawson’s 
regress.  I have to admit that my grip on, and interest in, the idea of a 
fundamental moral nature is not strong enough to resolve these issues.  But I 
do find it to be clear that desert of heaven and hell would require that it be 
possible to make some sort of final and overall assessment of a person’s 
moral worth, and that this in turn would need to be based on something more 
                                                
53 Note that I am not appealing to the intuition that a person must have an adequate 
opportunity to avoid hell.  T.M. Scanlon appeals to this idea in explaining why Strawson’s 
conditions may apply to hell, but not to his own account of blame.  Scanlon (2008) pp.182-85, 
190. The idea that a severe punishment, such as hell, should be avoidable has some intuitive 
appeal, but I do not find it adequate to explain the appeal of Strawson’s argument, nor to show 
why it would not apply to responsibility more generally.  The intuition does not explain why 
Strawson requires “conscious and explicit choice” rather than the mere opportunity to avoid.  
Nor does it explain why the argument would apply to heaven as well as hell.  Most importantly, 
this intuition does not capture why hell might be categorically different than blame.  Without 
some categorical difference of the sort that I have suggested above, we may be on a slippery 
slope.  If, for example, the unpleasantness or harshness of hell supports the need for an 
adequate opportunity to avoid, then why does not the unpleasantness of normal punishment 
here in the real world?  And if that does, then why does the unpleasantness of severe blame 
or the unpleasantness of mild blame? 
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than the sorts of behavior that can support the temporary and terminable 
blame that we impose here in this world. 
This presents us with a challenge.  I have argued that desert of heaven 
and hell require the propriety of a certain kind of judgment or assessment 
about a person, and that the nature of this assessment in turn is needed to 
support the conditions that Strawson imposes.  But in rejecting the application 
of these same conditions to the desert of blame and punishment, I have relied 
only on intuitions about particular cases of blame.  I have neither developed 
this idea of blame into an alternative to Strawson’s understanding of moral 
responsibility, nor given any positive account of the sort of conditions that are 
required in order for a person to deserve to be held responsible in these ways.  
To get a grip on what those conditions are, we should first understand what 
blame and praise are.  If heaven and hell represent “true” moral responsibility, 
I shall argue that blame and praise are the core elements of “real” moral 
responsibility, that which may be imposed by human persons here in this 
world.  This is a more mundane topic than Strawson’s, to be sure, but it is one 
of considerable importance nonetheless.    
III.   Proposals for an Account of Blameworthiness and Blame 
Blame has been the subject of considerable philosophical attention in 
recent years.  In this section, I consider a number of views of blame, including 
George Sher’s dispositional account; a proposal, based on P.F. Strawson’s 
work, that emphasizes the role of so-called reactive attitudes; and T.M. 
Scanlon’s relationship-based account.  I argue that these approaches do not 
reliably track our intuitions about particular cases of blame.  Both Strawson 
and Scanlon point us in the direction of an important general feature of blame, 
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which is that blame involves a modification to a person’s moral standing, but, I 
argue, neither develops this idea in the right way. 
A. Blaming is Not Merely Judging or Stating that a Particular 
Person is at Fault.   
There is a sense in which we blame merely by identifying a person as 
the person to blame, whether we do this in an unexpressed judgment or in a 
communicative act.  “Finger pointing” is a common term for this sort of 
blaming.  If there is a question about who committed some bad act or 
produced some bad consequence, and John says “James did it,” then it will be 
true to say that John “blamed” James.  To blame in this sense, John need not 
even believe that James was at fault.  Of course, John’s blaming act could be 
backed by a belief that James really is the person at fault.  But in either case, 
John has pointed the finger at James, and thus, James could ask, “Why did 
you blame me?” 
This is not the sort of blame that I am interested in.  A simple example 
shows that there is a richer and more interesting kind of blame.  Suppose that 
a colleague has done something that you find morally repugnant, and as a 
result, you are disappointed and angry with him.  You may have distanced 
yourself from him to a certain extent, but your lives are intertwined in ways that 
make it difficult to cut off all ties.  You must work together, and you have 
shared friends, commitments, and projects.  Your disappointment and anger 
with him makes this difficult.  He might say to you, “I know that what I did was 
wrong, and I understand why you are upset with me.  I deserve it.  But please, 
you need to stop blaming me.  We need to be able to put this behind us if we 
are going to work together.”  This may or may not be a fair request.  We can 
set that issue aside.  The point is that when he asks you to stop blaming him, 
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he is not asking that you stop believing that he is at fault, or the person to 
blame.  After all, he is admitting that he was wrong and that he deserved to be 
held responsible.  Nor need he be asking you to stop identifying him as the 
person to blame.  He may understand that you should continue to answer 
questions about who is to blame truthfully.  Instead, what he is asking is that 
you put the issue in the past and stop letting his blameworthy acts affect the 
way you feel about him and the way you interact with him.  In other words, by 
“blaming,” he refers not to any judgment or speech act identifying him as the 
person at fault, but instead to the change that such a judgment has created in 
the way that you treat him. 
There is another reason to suppose that blaming is something more 
than simply stating or judging that a particular person is at fault.  
Blameworthiness is the state of deserving blame.  “A is blameworthy for X” 
means that A deserves blame for X.  But saying or judging that A is 
blameworthy for X is a perfectly good way of saying or judging that A is at fault 
for X.  So, if blame is simply an act or a judgment identifying the person to 
blame, then attributions of blameworthiness would seem somewhat empty.  
Admittedly, attributions of blameworthiness would not necessarily be 
meaningless.  Attributions of blameworthiness might convey not only that one 
blames A, but also make it explicit that one believes it is appropriate to do so.  
However, when we say that a person is blameworthy, we presumably mean 
something more than that he deserves to be identified as the person to blame.  
We seem to mean that the person actually deserves to be held responsible in 
some way.  Thus, we seem to be indicating that the “blame” of which the 
person is “worthy” is something more robust.     
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Some examples help confirm that we do maintain a distinction between 
judging a person to be blameworthy and actually blaming them.  First, 
suppose that Raul reasonably judges that his boss is blameworthy for having 
an extra-marital affair, but that he also believes that it is none of his business 
to care about this.  Not only might Raul think it is imprudent to concern himself 
with his boss’s personal life, he might also feel that it would be inappropriately 
nosey and intrusive.  And so Raul might decide that he will leave it to others to 
blame his boss, and that he will simply keep his relationship respectful, cordial, 
and professional.  Thus, Raul can believe that his boss is blameworthy, while 
also believing that he is not the one to say or do anything about it.   
As a second example, suppose that Raul is told about an episode in 
which George, someone he knows only by description, did something morally 
wrong without a decent excuse, but this episode has nothing to do with Raul or 
anyone he knows.  If asked whether George is blameworthy, Raul might agree 
that he is.  But if asked whether he blames George, Raul might find the 
question odd.  He could reasonably respond, “Do I blame him?  I don’t know 
even know him.  I don’t condone what he did.  There’s no excuse for that sort 
of behavior, but it really isn’t any of my concern.”   
Third, suppose that Raul’s younger brother Daniel gets drunk and 
wrecks their father’s car.  Raul can admit that Daniel is fully blameworthy and 
that Daniel is going to deserve every bit of his father’s anger.  But Raul might 
say, “He’s got it coming to him, and he’s going to deserve it.  But I have no 
right to blame him.”  He might say this because he feels he would be a 
hypocrite to blame, having driven the car drunk himself and having never 
apologized or repented for it.   
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These cases each suggest that a person may believe that another 
person is blameworthy without actually blaming that person in a more robust 
sense.  This distinction between judging a person to be blameworthy and 
blaming that person would collapse if we thought of blame solely as judging or 
saying that a particular person is to blame.  Thus, we have reason to look for 
an account of a more robust sort of blame. 
B. Sher’s Account(s) of Blame 
George Sher agrees that blame is more than a mere judgment 
attributing fault.  He approaches the topic of blame by asking “what blaming 
someone adds to believing that he has acted badly or is a bad person.”54  
Thus, Sher appears to be after our same quarry.  After considering a number 
of views, Sher offers the following proposal:   
The additional element . . . is a set of affective and 
behavioral dispositions, each of which can be 
traced to the single desire that the person in 
question not have performed his past bad act or 
not have his current bad character.55 
Here, Sher seems to suggest that blame involves two elements in addition to 
believing that someone acted badly:  a desire and certain kinds of 
dispositions.   
With respect to the desire element, Sher suggests two possible 
contents:  that the person not have performed the bad act and that the person 
not have his bad character.  These desires are not meant to be 
interchangeable.  The first sort of desire is involved when we blame a person 
for a bad act, the second sort when we blame a person for his bad character.  
                                                
54 Sher (2006) p.112.   
55 Id. 
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Sher argues at length that we can and do blame people for their traits and 
characters.  As I am focusing on blame for bad acts or bad behavior, only the 
first of these desires is relevant.   
Next, with respect to the dispositional element, Sher explains that the 
relevant dispositions include dispositions to feel negative emotions toward the 
blamee, such as “anger, resentment, irritation, bitterness, hostility, fury, rage, 
outrage . . .”; dispositions to engage in hostile behavior, which might take 
virtually any form, including “writing someone out of our will,” “urinating in 
someone’s flower bed” and, presumably, simply ignoring or giving the cold 
shoulder to that someone; and dispositions to reproach the blamee.56  Sher 
claims that blame is closely associated with these attitudes and behaviors, but 
that a person can blame without actually having these attitudes and without 
actually engaging in hostile behavior.  Sher therefore relies on dispositions in 
order to explain the connection between blame and these attitudes and 
behaviors, in a way that permits the existence of blame without them.   
Though in the passage quoted above Sher seems to give dispositions a 
primary role, Sher is evasive about whether or not dispositions are actually 
essential to blame.  Immediately, after that passage, Sher asks: 
But how much of this additional element is 
essential to blame and how much is contingently 
associated with it?  To arrive at the best version of 
my proposal, should I take blame itself to 
encompass only the central desire-belief pair or 
also the various dispositions that that pair 
supports?57 
                                                
56 See id. pp.94-96. 
57 Id. p.112. 
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Sher is cagey about answering this question.  He claims that “some affective 
and behavioral dispositions may indeed be essential to blame—but . . . 
augmentation [of an account of blame with the desire that explains those 
dispositions] renders its reference to these dispositions superfluous . . . .”58  
Sher also asserts that he need not provide a definitive answer to his question 
“because the focus of our inquiry is neither a word nor a concept but a 
phenomenon in the world[,] . . . [b]ecause my topic is the nature of blame 
itself—because I am seeking neither a conceptual analysis nor a dictionary 
definition but something more akin to a theory . . . .”59  Further, Sher supposes 
that it does not matter whether we say that only the desire is essential or that 
the dispositions are essential as well, because, he claims, the blame-related 
dispositions are the “(virtually) universal” effect of the blame-essential desire, 
and that cases in which one has the desire without any of the dispositions are 
“so nonstandard” as to be “irrelevant.”60 
To be frank, I see no sense to the supposed distinction between 
conceptual analysis and theory that Sher is trying to make.  Whatever the 
distinction is supposed to be, it cannot support Sher in avoiding the question 
of whether or not the dispositions are or are not essential to blame.61  And for 
                                                
58 Id. p.98.  
59 Id. p.112. 
60 Id. 
61 The idea that one might provide an account of the phenomenon of blame apart from 
or instead of the concept of blame strikes me as deeply misguided.  The contours of the 
phenomenon of blame are not simply out there to be found in the world apart from our concept 
of blame. We respond to bad behavior in all sorts of ways.  There are no little markers out 
there in the world informing us which of those responses are blame and which are not.  Of the 
possibly infinite varieties of responses to behavior, the phenomenon of blame includes those 
responses that share features we take to be interesting and important in some way, and 
excludes those that we do not.  Thus, we cannot describe or give a theory of the phenomenon 
of blame without also specifying our concept of blame.  In any case, the suggestion that one is 
providing a theory of a type of phenomenon invites the questions, “Which phenomenon is that, 
and what features does it have?”  All other things being equal, a theory of a kind of 
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reasons that I shall explain below, I do not share Sher’s belief that the desire 
he identifies reliably leads to the dispositions.  Therefore, I will take Sher to 
have two different proposals:   
Sher1 - Blame for actions is a belief-desire pair, 
consisting of the belief that a person has acted 
badly paired with the desire that that person not 
have performed that past bad act.   
Sher2 - Blame for actions is a belief-desire pair of 
the sort identified in Sher1 together with 
dispositions to feel certain negative emotions 
toward that person, to engage in behavior hostile to 
that person, and/or to reproach that person. 
Neither of these proposals provides an adequate theory of blame. 
 Let us begin with Sher1.  This proposal features the idea of a past-
oriented and now-unsatisfiable desire:  the desire that a person had not 
performed a bad act.  Sher supposes that, although unsatisfiable, this desire 
still has effects and, except perhaps in people with “nonstandard psychology,” 
produces dispositions to negative emotions, hostile behavior, etc.   Before 
considering that suggestion, we should pause to note that the very idea of a 
past-oriented desire can sound a bit odd.  We do not normally attribute 
“desires” that the past were different.  The words “desire” and “want” are 
typically used to describe a desire, preference, or yearning for something in 
the present or the future.62  But in the broad sense of “desire” often used in 
philosophical discussions – a sense that covers a broad range of attitudes 
contrasted with beliefs – it may make sense to speak of past-oriented desires.  
                                                                                                                                       
phenomenon is better to the extent it answers these questions with a robust and precise 
account of the features that instances of this phenomenon always, sometimes, or never have.  
Sher is simply refusing to answer these sorts of questions. 
62 We do often attribute desires that the present be different in some way that would 
require the past to have been different.  For example, an orphan may want his parents to be 
alive.  But this is not the same as specifically wanting or desiring that their death did not occur. 
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Such attitudes are just more commonly referred to as “wishes.”  In short, we 
want things to be different (now), but we wish that things had gone differently.   
Characterizing the desire in Sher1 as a wish does not downgrade its 
significance or prevent it from playing the motivational and disposition-
grounding roles that Sher attributes to it.  An unsatisfied wish can be a very 
strong motivating or explanatory force.  We often explain behavior by 
reference to wishes about the past.  A retiree might take a “Great Books” 
course because he has long wished that he had gotten a liberal arts 
education.  A person might lie about his past without expecting much benefit 
from it, primarily because he wishes that past were different.  And of course, a 
person may be led to depression and all sorts of desperate acts because of 
the things he wishes he had done differently.  
Using the more familiar term helps us to construct cases that will enable 
us to evaluate Sher1.  If we are not familiar with cases in which a person has a 
desire that a person not have performed a past bad act, we should be quite 
familiar with cases in which we wish that a person had not.  Those familiar 
cases show that (a) Sher1 is subject to counterexamples, because people 
very often have the belief-desire pair in question without blaming, and (b) that 
the belief-desire pair identified in Sher1 very often does not give rise to the 
dispositions that Sher takes to be characteristic of, if not essential to, blame. 
Recall Raul, who does not blame his brother for wrecking their father’s 
car because it would be hypocritical of him to do so.  Raul recognizes that his 
brother acted badly.  He also surely wishes that Daniel had not driven drunk 
and wrecked the car.  He cares about Daniel and does not want to see him in 
trouble.  He may also have been counting on borrowing that car himself.  And 
we can also suppose that Raul wishes that Daniel had not wrecked the car 
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because it shows disrespect and causes hardship for his father.63  So Raul 
can believe that Daniel did something wrong, wish that Daniel had not done it, 
and yet choose not to blame Daniel.  He may feel that he should not blame 
Daniel, and so he may choose to support him and sympathize with him 
instead.  As before, it still seems that Raul believes that Daniel is blameworthy 
but does not himself blame Daniel.  The addition of Sher’s wish or past-
oriented desire does not change the situation. 
The same may be true in the case of Raul and his philandering boss.  
He may judge that his boss acted badly, and he may wish his boss had not 
done so.  Perhaps he feels badly for the spouse, perhaps he is saddened by 
the damage to their relationship, and perhaps he even feels badly for his boss, 
who may be suffering harsh emotional and personal consequences. Yet Raul 
may decide to stay out of it and to remain respectful, friendly, and even 
                                                
63 My list of Raul’s reasons for caring calls attention to the fact that a person may wish 
that someone had not acted badly for reasons other than concern for the underlying moral 
considerations.  Raul wishes Daniel had not acted badly in part because he does not want 
Daniel to suffer and because he may have wanted to borrow the car.  The example does not 
depend on such non-moral reasons because Raul’s respect and sympathy for the car’s owner 
could also support the requisite backward-looking desire.   
Nonetheless, the suggestion opens up a broad array of potential counterexamples to 
Sher1.  For example, I may believe that you acted badly when you robbed that bank, and I 
may wish that you had not done so because now my own heist looks much less daring in 
comparison or because I had plans to rob that same bank the following day.  And when I get 
back at you by turning you in, your defense attorney may also wish you had not acted badly 
because he had been planning a vacation.  If we take Sher1 at face value, these are 
counterexamples.  Sher1 calls only for a belief that a person acted badly and a desire “that the 
person in question not have performed his past bad act.”  Both your attorney and I agree that 
you acted badly, and we both wish you had not.  But neither your attorney nor I blame you for 
acting badly.  I am merely jealous, and your attorney is inconvenienced.   
However, these probably are not counterexamples to the spirit of Sher’s proposal.  
Sher describes the desire as “a specifically moral desire—because it is directed at the non-
existence of a bad act . . . .”  Sher (2006) p.109.  For reasons we have just seen, that 
“because” clause is mistaken.  A desire for the non-existence of a bad act is not necessarily a 
moral desire, even if the badness of the act is among the reasons for the desire.  Nonetheless, 
I will assume that what Sher intends is that blame requires a specifically moral desire that the 
person not have performed that past bad act, i.e., a desire that arises out of one’s concern for 
the very moral considerations that make the act bad.  Therefore, I am not relying on 
counterexamples that depend on clearly non-moral desires. 
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sympathetic to his boss.  Thus, it would seem that Raul can have the belief-
desire pair, but lack the corresponding dispositions, and it would be odd to say 
that Raul blames in this situation. 
Sher1 also faces a serious problem in cases of forgiveness.  Forgiving 
puts an end to blaming, but it need not put an end to believing that the person 
acted badly or to wishing that he had not done so. Returning to the drunk 
driving example, suppose now that there would be no hypocrisy in Raul 
blaming Daniel, but instead that Raul, recognizing that his brother is 
remorseful, forgives him and chooses to provide support.  Raul recognizes 
that his brother acted badly, and he may strongly wish that his brother had not 
done so.  Raul does not deny that Daniel is blameworthy, and he may believe 
that others would be well within their rights to blame or even punish Daniel, but 
for his own part, he has forgiven and does not blame.  Furthermore, having 
forgiven Daniel, Raul is not disposed to be angry or hostile towards him.  Raul 
has the belief-desire pair identified in Sher1, but he is not disposed to anger 
and hostility, and he does not blame. 
 Tragic figures also present a problem for Sher1.  We can acknowledge 
that they are blameworthy, and we often sincerely wish that they had not acted 
badly, but we tend to feel sympathy and sadness rather than anger, hostility 
and blame.  We can see Hamlet’s tendency to brood and his failure to act 
swiftly as moral failings, but our belief that he is blameworthy may not lead us 
to blame Hamlet, and it certainly need not lead us to feel anger or hostility.  
Instead, we may feel sadness and sympathy.  Or in Season 2 of the television 
series, The Wire, Ziggy is clearly blameworthy for his ill-fated decision to sell 
drugs and for the increasingly poor decisions he makes when this plan goes 
awry.  It would be difficult to watch the series without wishing that he had not 
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done these things to himself or to others who are harmed as a result.  But it is 
quite normal to feel only sadness and sympathy for Ziggy, not to have any 
disposition toward anger or hostility.   
The absence of blame in these cases is not simply a form of 
detachment that comes with fiction.  There are real tragic figures who generate 
a similar reaction.  Many of them are likeable, brilliant, or, in many ways, 
admirable people who have significant flaws that lead them to frustrate their 
own interests and cause harm to others.  We may recognize that those flaws 
are not going to change, and yet continue to care for and respect such people.  
Though such a person might be mentally troubled, he need not be, or at least 
he need not be so troubled as to preclude responsibility.  We can believe that 
such people are accountable to those they harm and, if their acts are criminal, 
to the public at large.  Yet, for our own part, we may accept that the flaws that 
cause these bad acts are simply a part of who this person is.  Having accepted 
them, we may choose not to blame.  We may recognize that their actions are 
bad, and sincerely wish that they had not performed them, but this belief and 
desire will tend only to produce sadness and sympathy, not anger or hostility, 
and not the sorts of changes that we would normally think of as blame.  
 Acceptance of flaws is not limited to tragic cases.  We can accept all 
sorts of flaws.  Consider a wife who comes to accept that her husband of 
many years has a temper or that he harbors certain unjustifiable prejudices.  
She need not approve of her husband’s flaws or the resulting behavior.  She 
might wish very much that her husband did not throw temper tantrums or did 
not make racist remarks.  But having long ago recognized that these things 
are not going to change, she might no longer be susceptible to feelings of 
frustration, and she might have no disposition to be upset or angry.  She has 
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learned to simply wait for the temper to pass or to ignore the comment and 
change the topic.  Depending on the behavior and the circumstances, it could 
be wrong for her to accept such flaws.  That is not my concern.  What matters 
is that people sometimes do accept blameworthy actions in this way.  When 
they do, they can believe that the person acted badly, and they can wish that 
he had not done so, but they are not disposed to feel anger or hostility, and 
they may eschew blame altogether.64 
 These examples should make clear that we can believe that someone 
acted badly, wish or “desire” that they had not done so, and not blame.  It is at 
least as certain that we can, and very often do, have this belief-desire pair 
without having any of the dispositions that Sher claims are almost universally 
associated with blame.  Therefore, Sher1 is inadequate as an account of 
blame.65 
Let us turn to Sher2.  If the dispositions that Sher identifies as relevant 
to blame are not entailed by the belief-desire pair in Sher1, as I have argued, 
then perhaps their addition to Sher1 will make for a more adequate account of 
                                                
64 By way of support for the view that the wife does not blame, consider the idealistic 
daughter who cannot understand why her mother tolerates her father’s behavior.  She blames 
her mother for not blaming her father. 
65 There may be another problem with Sher1.  The belief-desire pair is directed at the 
wrong object to count as blame.  Blame may be prompted by an event (an action or an 
omission), but it is directed towards an agent.  We blame for a particular action or omission, 
but the object of blame is the agent, not the event.  The belief and the desire that make up 
Sher1 are both directed at the event.  Sher1 involves believing that a person acted badly and 
wishing that he had not.  That is simply to believe that an event occurred and to wish that it 
had not.  The fact that a person figures in the description of the event does not show that 
these attitudes are directed toward that person.  It may be that these particular event-directed 
attitudes generally entail or are closely associated with some agent-directed attitudes.  But it is 
not obvious what the agent-directed attitudes might be.  As we have seen in the examples 
above, believing that a person acted badly and wishing that he had not are compatible with a 
variety of attitudes toward that person.  The mere likelihood of an unspecified association with 
some agent-directed attitudes or other does not make this an adequate account of blame.  An 
account of blame must identify and explain the stance that we take towards the person we are 
blaming. 
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blame. To understand Sher2, we need to say a little bit more about what 
dispositions are and why Sher takes them to be relevant to blame.  Sher 
proposes an account based on dispositions because he believes that negative 
emotions and attitudes, hostile behavior, and reproach are commonly, but not 
always, associated with blame.  Dispositions are supposed to explain blame’s 
association with these attitudes and behaviors without making the attitudes 
and behaviors themselves necessary for blame.  Dispositions can play this 
role because they are a sort of tendency or propensity to do something in 
certain circumstances.  Dispositions tend to generate the specified behavior in 
the relevant circumstances, but they do not necessarily or always do so.   
Of course, as with abilities, when discussing dispositions, the 
circumstances in which the specified behavior tends to occur are often not 
expressly stated.  For familiar dispositions like fragility, we expect that 
common sense will provide at least a rough sense of the relevant 
circumstances and triggering conditions.  But if we do not have a decent sense 
of what the triggering circumstances are, it will be difficult, at best, to 
determine whether an attribution of a disposition is correct.  If I tell you,  “That 
rock is disposed to shatter . . .”, and you do not hear me continue “. . . at 
temperatures of negative 100 centigrade or colder,” then you will be surprised 
when you cannot break the rock, and you may think me misinformed or a liar.  
The disposition to shatter when cooled below negative 100 centigrade is a 
very different property than the disposition to shatter at room temperature. 
Sher does not describe the range of circumstances in which we should 
expect the blame-related dispositions to be triggered.  This leaves Sher2 
vague.  Suppose that I insult someone.  According to Sher2, should we say 
that she blames me if she is disposed to feel angry in circumstances in which 
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she is already tired and irritated by other things, or need she be disposed to 
feel anger no matter what?  Need she be disposed to hostile behavior 
regardless of what else is going on, or is it enough if she is disposed to 
hostility only in circumstances where she is not distracted by some 
momentous news?  It seems likely that most humans have standing 
dispositions to get angry, to engage in hostile behavior and to reproach in 
some circumstances.  I, for one, currently have dispositions to do each of 
these things towards anyone in circumstances in which they do something 
infuriating.  But these standing dispositions do not show that I currently blame 
anyone, even if they are coupled with the Sher1 belief-desire pair.   
So, we should clarify Sher2 a bit.  Presumably Sher intends that a 
person who blames is disposed to anger and to hostile behavior in a way that 
the non-blaming person who has these sorts of standing dispositions is not so 
disposed.  I believe the best interpretation of Sher2 is that a person who 
blames must be disposed to anger and hostile behavior in precisely the 
circumstances she is in, those of having learned of some blameworthy 
behavior that she wishes had not occurred.  If distraction means that the 
person is not currently so disposed, then distraction means that he does not 
blame.  If frustration about other things helps generate the present disposition, 
then that frustration is part of the explanation of why the person blames.  
Even with this clarification, Sher2 would leave us with an acute problem 
in determining whether or not a person actually blames or merely feels that a 
person is blameworthy.  Sher2 is supposed to allow for cases in which a 
person blames, but does not actually feel anger and does not actually engage 
in hostile behavior.  In such cases, it will be unclear whether a person’s failure 
to feel anger and display hostility should be credited to the fact that he does 
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not blame or to the fact that dispositions do not always produce their specified 
behavior.  That might be acceptable in cases where we are trying to determine 
whether someone else blames.  We cannot, in fact, always tell whether 
someone blames.  But this account of blame also makes self-knowledge 
problematic.  As long as the dispositions do not actually produce anger, hostile 
behavior or reproaching behavior, the dispositions may remain indiscernible 
not only to others, but even to the person who supposedly blames.  Now 
certainly a person can be confused or conflicted about how he feels towards 
another person.  But the idea that he could actually blame someone without 
himself ever knowing it—without ever having any way of knowing it—strikes 
me as implausible.66  Because others will be no better positioned to determine 
whether this person blames, no one will have any way of saying whether or 
not this person blames. 
The problem is exacerbated by the fact that the Sher1 belief-desire pair 
does not reliably produce these dispositions, as I argued above in response to 
Sher1.  We generally suppose that dispositions are grounded in other intrinsic 
or categorical properties of their objects.  A vase is fragile, presumably, 
because of its structural and micro-structural properties; because, say, it is 
made of thin glass and because glass of that sort has certain molecular-level 
properties.  If a person is particularly disposed to catch an illness, we presume 
that this has some underlying explanation, perhaps in terms of his genetic 
                                                
66 One could argue to the contrary.  Imagine a person who becomes unduly angry at a 
friend for some minor misdeed.  Casting about for an explanation he might find that his anger 
stems in part from an earlier and more significant trespass that had never been dealt with.  
The person might say, “I guess I did not realize it, but I have blamed you ever since then.”  I 
am doubtful that this would be correct though.  Did he really blame his friend all along?  Is it 
not better to say that he did not previously have a specific reaction, and that he is now blaming 
his friend?  The fact that there has been some unaddressed irritation below the surface, 
waiting to be triggered by another event, does not convince me that the person has been 
blaming his friend all along.   
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makeup or his diet and sleep patterns.  And if a person is disposed to walk the 
long way home through the park, we expect some underlying explanation of 
this.  This explanation might be neurological or biological, but it could also be 
an explanation in terms of common sense psychology, e.g., that he likes the 
scenery or that it is the only route he knows.  A grounding explanation can be 
helpful in determining whether a thing has a particular disposition when its 
behavior does not make this clear.  By looking for the grounding properties, we 
may be able to determine that a thing is fragile even if, through careful 
handling or simple luck, it has not shown any signs of breaking.  So, if we had 
an account of the grounding properties for the dispositions in Sher2, we might 
at least have a criterion that, in principle, could distinguish cases of blame with 
untriggered dispositions from cases of non-blame.  Unfortunately, Sher’s 
suggestion is that these dispositions are grounded in the belief-desire pair 
identified in Sher1.  He believes that this belief-desire pair generates these 
dispositions, except perhaps in cases of “imaginary people” with “nonstandard 
psychology.”  But as we have seen, there is a wide range of perfectly real 
cases in which the belief-desire pair do not lead to any of the supposed blame-
related dispositions.  Thus, we have no grounding account that might at least 
provide a theoretical criterion for blame.      
These problems may not show that a dispositional account of blame 
cannot work, but they indicate that Sher has not given us an adequate one.  
They do show that Sher’s account is untestable.  In considering any given 
case in which a person does not actually become angry or hostile, we will 
have no basis for saying whether it is a case of blame or not.67  The prospects 
                                                
67 Information about counterfactuals—e.g., A would get angry with B, if B bragged 
about his bad behavior—is of little help.  It does not demonstrate whether A had the relevant 
disposition in the actual scenario, whether he only had a weaker disposition to get angry upon 
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for an adequate dispositional account along these lines seem bleak.  For one, 
dispositions alone, and thus in many cases un-triggered dispositions, add too 
little to the belief-desire pair to account for blame.  If the belief-desire pair is 
inadequate for blame—indeed, if these attitudes are not even directed at the 
right object—it is hard to see how an un-triggered and potentially indiscernible 
disposition to have some attitudes could supply the difference.  The person 
who has only the dispositions still lacks any particular attitude directed at the 
agent.  If the dispositions remain un-triggered, there is nothing to suggest that 
his behavior and attitudes would in any way differ from those of a person who 
merely wishes that another had not acted badly.   
Finally and most significantly, neither the proposed belief-desire pair 
nor the proposed behavioral and attitudinal dispositions account for the 
normative significance of blame, a feature that I will explain and argue for 
below.  On Sher’s account, negative attitudes and hostile behavior, where they 
occur, seem to be little more than outbursts, like a temper tantrum, stemming 
from a frustrated desire.  But, I will argue, blame involves a change in our view 
of a person’s moral status, a change in our view of the claims he may make 
against us and the expectations we may impose upon him.  When we blame a 
person, we believe that he should feel ashamed or remorseful, we believe that 
he has little or no claim on our sympathy, and we believe that he ought to 
make amends for his behavior.  Admittedly, these sorts of beliefs often 
accompany anger and hostile behavior.  But the significance of blame lies not 
in those feelings, those hostile behaviors, or the dispositions thereto, but in 
what these attitudes and behaviors signify:  a change in the blameworthy 
                                                                                                                                       
some further provocation, or whether he had neither to begin with but the provocation in the 
counterfactual scenario generates a disposition to be angry. 
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person’s moral standing.  An account of blame that focuses solely on 
identifying the feelings and behaviors that are characteristic of blame, without 
reference to the normative attitudes underlying these behaviors, captures only 
the surface-level symptoms of blame.  Therefore, we should turn to an account 
that does attempt to explain this normative component of blame.      
C.    A Strawsonian Account of Blame 
 Perhaps no writing has had a greater influence on philosophical views 
of blame (among broadly “analytic” philosophers at least) than P.F. Strawson’s 
“Freedom and Resentment.”  Strawson has made it quite common to think of 
blame and moral responsibility in terms of “reactive attitudes,” such as 
resentment, indignation and guilt.  It bears emphasizing then that Strawson did 
not himself propose any account of blame.  In fact, blame is hardly mentioned 
in “Freedom and Resentment.”  Strawson’s goal in “Freedom and 
Resentment” was not to provide an account of blame, but to shift the focus of 
the free will and responsibility debate from what he characterized as 
“impersonal” reactions to textbook moral crimes, such as punishment, to the 
deeply personal and emotional reactions to grievances that we all experience, 
such as resentment.  Strawson believed that this move raises the stakes for 
incompatibilists because it is harder to imagine that we could stop feeling 
these attitudes or that we would want to.  Not everyone has shared Strawson’s 
assessment of the possibility of either revising or giving up these reactive 
attitudes, but few of Strawson’s readers would now deny that these reactive 
attitudes are an important part of how we respond to blameworthy behavior.  
Many have seen the possibility of extending them into an account of blame.  
In developing a Strawsonian account of blame, two ideas in “Freedom 
and Resentment” merit attention.  First, there are the reactive attitudes 
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themselves.  Resentment and indignation are, arguably, ways of blaming a 
person, and guilt, shame, and remorse are plausibly important aspects of self-
blame.  Of these attitudes, Strawson suggests that indignation in particular is a 
distinctively moral attitude because it is based on concern for reasons 
generally.  It is an emotional response to the sense that moral considerations 
have been flouted, whether that flouting affects oneself or some other person.  
As a result, a Strawsonian account of blame might propose that feelings of 
indignation, and perhaps the other reactive attitudes, are an element, if not the 
essence, of moral blame.  Second, Strawson draws attention to what he sees 
as a consequence of holding some of these reactive attitudes, a consequence 
that he describes as a “withdrawal of goodwill”: 
Indignation [and] disapprobation, like resentment, 
tend to inhibit or at least to limit our goodwill 
towards the object of these attitudes, tend to 
promote an at least partial and temporary 
withdrawal of goodwill . . . .  The partial withdrawal 
of goodwill which these attitudes entail, the 
modification they entail of the general demand that 
another should, if possible, be spared suffering, is, 
rather, the consequence of continuing to view him 
as a member of the moral community.68 
“Goodwill” is vague, but Strawson provides one concrete example of what it 
could mean to withdraw goodwill.  In this passage, he suggests that, perhaps 
among other things, it involves a “modification” to the “general demand” that a 
person should be spared suffering.  Thus, a withdrawal of goodwill may not 
mean merely having a less pleasant or friendly demeanor or having 
dispositions to anger and hostility towards a person, but seeing that person’s 
moral standing as changed, and seeing them as having lost certain claims that 
                                                
68 Strawson, P.F. (1967) p.90 (emphasis removed). 
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they otherwise would have had.  A Strawsonian account may take this moral 
change to be an important aspect of blame.  So, a straightforwardly 
Strawsonian account of blame might hold that blaming involves (a) negative 
reactive attitudes, such as indignation, towards the person at fault, and (b) a 
partial withdrawal of goodwill, including a conviction that the person’s rights or 
claims are limited.   
Is such an account plausible?  On the way to defending his own 
account of blame, Sher criticizes a Strawsonian account.  Sher’s treatment of 
the topic is a bit ham-handed in two respects.  First, he incorrectly treats 
“Freedom and Resentment” as proposing an account of blame and 
inaccurately refers to “Strawson’s account of blame.”  However, having 
pointed this out, we can generally ignore it.  Second, Sher tends to blur the 
distinction between the two elements of a Strawsonian account.  Sher initially 
describes the Strawsonian account as a “proposal that what blaming adds to 
believing that [a person] has acted badly is some sort of negative emotional 
reaction to him”69 and then later as a proposal that “blame essentially involves 
anger or the withdrawal of good will.”70  Reconciling these descriptions, it 
would seem that Sher sees withdrawal of goodwill as a negative emotional 
reaction or a reactive attitude, rather than what Strawson says it is, a 
consequence of certain reactive attitudes.71  But Sher describes his arguments 
as being directed at the view that blame involves either anger or lack of 
goodwill, so I will take them to be directed at any broadly Strawsonian 
                                                
69 Sher (2006) p.79. 
70 Sher (2006) p.85. 
71 Sher does not overlook the passages in which Strawson clearly states that a 
withdrawal of goodwill is an effect of the reactive attitudes and that it involves a modification of 
normative claims.  He quotes them.  See Sher (2006) p.79. 
 131 
account, whether that account emphasizes the reactive attitudes, the 
withdrawal of goodwill, or both.      
Sher offers two arguments against such accounts.  Sher’s first 
argument, strictly speaking, is not directed simply at a Strawsonian account, 
but at what Sher calls the “combined account,” an account that combines the 
Strawsonian account with the view that blame can be deserved.  As I am 
committed to this latter part of the “combined account,” I, like Sher, would take 
any problems with the combined account to be a problem for the Strawsonian 
approach.  Sher claims that the combined account entails that: 
it is appropriate for everyone to be angry at, or to 
lack good will toward, virtually everyone else he 
knows.  That conclusion, however, is in effect a 
reductio; for whatever else is true, perpetual mutual 
hostility is hardly an appropriate ideal of human 
interaction.72   
The starting premises and the conclusion of this argument alone should make 
one suspicious.  The idea that the appropriateness of “perpetual mutual 
hostility” can be drawn out of a Strawsonian account of blame, like an elephant 
from a mouse hole, is a bit too much to believe.  Not surprisingly, the 
argument that is supposed to accomplish this feat is deeply flawed. 
The first steps in Sher’s argument are stated as follows (with emphasis 
added to illustrate what I take to be the central premises and the conclusion):   
[1] We can, if we like, conceal any anger or lack of 
good will that we harbor toward a wrongdoer.  
Thus, [2] if it is true both that anger or lack of good 
will is what blaming someone adds to believing that 
he has acted badly and that blame as so construed 
can be deserved, then it must also be true that 
wrongdoers can receive all the blame they deserve 
                                                
72 Sher (2006) p.87. 
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without ever knowing it.  Even when someone 
receives his full measure of deserved blame, his 
receiving it need not affect his life.  This implication 
is noteworthy because [3] in many other contexts a 
person’s getting what he deserves necessarily 
does have some impact on his life.  However, what 
the implication shows is not that the combined 
account is unacceptable, but only that in order to 
accept it, [4] we must take “X deserves blame” to 
mean no more than that blame directed at X is 
justified or appropriate—an interpretation that is in 
any case forced upon us by our earlier observation 
that blame itself can be kept strictly private.73 
This portion of the argument is supposed to show that, because blame on the 
Strawsonian account can be concealed we cannot think of blame as being, 
strictly speaking, deserved by the blameworthy person.  Instead, we must 
think of it as being something that is appropriate for the blamer to do.  This is 
only a subconclusion or first step in Sher’s argument, but we may stop here 
and consider the premises that are supposed to get us to this subconclusion.  I 
accept [1], that blame on a Strawsonian account can be concealed from the 
target of blame (except perhaps in cases of self-blame).  So, I will focus on the 
next two claims, which are [2] that this means that, on a Strawsonian account, 
a person can “receive all the blame they deserve without ever knowing it” and 
without it “affect[ing] his life,” and [3] that “in many other contexts” getting what 
one deserves “necessarily” has some impact on one’s life.  Both of these 
premises are plainly false.   
First of all, premise 2 should be rejected because nothing in either 
premise 1 or a Strawsonian account of blame supports, much less entails, that 
a person can get their full measure of deserved blame without it affecting his 
life.  Sher fails to explain why it follows from the fact that any potential blamer 
                                                
73 Id. p.86. 
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can hide blame (premise 1), that the blamee might get all the blame he 
deserves in this hidden form.74  Why shouldn’t the Strawsonian say that, 
although as a factual matter any particular blamer can conceal his blaming 
reaction, as a moral matter blameworthy people generally deserve at least 
some unconcealed blame?  Even assuming that it sometimes happens that 
every blamer conceals his blame for a particular person, why couldn’t the 
Strawsonian quite plausibly respond by saying that sometimes people do not 
get what they deserve?  The existence of concealed and unconcealed blame 
does not entail that people may receive all the blame they deserve solely in 
the form of concealed blame any more than the existence of closed-mouthed 
and open-mouthed kisses means that people may receive all the kisses they 
deserve solely in the closed-mouthed form.  Just as a Strawsonian can believe 
that people generally deserve a few open-mouthed kisses from time to time, a 
Strawsonian surely can believe that blameworthy people generally deserve at 
least some unconcealed blame.  
Even if the Strawsonian wanted to concede that a person might get all 
the blame they deserve in the form of concealed blame, there is a further 
problem.  Premise 2 depends on an assumption that something affects or “has 
an impact on” a person’s life only if that person is aware of it.  That is simply 
wrong.  My life would be terribly worse if, unbeknownst to me, the people I 
take to be my friends and associates actually harbor concealed negative 
attitudes or secretly lack goodwill towards me.  I am much better off if my 
friends actually feel warmly towards me than if they merely pretend to.  In 
                                                
74 It is also puzzling that Sher’s argument is supposed to follow from premise 1—the 
idea that blame can be hidden—when, as explained above, blame can certainly be hidden on 
either of Sher’s accounts.  It is not clear why Sher’s argument would not apply with equal force 
to Sher’s account, if it had any force.    
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some cases ignorance might be bliss (e.g., when knowledge causes only 
unnecessary and unproductive anxiety), but in this instance, true wellbeing 
involves correspondence between belief and reality.   
Moreover, concealed negative attitudes or lack of goodwill can have 
concrete, negative effects on our lives without us being aware of either the 
attitudes or their effects.  Concealed negative attitudes are quite likely to result 
in the closing off of opportunities that otherwise would have been open.  But 
for her concealed negative feelings towards me, an acquaintance might have 
been inclined to become a closer friend to me, to go out of her way to help me, 
to invite me to a wonderful event, or to speak kindly of me to a third person.  
When, in fact, she fails to do these things, I may not realize that I am missing 
out on opportunities I otherwise would have had, much less suspect the 
reason.  After all, I do not expect all of my acquaintances to go out of their way 
for me in these ways.  Nonetheless, I am worse off than I would have been if 
she did not have these attitudes towards me.  I have lost out on opportunities 
for help and friendship that I otherwise would have had.  Thus, concealed 
negative attitudes can have a dramatic impact on our lives without our being 
aware of it.  
 Sher’s next premise, that “in many other contexts a person’s getting 
what he deserves necessarily does have some impact on his life,” fares no 
better.  Sher does not identify or describe a single one of these “many other 
contexts.”  But if he supposes, as he must for his argument to be valid, that a 
person’s getting what he deserves “necessarily” involves that person being 
aware of an impact on his life, then he is wrong.  There are contexts in which a 
person gets what he or she deserves without ever being aware of it.  People 
who receive posthumous honors are very often said to be getting something 
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they deserve.  The same is true of those who become exposed as traitors, 
criminals or scoundrels after their death.  A former head of state, now senile 
and unaware, gets what he deserves when his crimes are exposed, he is 
convicted, and he is stripped of all of his honors and national recognition, even 
though he may live out the remainder of his life unaware that anything has 
changed.  A prisoner of war or an explorer, entirely cut off from the rest of the 
world, might receive a deserved honor back in his home country.75  There are 
also examples that do not depend on unusual ignorance-causing 
circumstances like senility or separation from society.  A bad husband might 
be getting just what he deserves when, unbeknownst to him, his spouse is 
unfaithful to him, and a pompous jerk might be getting what he deserves when 
people make fun of him behind his back.  
 In short, nothing about a Strawsonian account of blame makes it 
problematic to think of blame as deserved by the blamee.  We need not know 
that people blame us in order to be getting what we deserve.  Thus, a 
defender of a broadly Strawsonian account need not be forced from the 
position of conceiving of blame as something that is deserved by the blamee 
to the position that blame is only something that may be appropriate for a 
blamer to engage in.  Nonetheless, let us briefly consider whether the next 
part of Sher’s argument would follow if we did concede this.   
Sher claims that, as a result of the shift from desert to appropriateness, 
the Strawsonian will be unable to limit the appropriateness of blaming to a 
reasonable class of blamers.  Instead, Sher claims, the Strawsonian is forced 
to conclude that it is appropriate for virtually anyone to blame anyone who has 
ever done anything wrong.  
                                                
75 Thanks to Paul Kelleher for providing or planting the seed for these examples. 
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[1] Because the normative element of the 
combined account must thus be oriented to the 
person doing the blaming rather than the person 
blamed—because the account must view deserved 
blame not as something a wrongdoer “has coming 
to him” but rather as a response that his 
transgression renders appropriate in others—the 
account raises questions both about which others 
may appropriately have the response and about 
how long they may have it. . . . 
[I]f we are to capture the detached, impartial quality 
that Strawson rightly takes to distinguish blame 
from resentment,[76] [2] we can hardly restrict those 
in whom anger or a lack of good will toward a 
wrongdoer is appropriate to persons who are 
themselves affected by his transgression.  There is, 
moreover, no non-arbitrary basis for excluding any 
people who are not affected.  [3] For this reason, 
the combined view is best taken to assert that 
anyone who knows what a wrongdoer has done—
including the wrongdoer himself—may 
appropriately react to him with anger or a 
withdrawal of good will.77   
Sher believes that this entails the conclusion of his supposed reductio:   
Because we all sometimes act wrongly in ways that 
are readily apparent, it is not unreasonable to 
suppose that virtually everyone is known by each 
of his acquaintances to have recently performed at 
least one blameworthy act.  This supposition . . . 
supports the conclusion that it is appropriate for 
everyone to be angry at, or to lack good will 
toward, virtually everyone else he knows.78      
                                                
76 Sher seems to be referring to Strawson’s distinction between resentment and 
indignation, not resentment and blame.  Strawson does not draw any distinction between 
resentment and blame in “Freedom and Resentment.” 
77 Sher (2006) p.86. 
78 Id. p.87. 
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This phase of Sher’s argument is at least as problematic as the first.  The 
initial claim is baffling.  It is not clear why or how Sher supposes that his 
reinterpretation of “X deserves blame” in terms of the appropriateness of 
blame raises any new questions about who may blame.  On its surface, “X 
deserves blame” is just as unlimited with respect to potential blamers as “It 
would be appropriate to blame X.”  So, why can’t Sher’s reasoning be used to 
show that a person who thinks of blame in terms of desert is also committed to 
the view that a blameworthy person deserves to be blamed by anyone?  If—as 
is actually the case—there are reasons why a blameworthy person does not 
deserve blame from anyone and everyone, why do those same reasons not 
also show that it is not appropriate for anyone and everyone to blame X?  Put 
another way, when we say “X deserves blame,” we surely mean only that “X 
deserves blame [from some appropriate blamers, but not everyone].”  We do 
not mean that X deserves blame from unrepentant hypocrites; from people 
who have an overriding obligation to remain neutral, such as a counselor or a 
peer in group-therapy; or from those who do not know enough about the 
situation to properly calibrate their blaming response or to determine when X is 
no longer blameworthy.  So, if we did accept the need for a translation of “X 
deserves blame [from some appropriate blamers, but not everyone],” what 
prevents us from insisting that that translation should be “it would be 
appropriate [for some appropriate blamers, but not everyone] to blame X”?  
Sher’s only stated support for his view that we must give up on an 
“appropriate blamers” restriction (which we might call a “standing” requirement 
for blaming) is his claim that there is “no non-arbitrary basis for excluding any 
people who are not affected” by the blameworthy behavior.  This unsupported 
assertion is incredible.  There are numerous non-arbitrary reasons for limiting 
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the universe of appropriate blamers, many of which exclude people who are 
not affected.  I have just mentioned a number of categories of inappropriate 
blamers:  hypocrites, those obliged to remain neutral, and those who lack 
adequate knowledge.  Let me elaborate on this last category, as it is based on 
considerations that rule out many of the people who are not directly affected 
by the behavior prompting the blame.  People who are more remote from the 
blameworthy person or act may come to learn of the blameworthy act, but by 
and large, they tend to be in a worse position to blame because they will, by 
and large, have less knowledge of mitigating factors, of the actual degree of 
harm suffered by any victims, of the blameworthy person’s subsequent 
behavior, and of the countless other complexities that affect the appropriate 
response.  Their blaming response is therefore apt to be excessive, and that in 
itself is a good reason for them not to blame, even though it may be perfectly 
appropriate for others to blame.  It is also relevant that people who are far 
removed from the blameworthy person often have better things to worry about.  
Though we all have some reason to care about wrongdoing wherever it 
happens, we have only so much time, energy, and capacity to care.  If, as 
Sher’s conclusion supposes, people were constantly investing attention and 
energy into all of the routine moral failings of all sorts of people to whom they 
have no real connection, they would very likely have too little invested in those 
who are close to them.  Even if they could manage some constant concern 
about all other distant people (and surely they could not), it would be wrong for 
them to do so at the expense of concern for others with whom they are more 
closely related.  Thus, it can be quite inappropriate for many people to blame 
those who are blameworthy.79  In sum, a Strawsonian account of blame is 
                                                
79 Sher’s additional claim that the defender of an attitudinal account lacks a basis for 
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perfectly capable of accommodating the view that blame is deserved and the 
fact that, when blame is deserved, there may be considerations making it 
inappropriate for some particular people to blame.   
Let us turn to Sher’s second argument against Strawsonian accounts: 
The basic difficulty with that account is that the 
generalization upon which it rests—that blame is 
always accompanied by hostility or a withdrawal of 
good will—is far from airtight. . . . We may, for 
example, feel no hostility toward the loved one 
whom we blame for failing to tell a sensitive 
acquaintance about a hard truth, the criminal whom 
we blame for a burglary we read about in the 
newspaper, or the historical figure whom we blame 
for the misdeeds he performed long ago.  As the 
latter examples suggest, blaming is something that 
we can do regretfully or dispassionately and that 
need not be accompanied by any rancor or 
withdrawal of good will.80 
These supposed counterexamples are a bit of a mixed bag.  Without some 
further development, it is difficult to see why we should think that the second 
and third in particular (the criminal in the newspaper and the historical figure) 
present cases of blame.  They are quite like my example above, in which Raul 
                                                                                                                                       
limiting the time period over which blame remains appropriate does not merit much additional 
discussion.  Sher states that “to capture the important idea that a person can deserve blame 
now for something he did a long time ago, the combined view is best taken to assert that 
those reactions remain appropriate long after the transgression itself.”  Sher (2006) p.86.  This 
is a simple error of taking evidence of sometimes to support always.  It is true that sometimes 
a person can deserve blame long after her transgression.  Some people are remorseless, 
some people evade punishment and responsibility for a long time, and some transgressions 
are so serious that they are not quickly paid for or forgiven.  But this hardly supports the 
conclusion that, as a general matter, it is appropriate to blame people long after their 
transgressions.  Very often people receive all the blame and punishment they are due; they 
apologize, show remorse, and make amends; and they change in ways that can render blame 
inappropriate.  There is no reason why a Strawsonian account cannot incorporate these 
simple facts.  Indeed it would be plausible for a Strawsonian (or anyone else) to assert that 
over time there is a growing presumption that blame is inappropriate, absent special 
circumstances of the sorts just identified above. 
80 Sher (2006) p.88. 
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is told about a blameworthy act performed by someone he has never met that 
has no direct impact on anyone he knows or cares about.  As I said there, it 
might be normal to suppose that we disapprove of the conduct at issue and 
judge the person to be blameworthy, but it would be odd to suppose that we 
blame these complete strangers.   
Of cases like this, T.M. Scanlon plausibly says:  
[Blame’s] content is attenuated in the case of 
agents who lived long ago and have no 
significance for or effect on our lives.  We can 
judge such people to be blameworthy, but such a 
judgment has mainly vicarious significance . . . .  It 
may imply, for example, that those who interacted 
with this person had good reason to withdraw their 
intentions to trust or rely upon him.  But the idea 
that we ourselves blame him for what he did can 
sound somewhat odd.81   
It is true, of course, that we can sometimes have strong emotional reactions to 
stories of distant blameworthy activity.  We can be disturbed, disgusted, and 
even angered, but of course, Sher is not talking about such cases.  He is 
trying to identify a case of dispassionate blaming.  It is not clear whether being 
moved to anger by a story of some distant blameworthy act should count as 
blame, but not being moved by a story of distant blameworthy behavior is 
clearly not a case of blaming.  Without some further argument, I take Sher’s 
history and newspaper examples to be what they seem, examples of judging a 
person to be blameworthy but not actually blaming.      
Sher’s other example, blaming a loved one without hostility, and his 
suggestion that we can blame “regretfully” are a bit more interesting.  I think 
Sher may be correct here.  After all, one of the more familiar ways of 
                                                
81 Scanlon (2008) p.146. 
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communicating blame to a person that we trusted, liked, or cared about is by 
stating that the person has disappointed us.  In such cases, we may blame, 
but more with a sense of sadness than anger.  This is not surprising.  If we 
trusted or cared for the person we blame, it may be sad and painful to accept 
that our hopes and expectations of him have not been fulfilled or that we 
cannot have the relationship we had hoped, but at the same time, our affection 
for that person may keep us from feeling outright anger. 
But how much does this show?  For one, it is not clear that a 
Strawsonian account must be saddled with Sher’s assumption that the 
relevant reactive attitude is anger, or any other attitude of hostility.  Strawson 
did not suggest this, and it is not clear why we should.  Why not suppose that 
a feeling of morally-based disappointment is a blaming reactive attitude?  In 
any case, the mere suggestion that we can blame regretfully does not cast any 
doubt on the second aspect of a Strawsonian account, that blame involves a 
withdrawal of goodwill.  As Strawson suggests, a withdrawal of goodwill need 
not be seen as a weak analogue for anger but, at least in part, a change in our 
view of the blameworthy person’s moral claims.  I see no reason in Sher’s 
cases to believe that we can blame a person without feeling that the person 
has, to some degree or in some respect, less of a claim to sympathy, concern 
and respect.   
Thus, neither of Sher’s criticisms poses any obstacle to the 
development of a broadly Strawsonian account of any variety.  First, Sher fails 
to demonstrate that we can blame entirely dispassionately.  His point that we 
can blame regretfully does not rule out the possibility of a reactive attitude 
based account.  It merely suggests that if we suppose that blame involves 
reactive attitudes, we should take a broad view of what those attitudes are.  
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Second, none of his criticisms casts any doubt on the suggestion that blame 
involves a modification to one’s view of the blameworthy person’s moral 
standing, including seeing that person’s claims as diminished and, I would 
add, imposing new demands and expectations on that person.  If there is a 
problem with a Strawsonian account of this sort, it is that it needs further 
development.   
D.    Scanlon’s Relationship-Based Account of Blame 
T. M. Scanlon’s account of blame provides one way of developing the 
Strawsonian idea that blame involves a withdrawal of goodwill.  Scanlon’s 
account of blame is built around the idea of relationships.  He suggests that 
ideal relationships involve persons having certain attitudes, intentions, 
dispositions and expectations toward each other.  For example, on Scanlon’s 
view, being friends ideally involves, among other things, “intending to give help 
and support when needed, beyond what one would be obligated to do for just 
anyone; intending to confide in the person and to keep his or her confidences 
in return; intending to spend time together when one can . . .” and presumably, 
liking and caring about the person.82   
Scanlon claims that blame is a response to behavior that shows what 
he calls an “impairment” to a relationship.83  What he means, it seems, is that 
we blame in response to behavior that shows a person does not have the 
attitudes, intentions, etc., that make up the ideal relationship, or at least the 
relationship we reasonably hoped or expected we had with that person.  So, in 
the case of friends, one might blame if a supposed friend shows that she lacks 
the requisite affection, if she fails to keep confidences, or if she stops showing 
                                                
82 Scanlon (2008) p.132. 
83 Id. p.128. 
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interest in spending time together.  Blame itself, on Scanlon’s view, is a 
responsive modification to the relationship that is appropriate in light of the 
other person’s lack of the requisite attitudes, etc.84  In seeing the friend as 
blameworthy, we may believe that he has lost his claim to reciprocal 
friendship.  So, blame in a friendship might involve a corresponding decrease 
in one’s affection and concern for the other, an end to one’s own intention to 
spend time together, or I would suppose, an intention to confront and reproach 
the other person.  
Like the Strawsonian idea of a withdrawal of goodwill, blame on 
Scanlon’s account involves taking a new or special stance towards the 
blameworthy person, including a revision to one’s view of the claims that the 
blameworthy person has against oneself.  But Scanlon’s framework suggests 
a possible path for replacing the vague Strawsonian idea of a withdrawal of 
goodwill with something more specific.  In theory, we might be able to identify 
the specific attitudes and expectations that are appropriate in a given 
relationship and the ways in which we modify those attitudes when we blame.   
There are, however, at least two problems with this account.  The first is 
structural.  The relationship framework of Scanlon’s account is strained in a 
variety of cases.  Most obviously, it is strained in cases of pure moral blame 
among strangers, where there is no preexisting relationship.  But even in 
cases involving a real relationship, we can often reasonably blame in response 
to behavior that does not reveal anything that could be naturally described as 
“impairment” to a relationship.  Applying Scanlon’s relationship framework in 
such cases is an imposition upon, rather than illumination of the underlying 
                                                
84 Id. p.128 (“To blame a person is to judge him or her to be blameworthy and to take 
your relationship with him or her to be modified in a way that this judgment of impaired 
relations holds to be appropriate.”) 
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phenomenon.  The second problem has to do with the content of Scanlon’s 
view.  Scanlon’s own account of appropriate blaming responses is unjustifiably 
revisionist.  In general, Scanlon is too mild or timid about the special attitudes 
that a person may take when she blames another.  If we were to defend only 
Scanlon’s version of blame against determinism and other worries, we would 
be conceding a great deal of our actual beliefs and practices.  I will explain 
each of these problems in greater detail. 
  1.   The relationship framework of Scanlon’s account 
The structure of Scanlon’s account is strained when applied to cases of 
purely moral blame, where one person is wronged by a stranger with whom he 
does not have a preexisting relationship, in any normal sense of the word.  
Imagine, for example, a person who is mugged while traveling thousands of 
miles from home in a place where she knows no one.  Scanlon acknowledges 
that it “sounds odd” to talk about a preexisting “moral relationship” in such 
cases and to propose that blame is a reaction to the impairment of that 
relationship.  
[W]e naturally take the term ‘relationship’ to refer to 
a particular relationship, like the friendship between 
two individuals, which is constituted by the friends’ 
special attitudes toward each other.  Morality is not 
a relationship in this sense.  Rather it is a 
normative ideal . . . that specifies attitudes and 
expectations that we should have regarding one 
another whenever certain conditions are fulfilled.   
* * * 
In the case of morality . . . the relevant conditions 
[for the existence of the relationship] do not 
concern the parties’ existing attitudes toward one 
another but only certain general facts about them, 
namely that they are beings of a kind that are 
capable of understanding and responding to 
 145 
reasons.  Insofar as one assumes that the 
relationship must, like friendship, be constituted by 
the parties’ attitudes, this provides a . . . reason for 
thinking it inappropriate to say that morality defines 
a relationship that holds even between total 
strangers.  But this assumption is mistaken.  The 
conditions in virtue of which the relationship exists, 
and the relevant normative standards therefore 
apply, do not always involve the parties’ attitudes 
toward one another.85   
This passage shows that there is nothing to the “moral relationship” except (a) 
the fact that the parties are persons capable of responding to reasons and (b) 
the existence of moral norms and moral reasons that apply to the way such 
persons should feel and act towards each other.  Thus, the parties to the 
“moral relationship” need not have any actual attitudes towards one another.  
Indeed, they need not even know the other exists.  So, Scanlon’s “moral 
relationship” is simply an unusual way of referring to the fact that there are 
moral norms dictating how competent agents ought to feel and behave 
towards each other.   
If we can describe the existence of norms and the capacity to respond 
to them as a “relationship,” what does it mean to speak of “impairment” to that 
“relationship” as the thing that warrants blame?  As there is nothing to the 
relationship except for the fact that people ought to be responsive to normative 
reasons, behavior revealing an “impairment” to this relationship could be 
nothing other than behavior showing that a person is not appropriately 
concerned about these norms.   
My concern here is not so much that this terminology is wrong, but that 
it is unnatural and unhelpful.  I suppose that we might agree to use terms like 
                                                
85 Scanlon (2008) p.139 (emphasis added). 
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“relationship” and “impairment” in these ways, but doing so obscures rather 
than illuminates the underlying phenomenon.  The idea that my moral 
relationship with someone is impaired is an utterly foreign way of capturing the 
entirely familiar idea that they have failed to show the sort of concern for moral 
norms that I should expect.  Thus, the explanation of what Scanlon means by 
his terms is clearer and more helpful than the account using these terms.  As a 
result, at least in the case of pure moral blame among people with no prior 
relationship, Scanlon appears to be imposing a theory on the facts, rather than 
providing a theory that explains them.   
Scanlon could concede that the relationship structure is strained in the 
purely moral case, but argue that its value lies not in its ability to describe this 
one kind of case, but in its ability to illuminate the differing nature of blame 
across various circumstances.  Perhaps the idea of a moral relationship, 
though imperfect, provides a useful contrast with blame in cases of a 
preexisting relationship, and perhaps the ability to apply a consistent 
framework allows us to see why blame varies in these different contexts.   
But even in the case of preexisting relationships, the idea that blame is 
a response to “impairment” of the relationship is a dubious or, at best, strained 
description of the phenomenon.  Consider two brothers, the younger of whom 
irresponsibly runs out of money.  The older brother may feel obliged to help 
with a loan, but because he blames the younger brother for his wasteful 
spending, he also feels that the younger brother has little claim to feelings of 
sympathy regarding his predicament.  He may also feel that the younger 
brother deserves a stern lecture that, in other circumstances, would be 
condescending and inappropriate.  Though he bails his brother out, he may, 
for a while, be irritated or even indignant about it, and he may let his brother 
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know how he feels.  The older brother may also expect, or even demand, 
contrition and a commitment to be more responsible.  A simple and seemingly 
adequate explanation of what is going on here is that the older brother blames 
the younger brother for not exercising care and good financial sense.  
Because it is his brother, he remains more helpful and more concerned than 
he would toward a stranger, and he still feels affection and love for his brother, 
but for a time, he is irritated and sees his brother as less trustworthy.  He may 
see his brother as having forfeited a claim to trust in financial or other related 
matters and as being subject to new demands in order to earn that trust back.   
On Scanlon’s account, to see the older brother as blaming we must 
suppose that he is reacting to an attitude that shows some impairment either 
to their relationship or to the younger brother’s relationship with others.  But 
what relationship is impaired here?  And is any such supposed impairment 
really a better explanation of what the older brother is responding to?  It might 
be argued that there is an impairment to the relationship between the brothers.  
The younger brother has failed to get by independently and handle his own 
affairs.  He has therefore shown some dependence on his brother and some 
lack of reliability.  As a result, the older brother may feel that he cannot count 
on his brother to handle certain situations involving money, or for that matter, 
to be able to provide the same sort of financial support if their roles were 
reversed.  But is this really an impairment to their relationship?  
I certainly admit that we all have reason to be responsible for ourselves 
and not to be an unnecessary burden on others.  In particular, we may owe it 
to our family to avoid being a burden as best we can.  We may also owe it to 
our family to take care of ourselves, not only because we might burden them 
with our messes, but because our failures and our suffering may be painful for 
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them.  But I do not accept that a failure to live up to these responsibilities—
even a failure that merits blame—should necessarily be seen as an 
impairment to our relationship with our family or that any such impairment 
provides the best explanation of the blaming reactions.  Indeed, I find it hard to 
understand the suggestion that an occasional failure to be self-reliant and 
financially responsible should count as an “impairment” to one’s relationship to 
one’s immediate family.  Instead, the suggestion that a brother’s financial 
irresponsibility deserves blame because it makes him a “bad brother” or 
because it damages the relationship between the brothers seems to me to be 
an insult to the ideal of brotherhood.   
In my view, complete independence is not necessarily coincident with 
ideal family relationships.  Instead, it seems to be characteristic of strong, 
close family relationships that their participants expect to take care of each 
other from time to time.  Ironically, the younger brother’s blameworthy mistake 
could actually strengthen their brotherly relationship.  It could be that, having 
been independent, the brothers were drifting apart, and that the younger 
brother’s need for financial help in my example reaffirms, rather than impairs 
their relationship.  In that case, it would be very odd to explain the older 
brother’s blame as a response to the younger brother’s impairment of their 
previously weak relationship.  Nonetheless, blame may be appropriate.  
Nor is it plausible to suppose that the older brother’s blame is a 
response to some impairment to the younger brother’s relationship with others.  
We may assume that the younger brother’s conduct will have little significant 
impact on the rest of the family’s wealth, on their time and energy, or on their 
love and concern for the younger brother.  We need not suppose that the 
brother has failed to pay any debts to others.  Thus, at most, his 
 149 
irresponsibility and dependence might show that he is not an ideal candidate 
for certain kinds of relationships going forward.  Creditors may want to beware.  
But surely this is not why the older brother blames his younger brother.  The 
older brother need not be concerned about the younger brother’s relationships 
with potential, future creditors.  He may blame simply because he is upset 
about what the younger brother has done.   
Scanlon could respond that there is impairment to their relationship as 
brothers because, although they may expect to support each other when 
necessary, ideally they also have hopes and desires that each other is 
responsible and does well, and the younger brother has frustrated those 
hopes and desires.  But that is simply to say that the younger brother has not 
done what he should and the older brother cares about it.  Thus, in this case, 
the simpler explanation is the better one:  in blaming, the older brother is 
responding to the fact that his younger brother has been irresponsible, or, in 
other words, not adequately concerned about acting on reasons and doing the 
right thing.  What this case suggests is that blame is not in any normal sense a 
response to impairment of a relationship.  It is a response to a person’s failure 
to show adequate concern for reasons.   
This is not to say that relationships are irrelevant in assessing or 
attributing blame.  The reasons that a person has depend upon his or her 
relationships.  We have reason to show basic concern and respect for people 
generally, but we also have reasons to do other things that arise out of our 
friendships, our family ties, our group affiliations, our contractual relationships, 
etc.  Relationships may also affect our interest in the blameworthy act and our 
standing to blame, as well as the form that our blame should take.  So, we 
must be attentive to the existence of various relationships and the reasons 
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that arise from them in order to determine when a person will be blameworthy 
and from whom he will deserve blame, but this does not mean that it is 
accurate or illuminating to think of blameworthy behavior as behavior that 
reveals impairment to a relationship or to think of blame as a reciprocal 
response to that impairment.   
  2. The anti-retributive aspect of Scanlon’s account 
Though the structure of Scanlon’s account is problematic, his 
suggestions about the particular reactions that constitute blame still deserve 
consideration.  Scanlon identifies a handful of special attitudes and 
dispositions that may arise in cases of moral blame, including: (a) “not . . . 
tak[ing] pleasure in that person’s successes, and not . . . hop[ing] that things 
go well for him;”86 (b) withholding help with that person’s projects (though 
Scanlon notes that it may remain inappropriate to withhold rescue or to go out 
of one’s way to cause harm to those projects);87 (c) “refus[ing] to make 
agreements with that person or enter into other specific relations that involve 
trust and reliance” and “suspen[ding] . . . friendly attitudes that signal a 
readiness” to enter into such relationships;88 and (d) feeling “moral emotions 
or similar attitudes” such as “moral disapproval” and “resentment.”89  These 
suggestions are reasonable.  Whether or not they are essential or central to 
blame, they are at least often associated with blaming.  
However, Scanlon also believes that there are certain things we may 
not do when we blame.  Scanlon rejects what he calls “moral retributivism,” the 
                                                
86 Scanlon (2008) p.144. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. p.143. 
89 Id. 
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view that the proper response to blameworthy behavior is “to see even their 
most basic moral claims on the rest of us as limited and qualified.”90  He also 
rejects the idea that it is appropriate for a person “to suffer some loss in 
consequence” for blameworthy behavior.91  Scanlon seems to see these two 
ideas as related.  After stating that he rejects this idea—i.e., that it may be 
appropriate for a person to suffer a loss in response to blameworthy 
behavior—the reasons that he gives are all expressly directed at “moral 
retributivism.”92  The connection appears to be that believing it is appropriate 
for a person to suffer some loss also naturally involves believing that he has 
no claim against us for help in preventing that loss or for sympathy and 
concern about that loss and might even involve believing that he has no claim 
against our imposing or facilitating that loss.   
When Scanlon argues against moral retributivism, he tends to present 
only an extreme instance of the view, one on which the loss to be suffered is 
death or serious harm.  He claims that a view that supposes it is appropriate 
for a person to suffer such a loss would be implausible because we owe duties 
to help avoid such losses unconditionally:  “it is implausible to hold that even 
the most basic moral requirements—such as the requirement not to inflict 
serious harm and to prevent such harm when one can—are conditional, and 
not owed to those whose attitudes impair their moral relations with others.”93   
And again Scanlon states:  “Even those who have no regard for the 
justifiability of their actions toward others retain their basic moral rights—they 
                                                
90 Id. p.142. 
91 Id. p.188.  
92 Id. p.189. 
93 Id. 
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still have claims on us not to be hurt or killed, to be helped when they are in 
dire need, and to have us honor promises we have made to them.”94  
But the view that Scanlon rejects on the basis of these arguments is 
much broader.  The retributivism Scanlon rejects does not say that when we 
blame we may see it as appropriate for the person to suffer grievous harm or 
death and, therefore, as appropriate to withhold help in avoiding such harm.  
As Scanlon himself puts it, retributivism says more generally that when we 
blame we may see it as appropriate that a person should suffer some loss in 
consequence for his blameworthy act.  One can accept this view without 
supposing that death or other forms of severe harm are ever among the 
appropriate losses.  For one example, when we blame, we might feel that it 
would be appropriate for the person we blame to lose some sleep and some 
peace of mind over what he has done.  There is nothing implausible about 
this.  A person has no unconditional claim to our help in setting his mind at 
ease, nor even against being given a guilt trip.  For another, when we blame a 
cheat or a scoundrel we might feel it is appropriate for him to suffer the loss of 
fortune and reputation in consequence for his actions.  He also has no 
unconditional claim to our help in avoiding such losses.  And for yet another, 
when we blame, we might feel that it is appropriate for a violent criminal to 
suffer the loss of his freedom.  I see nothing implausible about the idea that 
one’s right to freedom, and one’s claims against others in this regard, are 
                                                
94 Id. p.142.  The last idea thrown in here—that people who have no regard for 
reasons still have a claim against us to honor our promises to them—is far too sweeping to be 
credited.  Suppose a woman promises to keep a man company for the day.  She need not 
keep that promise if he becomes a boor and makes her feel unsafe.  Or suppose that I 
gratuitously promise to give you five dollars if you will stop by my house to collect it, but when 
you do stop by, you kick my dog, set fire to the tree in my yard, smash up my car, and 
threaten death or worse for my family.  The idea that you continue to have a claim on my five 
dollars is ludicrous.  Promises are significant, but not that significant. 
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conditioned upon obedience to certain laws, including the avoidance of 
unjustified violence.  So, even if we assume with Scanlon that people have 
(more or less) unconditional claims against death and severe harm, this does 
little to support his rejection of the more general view that it can be appropriate 
for a blameworthy person to suffer a loss in consequence for a wrongful act. 
Scanlon also argues for his view by claiming that the blaming reactions 
he approves of can be justified by appeal to the notion of “appropriateness,” 
whereas the “retributive” responses cannot: 
If blame involves only the alteration of attitudes that 
I have described, then it can be justified by appeal 
to the idea that this shift of attitudes is appropriate, 
or called for, by what the agent is like. . . . It is 
asking too much to demand that we be ready to 
enter into relations of trust and cooperation, and 
various forms of friendly relations, with people who 
have shown that they have no regard for our 
interests.  Doing so can even be demeaning.  So 
an appeal to what is appropriate is an adequate 
explanation for the suspension of these attitudes.  
But it is much less plausible to appeal simply to 
what is “appropriate” to justify the infliction of 
suffering on those who have treated others badly, 
or even to justify refusing to help them when they 
are in danger.95  
Scanlon may be right that it would be asking too much to expect us to be 
ready to enter into relationships with those who have committed wrongful acts,  
but it is not clear why it would not also be “asking too much” that we respect 
their claims against all forms of suffering, while they cause us to suffer.  Nor is 
it clear why it is not also “appropriate” to suppose that a person should suffer 
the loss of his freedom if he has used that freedom to harm others.  Scanlon’s 
                                                
95 Scanlon (2008) pp.189-90 (footnotes omitted).  
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appeals to appropriateness provide no answer to these sorts of questions 
because they are merely naked appeals to his own intuitions.96   
Scanlon recognizes this as a potential problem but suggests that he 
can avoid it: 
Justifications that appeal to the idea of what is 
‘appropriate’ or ‘fitting’ are open to the objection 
that they involve appeals to unstructured intuition, 
and unless supplemented in some way lack serious 
normative force.  The view I am offering gives this 
idea more structure (thereby mitigating this 
objection, if not, to be sure, avoiding it altogether) 
by locating the idea of appropriateness with the 
conception of particular relationships, which explain 
the kind of normative force that is in question.97 
But we have already seen that there is nothing to the “moral relationship” 
except the existence of moral norms and moral reasons.  So, the idea of 
appropriateness here is “located,” if anywhere, only within Scanlon’s own 
views about the content of moral norms and moral reasons.  That is to say, 
Scanlon’s claims here are simply an appeal to his personal views about what 
we owe to each other unconditionally and what we do not.   
On that front, Scanlon is out of step with common sense and with our 
actual attitudes and practices when we blame.  We do commonly believe that 
it is appropriate, even just and good, for a blameworthy person to suffer, 
whether in the form of a guilty conscience or in the form of some more 
concrete loss.  And we commonly believe that it is appropriate for blameworthy 
                                                
96 In Moral Dimensions, Scanlon notes that he previously stated his opposition to the 
view that it is sometimes the case that one should suffer in consequence for a blameworthy 
act in What We Owe To Each Other (Scanlon (1998)) at p.274.  From a review of the section 
that Scanlon references I can discern no argument against that view, only a bald assertion 
that the view is “morally indefensible.”    
97 Scanlon (2008) p.189. 
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people to be deprived of liberties, opportunities, and advantages.  It is safe to 
say that the view that people do not deserve to suffer in consequence for 
blameworthy acts is far outside the mainstream.  Our penal institutions and our 
public discourse about them make this quite clear.98  But if you must, imagine 
a candidate for high political office proposing that rapists and murderers do not 
deserve to suffer in consequence for their actions.  It would be political suicide.   
Of course, this is not a conclusive argument that Scanlon is wrong.  It is 
conceivable that these widely held views and common practices are wrong, 
but it would take more than Scanlon’s assertions about appropriateness to 
show this.  In any case, these claims are important because my immediate 
interest is not in deciding whether common sense views about blame are right 
or wrong, but in providing a reasonably accurate account of what they are.  My 
goal is to provide a descriptive account of blame so that we can subsequently 
turn to the topic of whether this sort of blame can be defended against 
arguments based on determinism.  Scanlon does not offer an account that 
captures our actual attitudes and practices when we blame.    
IV.  Blame and Blameworthiness:  A Common Sense Retributive Account 
 In the foregoing, I have criticized a number of proposals for 
understanding blame.  Along the way, I have made a number of claims about 
the nature of blame:  that blaming involves more than a judgment identifying 
the person who deserves blame and more than a desire or wish that the 
person had not acted badly; that blame need not involve hostile feelings, like 
anger or resentment and that accounts that focus on reactive attitudes alone 
                                                
98 Our criminal law and penal institutions are publicly justified by and structured 
around the appropriateness of retributive punishment.  To be sure, non-retributive 
justifications, such as deterrence and public safety, are mentioned and considered by 
legislatures, sentencing judges, and parole boards, but typically in conjunction with, not to the 
exclusion of, the virtually unquestioned premise that criminals deserve punishment.     
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(or on dispositions to have such attitudes) do not do justice to what I have 
called the normative significance of blame.  I have indicated that I favor the 
idea, derived from P.F. Strawson and in some respects developed by Scanlon, 
that blame and blameworthiness involve a change to a person’s moral 
standing, to the claims that he has and to the obligations to which he is 
subject.  However, I have criticized Scanlon’s attempt to develop this idea both 
because it imposes the unnecessary framework of a relationship on moral 
blame and because it dismisses, without reason, the retributive nature of 
blaming attitudes.  In this section, I build on these claims and develop a 
descriptive account of blame and blameworthiness.   
On my account, when a person is blameworthy, his moral standing 
changes in certain ways.  By moral standing, I do not mean that his moral 
record declines, as though blame were a black mark on some account or 
grading sheet.  Instead, I mean that he loses certain normative claims he 
otherwise would have had against others and that he is subject to new 
normative expectations and obligations to which he would not otherwise have 
been subject.  For examples of lost claims, if a person is blameworthy for 
causing some injury to others, he will have less, if any, claim to the continued 
respect or friendship of those he has injured.  He will also have little claim to 
sympathy or help in avoiding certain kinds of bad consequences that follow 
from his action, including consequences ranging from the resentment felt by 
his victims to the civil or criminal liability that might be imposed on him.  
Indeed, he may lose any claim he would have against our causing or 
facilitating these sorts of harsh consequences.  In terms of additional 
expectations, we will also suppose that the blameworthy person owes his 
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victims an apology and that he may be obliged to take steps toward self-
improvement in order to avoid committing similar acts.   
Turning from blameworthiness to blame, on my account, to blame is to 
withdraw those attitudes or other things to which the person has lost his claim 
and to demand that he fulfill the special obligations that apply.  So, the person 
who blames does not merely believe it would be appropriate to withdraw 
sympathy, for example, he actually withdraws at least some degree of 
sympathy.  The person who blames also cares or insists that the blameworthy 
person meets the new obligations to which blameworthiness gives rise, such 
as obligations to apologize and to promise to avoid similar bad actions.  The 
person who blames may insist that these obligations be met before he will 
accept that the blameworthy person should be permitted to return to his 
normal standing and before extending the sympathy that has been withdrawn. 
With this rough statement of my view out of the way, let me try to be a 
bit more precise about some of the central changes that blameworthiness 
entails.  Chief among them is the one that Scanlon rejects.  When a person is 
blameworthy, it becomes appropriate that he should suffer in some degree in 
consequence.  Thus, to some extent, he loses his claims to sympathy, to help 
in avoiding suffering, and to our avoidance of behavior that may cause him to 
suffer.  As I argued in reply to Scanlon, this need not mean that it is ever 
appropriate for blameworthy person to suffer great harm.  It need not even 
mean that it is appropriate for the blameworthy person to suffer any concrete 
loss or injury.  In many cases, it is enough that the person should come to 
recognize the wrongness of what they have done and feel some remorse for it.   
To be clear, shame, guilt, and remorse are ways of suffering for what 
one has done.  These feelings do not always need to be excruciating or 
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enduring.  If a person makes a rude or insensitive remark, she might “feel bad” 
about it without experiencing any intense suffering.  That may be all the 
suffering she deserves to experience.  On the other hand, we should not lose 
sight of the fact that guilt and shame can be terrible, destructive forces.  In 
their extreme forms, they can eviscerate a person’s sense of self-worth and 
lead him to do awful things to himself.  I am not advocating the 
appropriateness of any particular degree of shame or remorse for any 
particular kind of blameworthy act.  I simply wish to make clear that the idea 
that the blameworthy person deserves to feel some amount of remorse, 
shame, or guilt, an idea which I think is both plausible and commonly 
accepted, is not some weak impostor for the idea that the blameworthy person 
deserves to suffer.  
At the same time, the view that a blameworthy person deserves to 
suffer should not be limited to suffering from guilt and shame.  Sometimes, but 
certainly not always, we believe that a blameworthy person deserves to suffer 
in some more tangible or physical way.  The belief that a criminal may deserve 
incarceration is perhaps the most obvious example, but it is not the only form 
that this attitude commonly takes.  We commonly believe that, regardless of 
any state sanctioned punishment, a blameworthy person may deserve to lose 
his job, the love and trust of his spouse or his friends, his reputation, or his 
wealth, and we may hope that he does suffer some of these losses.   
For an example, imagine a person who runs a business that he secretly 
knows to cause great and unjustifiable harm to others.  Suppose that he has 
decided to have his company test dangerous chemical products or risky 
medical procedures on people in impoverished communities without their 
informed consent, while deceiving government regulators and corporate 
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shareholders about this practice.  Seeing him as blameworthy, we may believe 
that he deserves to lose his job and any comparable position of trust and 
authority.  We might also believe that it would be appropriate or well-deserved 
if he lost the wealth he has made from this business.  These consequences 
seem quite fitting given that the blameworthy acts at issue arise in the exercise 
of his professional role.  But we might also believe that he desrves other, less 
directly related consequences.  We might judge it to be appropriate if his 
spouse, upon learning what he did, felt that he had so violated their shared 
principles that she could not trust or respect him again.  We might see it as 
appropriate and deserved if she chose to leave him and raise their children 
without him.  We may suppose not only that a blameworthy person brings 
these consequences upon himself, but that it is actually a good thing that he 
suffers them (or at least that it would be a bad thing if he did not).99  As a 
result, by judging him to be blameworthy, we will suppose that he has no claim 
to help in avoiding these consequences and, indeed, no claim against 
reporting his conduct and thus causing or facilitating these harsh 
consequences.        
                                                
99 On Scanlon’s view, it is inappropriate to see it as a good thing that a person should 
suffer a loss as a consequence for bad behavior.  I find this view puzzling.  Are we to suppose 
that it would be a good thing (or just an acceptable and fine thing) for the person in my 
example to go on happily without any consequence, to retain his job, enjoy his ill-gotten 
wealth, and continue to enjoy an unquestioning love and trust from family and friends?  To 
avoid this implausible conclusion, Scanlon might appeal to intuitions that the impairment to the 
blameworthy person’s relationship with his employer makes termination a fitting response, the 
impairment to his relationship with his wife makes separation or divorce appropriate, and the 
impairment to some relationship (perhaps with the employer or perhaps with his victims) 
makes it appropriate for him to lose his fortune (though note that I have not assumed that any 
deserved financial consequences must be brought about by repaying his victims; it may be 
appropriate enough that he loses his money to lawyers and creditors).  But how does Scanlon 
explain how we, as third-party observers, can approve of these outcomes without undercutting 
his own rejection of retributivism?  If we can see these as good or appropriate things, and 
surely we can, we should also be able to see it as “fitting” or “appropriate” for the public to 
impose a penalty in response to his violation of the public trust.  But that is just to say we may 
see it as appropriate that people are made to suffer in certain ways as a consequence for 
blameworthy behavior. 
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The claim that a blameworthy person deserves to suffer and has no 
claims to sympathy or help in avoiding certain kinds of suffering can sound 
harsh and vindictive, but in fact, I suspect that the view could not be more 
commonplace.  I, for one, am quite used to hearing, “Well, you should feel 
bad,” as a response when I confide that I feel badly for having done something 
mean or thoughtless.  The friends and family members who tell me this are not 
unusually cruel.  It is quite normal to hope that people feel guilt and shame for 
their bad behavior.  In fact, we often make a deliberate effort to provoke such 
feelings in people who have done something wrong.  Though we might 
pejoratively call this a guilt trip, we very often seek to make a blameworthy 
person see the harm he has done from the perspective of others.  Our goal is 
not simply to make him see it, but to make him see it and feel badly about it.  
After all, we will surely be disappointed and troubled if a new perspective on 
the pain does not cause remorse in the blameworthy person, but instead 
leaves him indifferent or even more inclined to do it again.  This appears to 
indicate that we believe that blameworthy people ought to suffer remorse, at 
least, and that they have lost claims against being made to feel remorse. 
Of course there are limits to the ways in which blameworthiness should 
affect our view of a person’s claims.  Retributivism should not be mistaken for 
the view that punishment and suffering are appropriate without qualification.  
How much a blameworthy person deserves to suffer depends on what she has 
done.  So, though we may believe that a person deserves to suffer to some 
degree and though she may have no claim to our sympathy if she suffers in 
the appropriate degree, she may deserve every bit of our sympathy and 
assistance if her suffering becomes disproportionate.  If she is made to suffer 
disproportionately, this may be cause for disapproval, blame, and even 
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outrage.  We may believe that the immoral businessman in my example 
deserves to suffer in all of the very serious ways described above, and yet 
disapprove if he receives a punishment that offers little opportunity for 
redemption, and we may be horrified if he is attacked and brutalized by an 
angry mob.  In short, whatever claims a blameworthy person loses, he or she 
certainly retains claims against excessive punishment.  
In addition to believing that it is appropriate for a blameworthy person to 
suffer, the blameworthy person may lose a number of other claims that he may 
normally have on us.  As indicated above, Scanlon identifies a number of 
these sorts of claims.  There may be others.  To catalog them with particularity 
would be difficult, as they may vary greatly with the circumstances and nature 
of the blameworthy act.  But in general terms, a blameworthy person may lose 
his claims to our trust, our esteem, our friendly or cordial attitudes, and our 
openness and willingness to engage and work with him or to enter into 
relationships.  Where he does, this is not to say that we must withdraw our 
trust, esteem, etc.  For one, the point is that the blameworthy person loses his 
claim to these things, not that we have no right to extend them if we choose.  
But in addition, in viewing a person as blameworthy, we may believe that the 
changes to the person’s claims and obligations should be localized in 
particular ways.  In judging one’s boss to be blameworthy for infidelity to her 
husband, we may feel that the boss has lost her claim to her husband’s trust 
and to the respect and friendliness of his family and friends.  So, we may 
believe it is appropriate for them to withdraw from her in these ways.  But we 
may still feel that our boss is entitled to respect from people in the workplace 
and to trust and esteem in matters involving the business.    
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As I have said above, a blameworthy person does not only lose claims 
that she might otherwise have.  She also becomes subject to special 
normative expectations or demands.  Typically, blameworthiness includes or 
gives rise to obligations to apologize or otherwise show remorse and 
contrition; obligations to make reparations and correct or offset, to some 
reasonable extent, the effects of the bad behavior; and obligations to take 
measures to avoid similar behavior, whether that involves merely making a 
resolution or something more, like habit formation or treatment.  When judging 
a person to be blameworthy, we accept that she is appropriately subject to 
some or all of these obligations.  However, in simply judging her to be 
blameworthy, we need not care particularly that these obligations are met.  We 
may feel it is none of our business.  But we will believe that she deserves to be 
held to these expectations by appropriate blamers.  The difference between 
judging a person to be blameworthy and actually blaming him is, on my view, 
caring in the particular instance that the person gets what he now deserves 
and that he fulfills these new obligations.  When we blame, we do not merely 
judge that it would be appropriate for the blameworthy person to suffer in 
some degree, we actually want him to suffer.  We expect the person to feel 
badly for what he did, whether this means only a moment of understanding 
and remorse or years of guilt.  It may cause us pain to see the blameworthy 
person continuing to thrive in ways that we feel he no longer deserves.  And to 
the extent that the person has lost his claim to our trust, esteem, etc., then 
blaming involves actually withdrawing our trust, esteem, etc.  Blaming involves 
imposing the sorts of special obligations identified above, and actually caring 
that they are fulfilled.  When we blame, we do not merely suppose that it would 
be appropriate for the person to apologize and fix the damage he has done.  
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We care about whether or not the person does so.  We may refuse to extend 
our trust, sympathy or openness to him until he meets these expectations, and 
if he does not, we may take offense and sharpen our blaming responses. 
The various special expectations associated with blame and the belief 
that the blameworthy person deserves to suffer are not only part of what it is to 
blame, they are conditions for the termination of blame and blameworthiness.  
If a person has adequately fulfilled these expectations—if say, he has suffered 
remorse, shown sufficient contrition, and made an honest effort to better 
himself in ways that will prevent similar blameworthy acts—it typically 
becomes appropriate to stop blaming.  The person who has suffered enough 
and who has improved or reinvented himself may have a claim on others to 
stop blaming him.  If not in every case, then in all but those involving 
egregious behavior, it will be possible for these special expectations to be met 
during the blameworthy person’s lifetime.  In many cases, the appropriate 
demands can be met very quickly and easily, as they might require only a 
short period of remorse, an apology, and a promise not to repeat the bad act.  
Even in more serious cases, it will normally be possible to reach a point where 
one no longer deserves blame for some instance of past behavior.  Thus, 
blameworthiness is often, if not always, a temporary and terminable change to 
one’s moral standing.     
The foregoing description of blameworthiness and blame supports the 
fact that when we blame we very often feel certain reactive attitudes.  It is not 
hard to see that behavior that would make us want a person to feel and show 
remorse would also naturally cause anger and indignation, or that the belief 
that we should withdraw trust from a person whom we had previously liked 
could be accompanied by disappointment and sadness.  And if blame involves 
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a withdrawal of sympathy and concern, it naturally will also lead to outright 
antipathy in many cases.  But my view of blame does not make these feelings 
a prerequisite for blame.  I believe that attention to the normative implications 
of blame, to the ways in which we alter our view of the claims and 
expectations that apply, shows that these feelings, however important they 
are, are not the essence of what it is to blame a person.   
My account of blame also naturally makes room for the practice of 
retributive punishment.  Retributive punishment can be justified only if it is 
appropriate that a person suffers in consequence for blameworthy behavior.  
That alone is not enough, of course.  For one thing, we could think it 
appropriate for a person to suffer for what she’s done without thinking that 
anyone has the right to make her suffer.  Our aversions to hypocrisy, 
vigilantism, and penal systems that lack procedural safeguards, all show that 
we believe that not just anyone should be empowered to punish.  In addition, 
in many cases at least, we may believe that a person has lost her claim to 
sympathy or to help in avoiding suffering without also believing she deserves 
punishment of any of the sorts normally imposed by the state.  My conception 
of blame supports the propriety of retributive punishment, but it is not sufficient 
for it.  In other words, on my account, in any particular case, it does not follow 
from the fact that a person is blameworthy that she should be punished, and a 
further account of the conditions for the justifiability of retributive punishment 
would need to be developed in order to explain whether retributive punishment 
is ever appropriate.  My retributive account of blame and blameworthiness 
merely allows room for the possibility of that retributive punishment is 
appropriate.   
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 Having discussed blame and blameworthiness, it is worth adding that 
there is room for an analogous account of praiseworthiness.  More so than 
“blame,” the term “praise” calls to mind a communicative act, speaking well of 
someone.  “Praise” may not commonly be used in a way that corresponds to 
blame in the robust, normative sense that I have identified here.  But even if 
“praise” refers most naturally to a speech act, praiseworthiness can be 
understood as involving a change in moral standing, analogous to 
blameworthiness.  To deem a person to be morally praiseworthy is not simply 
to say that she deserves to be praised outwardly, in the speech act sense.  It 
involves believing that she deserves to be held in esteem, to be trusted and 
granted a degree of deference in certain matters, and perhaps to enjoy our 
gratitude.  Praiseworthy people deserve particularly strong concern and 
sympathy.  It seems particularly sad or repugnant when they suffer bad luck or 
when they are treated without respect.  We feel that in a just world they should 
not suffer, but instead be rewarded for their virtue.  Thus, when one is 
praiseworthy, one has some claim to heightened respect, trust, and concern 
from others.  Of course, praiseworthiness, like blameworthiness, is a 
terminable condition.  One deserves only so much credit for individual 
praiseworthy acts, and if one ceases to behave admirably, one will eventually 
cease to be praiseworthy.  
V.  The Possibility of Real Moral Responsibility 
 I began this Chapter with the claim that an understanding of moral 
responsibility is crucial to evaluating arguments about the conditions for moral 
responsibility.  To demonstrate that fact I began with a look at Galen 
Strawson’s argument for the impossibility of “true” moral responsibility.  There, 
I relied solely on intuitions about particular cases of blameworthiness.  Now, I 
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want to return to Strawson’s argument and explain why it does not apply to 
blameworthiness and praiseworthiness of the sort that I have now identified.  
Recall that Galen Strawson’s argument depends on identifying certain 
conditions for responsibility, particularly the supposed condition that a person 
must have chosen, consciously and explicitly, the mental states that caused or 
motivated the behavior at issue.  To respond to this suggestion, this section 
explains what my account of blameworthiness and praiseworthiness indicates 
about the conditions for moral responsibility.  That is, it offers an initial answer 
to the question, “What must be true of our behavior for it to warrant the 
blaming and praising responses that I have just described?”  
My account of praise and blame supports a view of the following sort:  
moral praise and blame for behavior may be deserved only as a response to 
the strength of that person’s moral motivation evident in her behavior.  A 
person deserves blame for her behavior, i.e., is blameworthy, only if that 
behavior reveals that her concern for conforming her behavior to normative 
reasons is weak, and a person deserves praise for her behavior, i.e., is 
praiseworthy, only if that behavior reveals a particularly strong concern for 
normative reasons.  By strong and weak, I do not mean strong and weak in 
relation to that person’s other motives at the time.  One does not deserve 
much praise for doing the right thing simply when all of the other options are 
not very attractive, or where no normal person would be tempted to do 
otherwise, and one does not deserve blame if one is deeply concerned to do 
the right thing, but that concern is overwhelmed by a truly pathological desire.  
Instead, strength and weakness must be measured relative to that degree of 
moral motivation which we may reasonably expect of a person.  If a person’s 
actions reveal that she is more motivated to do the right thing than we would 
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reasonably expect, then she may be praiseworthy, and if they reveal that she 
is less motivated than we should reasonably expect, then she may be 
blameworthy. 
On this view, moral motivation of the sort that is sufficient to avoid 
blameworthiness neither entails, nor is entailed by what I referred to in 
Chapter One as “sufficient motivation” to do the right thing.  “Sufficient 
motivation,” as I used the phrase there, means motivation that is actually 
sufficient to trigger an exercise of a given ability.  But as I have just indicated, 
a person may lack sufficient motivation in that sense, perhaps because of an 
opposing pathological desire, and yet not be blameworthy.  When we are 
concerned with what a person ought to do, we ask what they would have done 
if they were sufficiently motivated to do the right thing.  That is, we consider 
what they would have done if their motivation to act on reasons outstripped 
their other desires and temptations no matter how strong those other desires 
are.  So, it will be the case that a person ought to have done something else 
any time that his moral motivation is weaker than a desire that impels him to 
do what he does.  But we will judge him to be blameworthy only to the extent 
that his moral motivation falls short of what we can reasonably expect.  Thus, 
a kleptomaniac ought not steal, but she may not deserve blame if she makes 
a heroic, but unsuccessful effort to avoid stealing.  We might even see that as 
an occasion for praise.   
Similarly, a person who has very strong, but not pathological, motivating 
reasons for doing the wrong thing could be less blameworthy than the person 
who does the wrong thing without any need to do so.  Compare a person who 
trespasses into a building because he desperately needs a bathroom with a 
person who does so simply because she wants to look around.  The first 
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person might be blameworthy.  Perhaps he could have planned better and 
avoided that situation.  But the second person is probably more blameworthy.  
We may infer that the second person’s desire to act on the relevant normative 
reasons is very weak.  From the fact that her desire to look around took 
precedence, we may infer that she is utterly unconcerned about the normative 
reasons not to trespass onto another person’s property.  But we cannot infer 
the same about the first person.  We only know that his respect for the 
reasons not to trespass gives way in cases of somewhat more serious need. 
Let me elaborate on my proposal a bit more and then explain why I take 
it to follow from the account of moral responsibility that I have developed here.  
We may reasonably expect moral agents to have some general moral 
motivation, some general desire to do what they ought to do.  This might be 
phrased in a number of ways:  a desire to do the right thing, a desire to do 
what one has most reason to do, a desire to pursue value, a desire to be 
good, etc. For my purposes here, I am not aware that there is any significant 
difference between these descriptions of a basic moral desire.  The inculcation 
or encouragement of this general desire, and the suppression of its opposite, 
is a central part of any minimally adequate moral education.100  Setting worries 
about determinism to the side for a moment, it is presumably reasonable to 
                                                
100 Of course, we may also reasonably expect moral agents to have other more 
specific, but still quite general moral desires and dispositions, such as desires to be fair, kind, 
courageous, just, honest, etc.  But I am going to focus on the more general desire.  It is 
difficult to identify a virtue of this sort that cannot be overdone and thus lead to non-optimal 
behavior.  People can be too kind, too courageous, etc., unless these desires are moderated 
by a more general interest in doing the right thing.  So, simply acting from a desire to be kind 
may not be acting from a desire to do the right thing, nor something that merits praise.  But I 
do not mean to exclude these dispositions from the idea of moral motivation.  I assume that 
any reasonably adequate concern to do the right thing will naturally provide a motive for 
developing these more specific desires and dispositions (to the right degree) and suppressing 
their opposites.  So acting as a result of these dispositions can be a way of revealing the 
strength of one’s concern to do the right thing.   
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expect any moral agent to be strongly but, given other natural human desires 
and temptations, imperfectly motivated by this moral desire.  On my view, only 
behavior that reveals that an agent is weakly motivated by this general moral 
desire is behavior for which she may be blameworthy.   
However, my proposal is not that we should assess blameworthiness 
and praiseworthiness simply based on the strength of a person’s moral 
motivation at the moment before acting.  Very often it is not obvious what the 
right thing is, and in assessing responsibility, we give people the benefit of 
some, but not all, of their mistaken beliefs about what it is.  As a result, in 
some cases, a person may be blameworthy for behavior even though they 
were, in that instance, motivated by the desire to do the right thing.  This does 
not conflict with my proposal.  If it is reasonable to expect a person to be 
motivated by the desire to do the right thing, it is equally reasonable to expect 
him to want to find out what the right thing is.  In fact, one cannot fully have the 
former desire without the latter.  As a result, a person has a duty of reasonable 
care to investigate and think through his beliefs, both factual and moral, and to 
discern the truth about what he ought to do.101  The diligence with which a 
person performs this duty may then affect his culpability for his behavior in 
other instances.  His later behavior may reveal or support an inference that he 
has not been concerned to think about and figure out what he ought to do.  
There is another way in which one’s moral motivation at the instant of 
acting is not a sufficient guide to blameworthiness.  Knowing what one ought 
                                                
101 The point of calling it a duty of reasonable care is that the scope of the duty is 
limited not only by the agent’s ability and opportunity to ascertain the truth, but also by a 
reasonable balancing of the foreseeable importance of a particular area of facts as compared 
to the cost of ascertaining the truth about it.  So, though an agent might have the ability and 
opportunity to investigate the potential distant consequences of his behavior, he has no duty 
to do so where the information is likely to be of very little practical value and gathering it will 
interfere with other more important activities.   
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to do is not always a matter of puzzling through tough moral questions and 
balancing competing reasons.  Sometimes it just requires remembering one’s 
promises and planning so that one can fulfill them.  If a person makes a 
commitment, but then fails to take reasonable measures to ensure that he will 
remember that commitment, he will be blameworthy if he forgets to fulfill that 
commitment.  This is so even though when the time comes to fulfill the 
commitment his intentions are perfectly good.  So, like the person who 
neglects to reflect on his moral views, this person may be blameworthy even 
while he is currently motivated by a desire to do the right thing.  And as in that 
case, this is reconciled with my view by the fact that strong motivation to do 
the right thing includes the desire to ensure that we are later in a position to do 
the right thing.  Our failure to remember a promise may reveal our failure to 
plan ahead or to set ourselves a reminder, and that in turn may reveal a lack 
of concern to do the right thing.   
What these points show is that we cannot evaluate the strength of a 
person’s concern to do the right thing by focusing narrowly on the immediate 
source of his motivation.  In looking at what a person’s behavior reveals about 
the strength of his concern to do the right thing, we take a broader view.  We 
consider what their behavior shows about their desire to figure out what they 
ought to do and to put themselves in a position to do it.  On my view, we 
cannot make an accurate judgment about how concerned they are about 
doing the right thing unless we take this broader view. 
My proposal is similar in spirit to the Kantian position advocated by 
Nomy Arpaly, but different in detail.  Arpaly suggests that “[a] person is 
praiseworthy for taking a morally right course of action out of good will and 
blameworthy for taking a morally wrong course of action out of lack of good 
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will or out of ill will.”102  This account correctly directs our attention to the 
quality of the person’s motives and desires, but it has two disadvantages.  As I 
have just argued, a person can be blameworthy despite being, at the moment, 
sincerely motivated by the desire to do the right thing and thus apparently 
acting with “good will.”  Perhaps she has previously been lazy about figuring 
out what the right thing is, or perhaps she has failed to be vigilant about 
remembering her obligations.  There may be wiggle room in the idea of taking 
a course of action “out of good will” that would allow Arpaly to account for this, 
but that would only emphasize the second problem, the vagueness of these 
terms.  Though I suspect I have some sense of what is meant by “good will” 
and “ill will,” I do not see their vagueness as a virtue.  In place of these terms, 
my view specifies that in assessing blameworthiness and praiseworthiness for 
actions, we are concerned with what those actions reveal about the strength of 
a person’s motivation to do the right thing, in the broad sense that includes her 
desire to discover reasons and determine how they apply in a given situation 
and to plan and prepare so that she can be in a position to do what she 
should, and that we are concerned with the strength of this desire relative to 
our reasonable expectations, rather than relative to her other desires. 
The view that blameworthiness and praiseworthiness depend on what 
the agent’s behavior reveals about the strength of her concern for doing the 
right thing gains support from my account of blame and praise.  Moral praise 
and blame involve departures from the attitudes that we normally ought to 
have towards one another.  They are departures from the respect, sympathy, 
and good will that people generally deserve.  On this account, a person’s 
claims to respect, sympathy and concern are to a certain extent conditional.  
                                                
102 Arpaly (2006) p.15. 
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They may lose those claims—or in cases of praise they may earn a stronger 
claim—based on what they do.  Moral blame also involves the imposition of 
additional obligations or expectations upon the blameworthy person.  This 
raises the following questions:  On what grounds would it make sense to 
suppose that a person could lose or gain such claims, and on what grounds 
may we make these additional moral demands of people?  On what grounds 
would it make sense to say that a person’s behavior makes them deserve a 
departure from these basic moral attitudes?  I believe the answer is only on 
the grounds that their behavior shows that their concern to do the right thing 
has exceeded or fallen short of that which can be reasonably expected from 
them.  
  Consider moral blameworthiness first.  We normally owe each other a 
reasonable degree of sympathy and concern, but on the view that I have 
argued for here blame involves believing that a person should suffer.  Moral 
blame involves a change to attitudes that people normally deserve solely in 
virtue of their standing as fellow persons.  It is difficult to see how someone 
could deserve a departure from these attitudes unless his behavior reveals 
that he does not care very much for moral reasons himself.  It is a basic moral 
intuition, I think, that a person would not deserve a withdrawal of moral respect 
and concern and may not be held to heightened moral obligations simply 
because she is weak, slow, unattractive, or unlucky, or because she has any 
other morally insignificant trait.  Instead, her normal moral standing depends 
only her status as a person and on the presumption that she is reasonably 
concerned for moral and normative reasons.  Only if her behavior displays a 
failure to be concerned for and motivated by moral reasons and moral value—
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and not simply a lack of intelligence, skill, or resources—should we say that 
she deserves any alteration to her normal moral standing.   
This might sound a bit like a crude eye-for-an-eye retributive principle:  
if she does not show others moral respect, then we need not show it to her.  
My account of blame and blameworthiness is intended to be retributive, but 
not crudely so.  Any impression that I am relying on eye-for-eye type 
reasoning overlooks important differences between blameworthy behavior and 
blaming responses.  Blameworthiness affects some moral claims and supports 
a withdrawal of a degree of moral concern and respect, but blameworthiness 
and blame are not simple matters of settling the score.  As I claimed above, 
even very blameworthy people still have claims against many forms of cruel 
treatment.  The idea that a blameworthy person may deserve to suffer in some 
ways does not mean that he deserves anything like the behavior for which he 
is blamed.  Thus, a torturer may deserve to suffer, but he may maintain a 
claim against being tortured.   
The conditions that call for an end to blame also confirm both that 
blameworthiness is not crudely retributive and that blameworthiness depends 
on the quality of a person’s motives.  Apology, remorse, and demonstrated 
change of character can make it reasonable to decide that a person no longer 
deserves blame.  They do so because they reveal that the formerly 
blameworthy person has come to appreciate the problems with her prior 
behavior and would no longer want to behave that way if she had another 
chance.  Her remorse and her efforts to change show her concern for reasons.  
Moreover, in such cases, it is often appropriate to stop blaming regardless of 
whether or not the “score has been settled” and our vindictive impulses have 
been satisfied. 
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It must be admitted that there are cases in which it is natural and 
understandable to blame a person although her behavior cannot be explained 
by a lack of concern for reasons.  We sometimes feel bitterness and 
resentment towards a person who has harmed our interests, even if the harm 
was just the result of fair competition or bad luck.  Their close causal 
connection with our loss may make it difficult to maintain the respect and 
concern we ought to have towards them.  But the fact that this is natural or 
understandable does not mean that the person deserves anything less than 
full moral respect.  It simply means that we can see why we might be prone to 
respond in this way.   
Similarly, there are cases in which our blaming attitudes are in part 
responses to a moral fault, but also are affected by other factors, such as luck.  
We tend to blame the drunk driver who injures a person more than the equally 
drunk driver who, luckily, makes it home without causing harm.  My own view 
is that these responses, like those above, are understandable, but that they do 
not correspond to what is deserved.  We have understandable tendencies 
both to be harsh, possibly too harsh, to the unlucky drunk driver and especially 
to be too easy on the lucky one.  Blaming can be emotionally and practically 
difficult, particularly where it would involve distancing ourselves from someone 
that we care about or with whom we cannot avoid interacting.  So, we may be 
prone to let a person off the hook easily where he has done no real harm.  But 
it is more difficult to avoid withdrawing from and feeling resentment towards a 
person who is closely, causally linked to a serious and vivid moral harm.   
Now consider praiseworthiness.  The appropriateness of some of the 
attitudes that a praiseworthy person deserves obviously depend upon the 
strength of her concern to do the right thing.  The esteem she may deserve is 
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not esteem for her athletic prowess, artistic ability, or mental acuity, but 
specifically for her moral character and her interest and resolve to do the right 
thing.  Similarly, the trust and deference a praiseworthy person deserves 
relates to the fact that she has shown herself to have good moral character, 
not some technical skill.  We should trust her to try to discern her duty and 
carry it out, not to score points in a basketball game or bake a soufflé.  Such 
trust could only be deserved on the basis of behavior that shows she is 
strongly concerned about acting on good reasons.  Our belief that a 
praiseworthy person deserves happiness also depends, though less obviously 
so, on the fact that their action displays strong concern for reasons.  We 
generally believe that people of skill, talent and natural ability may deserve to 
be rewarded.  They deserve to be fairly compensated for their productive 
talents, which is to say that they deserve reward in return for the value and 
happiness that these talents bring to others.  But this kind of desert is different 
than the desert of happiness that comes with moral praiseworthiness.  What 
people deserve in the first instance depends on the existence of a market for 
the products of their skills and talents, and it is desert of compensation, not 
happiness.  Unlike a person of skill, a person of moral character and strong 
concern for reasons deserves happiness, and she deserves it regardless of 
whether her virtue is appreciated or economically valued by others.  This could 
only be because her behavior shows exceptional concern to do the right thing. 
Now let us consider Galen Strawson’s position that to be responsible 
for our behavior, we must have chosen the mental states that caused that 
behavior.  As I have just argued, from the nature of blame and praise, we can 
see that judging a person to be blameworthy or praiseworthy for her behavior 
requires us to be able to make a judgment about the strength of her concern 
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for reasons relative to our reasonable expectations.  But this conception of 
praise and blame does not give us any reason to believe that blameworthiness 
or praiseworthiness requires us to know anything more about the mental 
causes of a person’s behavior.  For unlike heaven and hell, praise and blame 
are generally temporary, terminable responses to a person’s behavior.  We 
need not make any final assessment about a person’s moral character in order 
to judge her to be blameworthy or praiseworthy.  Judgments that a person is 
blameworthy or praiseworthy may not be fleeting, but they are subject to 
revision as the agent reacts to her own behavior and as she continues to act in 
ways that further reveal her character.  We can also blame or praise for 
behavior without making any overall assessment of a person’s moral 
character.  People who are generally good people can deserve blame for 
isolated instances of bad behavior.  And people may deserve blame for a lack 
of moral motivation that is evident in one field (e.g., laziness in work and 
career), while simultaneously deserving praise for showing strong moral 
motivation in another (e.g., kindness and sensitivity towards others).  Thus, 
there is nothing inconsistent about thinking that a person deserves some 
degree of blame, while thinking she is, by and large, a decent or good person.  
Nor is there any inconsistency in believing that a person should feel remorse 
and that she should learn from her mistakes, while also believing that she is 
the sort of person who will do so quickly.  Thus, to support praise or blame, we 
need not believe that a person’s behavior accurately reflects something deep 
about who she truly or fundamentally is.  We need only determine that she 
ought to have been more concerned to act on reasons, or in the case of 
praise, that she was more concerned than we might have expected.   
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This is not to say that having or lacking a certain degree of moral 
concern is sufficient for praiseworthiness or blameworthiness.  Perhaps we 
can argue that other conditions pertain.  Nor should I be taken to be 
suggesting, at this point, that determinism does not pose a problem for moral 
responsibility.  My explanation of when a person deserves blame depends on 
the idea that we could reasonably expect a person’s moral motivation to be 
stronger.  One might ask when it is reasonable to have that expectation, 
particularly in a deterministic world.  I have passed over this issue so far.  My 
goal here is not to identify all of the conditions for responsibility.  It is to explain 
why Galen Strawson’s conditions do not apply.  My conception of blame and 
praise provide no reason to suppose that real moral responsibility, including 
praise and blame, requires that a person consciously and explicitly chose the 
degree of moral motivation that they have, as Galen Strawson assumes.  
Having developed an account of moral responsibility in terms of 
blameworthiness and praiseworthiness, we may now turn to some of the other 
arguments that suggest determinism might undermine moral responsibility. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE POSSIBILITY OF 
BEHAVING DIFFERENTLY 
 
 
I.  Introduction: 
 
A person is not blameworthy for what she does if it would be 
unreasonable to expect anything better of her.  Similarly, we might suppose 
that a person has no claim to praise or admiration if no one in her situation 
would have been tempted to do less.  Taken together, a person is morally 
responsible for what she does only when it is reasonable to expect something 
different from her.  These claims, I am confident, are true when properly 
understood.  However, they come close to implying a familiar and highly 
controversial claim about responsibility.  If we can reasonably expect better (or 
worse) from a person than what she has actually done, then we are only a 
small step from supposing that she could have done something else.  Thus, 
we are naturally led to the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP):  If a person 
is morally responsible for what she has done, then she could have done 
otherwise.   
Stated this way, PAP is weaker in one respect than the intuitions from 
which I started.  It does not specifically require that the possible alternative is 
better for cases of blameworthiness and worse for cases of praiseworthiness, 
and it does not require that the alternatives are within the range of our 
reasonable expectations.  It requires only that some alternative course of 
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action is possible.  Nonetheless, PAP is strong enough to pose a problem for 
anyone who supposes that morally responsibility and determinism are 
compatible.  PAP provides the key premise in an argument much like the one 
we confronted in Chapter One.  That argument might be put this way: 
1)  If determinism is true, then no one could have 
done anything other than what he did. 
2)  If a person is morally responsible for what she 
has done, then she could have done something 
else. 
3)  So, if determinism is true, no one is ever morally 
responsible.   
Based on the discussion of the argument from determinism in Chapter One, it 
is clear that more needs to be said about the sense of “could have” in 
premises 1 and 2 before we declare this argument to be valid.  Still, the 
intuitive plausibility of the premises and the appearance of validity are enough 
to make clear that any defender of the compatibility of determinism and moral 
responsibility must have something to say about the principle of alternate 
possibilities.   
 There are two widely recognized compatibilist responses.  The first—
the “traditional compatibilist” response—accepts the truth of PAP, but exploits 
the flexibility in the meaning of “can” or “could have” in order to block the 
argument.  The most familiar versions of this strategy suggest that, as used in 
the principle, “could have done otherwise” means only “would have done 
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otherwise, if she so chose.”103  If some such interpretation of the principle can 
be defended, then the argument is not valid.  As we have already seen, 
determinism implies that no one could have done otherwise in a different and 
stronger sense than this.   
The second compatibilist strategy does not attempt to finesse the 
principle in this way.  It rejects the principle outright.  Those who reject PAP 
generally do so on the basis of a controversial counterexample developed by 
Henry Frankfurt and elaborated by countless critics and supporters.104  This 
may be called the “Frankfurtian compatibilist” response.   
   To generate a Frankfurt-type counterexample, we start with a person 
who is morally responsible for what she does.  Suppose, for example, that a 
competent moral agent, J, does something awful and that she does it for 
utterly bad reasons.  We then simply add that, unbeknownst to J, there was 
someone else, B, who was ready to intervene if necessary to make sure that J 
“does” what she actually did.  So, B would have forced J’s hand if J had 
changed her mind or otherwise became inclined to do the right thing.  But 
because J chooses to act for her own bad reasons, B does not actually need 
to intervene.  In such cases, Frankfurt and his supporters suggest that we 
should see J as blameworthy because she acted for her own bad reasons.  
The fact that B was ready to intervene had nothing to do with what she 
                                                
103 Conditional analyses of this sort have been offered for various principles related to 
freedom and moral responsibility including the principle of alternate possibilities.  See, e.g. 
Hume (1740) p.63; Moore (1912) pp.13, 196-222; Austin (1956); Ayer (1954). 
104 See Frankfurt (1969). 
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actually did, and therefore nothing to do with her responsibility for what she 
did.  However, they also insist that B’s possible intervention ensures that J 
could not have done anything else.  The key to these cases is the insight that 
something can make an agent unable to do anything but φ without itself 
causing her to do φ. 
 In the literature on Frankfurt cases, there has been a great deal of 
disagreement about whether they really rule out the possibility of doing 
otherwise.  Everyone must concede that there is inevitably some difference 
between the course of events in which J acts for her own reasons and the 
alternative in which B intervenes.  In the counterfactual scenario in which B 
intervenes, J’s behavior has different causes; J’s reasons for acting in the 
actual scenario do not motivate or explain her counterfactual behavior; and J 
is almost certainly not responsible for what B makes her do.  Frankfurt’s critics 
sometimes stress the importance of these differences, arguing that they show 
that J has alternatives.  Frankfurt’s supporters, on the other hand, have 
downplayed the significance of these differences and insisted that they do not 
amount to doing otherwise in any sense that could be relevant to moral 
responsibility.   
There is something to be said for each side.  It should be conceded that 
the differences between acting on one’s own and being manipulated by a 
Frankfurtian intervener are not sufficient to sustain the principle of alternate 
possibilities as stated above.  This is not because Frankfurtian interveners are 
able to ensure that the agent does the same thing in the counterfactual 
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scenario, but because, when they intervene, they can ensure that there is 
nothing whatsoever that the agent does.  If there is nothing that an agent 
does, then she is not doing otherwise.  Frankfurt’s supporters go wrong, 
however, if they suppose that this means the alternative, counterfactual 
scenario is irrelevant or unimportant to the agent’s responsibility for her 
behavior.  Alternate possibilities of a sort do remain, and they are essential to 
moral responsibility.  The fact that Frankfurt cases, no matter how they are 
tweaked, cannot rule out differences between the agent’s actual and 
counterfactual behavior should be a clue that these differences reflect an 
important truth about moral responsibility.  Once these differences are 
accurately characterized and understood, rather than downplayed or 
dismissed, it should be clear that a principle somewhat like PAP states a 
necessary condition for moral responsibility.  I refer to this principle as the 
Principle of Alternate Possible Behavior (PAPB), and I will argue that we have 
reason to accept a traditional compatibilist version of this alternative principle. 
II.  The Principle of Alternate Possible Behavior 
A.   Introduction to the Principle of Alternate Possible Behavior: 
PAP says that if a person is morally responsible for her behavior, then 
she could have done otherwise.  It makes the possibility of doing otherwise a 
necessary condition for responsibility for actions and omissions.  This section 
explains and then defends a different principle, PAPB.  Here is a rough 
statement of PAPB, which will need some explanation and refinement:   
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If a person is morally responsible for her behavior, 
then she could have behaved differently.   
The key difference between PAP and PAPB is that PAPB does not require a 
counterfactual scenario in which the agent does anything at all.  Instead, it 
only requires an alternate possible scenario in which the agent’s behavior is 
relevantly different.  To bring out this difference between PAP and PAPB, let 
us define some terminology and then consider an illustration.   
PAP relies on the possibility of doing otherwise.  I understand the things 
that an agent does to include her voluntary actions and her voluntary 
omissions, but nothing else.  Including omissions within the category of things 
a person does may seem strange or even like an oxymoron.  For some 
purposes it would be a mistake not to distinguish between actions and 
omissions, but for my purposes here I see no serious problem with lumping 
them together.105  An omission may be thought of as a case where one allows 
something to happen or allows something to be the case though one has 
some opportunity to prevent or change it.  Allowing is something that a person 
“does” in the sense that I am concerned with.   
Actions and omissions are voluntary in the weak sense that I have in 
mind if they can be explained by an agent’s beliefs, desires and other 
                                                
105 Note the significance of calling a voluntary omission something that the agent 
does.  For one thing, it means that I read PAP as stating a single condition on responsibility for 
both actions and omissions.  Not everyone has supposed that this is so.  Van Inwagen, for 
example, has suggested that PAP concerns only “performed acts,” not omissions. Van 
Inwagen (1983) pp.164-65.  Incidentally, Van Inwagen is willing to concede PAP to the 
Frankfurt examples, but not his “Principle of Possible Action,” which states that a “person is 
morally responsible for failing to perform a given act only if he could have performed that act.”  
On my approach, the Principle of Possible Action is simply a more restricted version of PAP.   
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motivational states in the normal, familiar manner.  This means that an act or 
omission may be voluntary although it is done only in response to a threat or 
compulsory legal order.  A person who, fearing a death threat, does something 
that she finds loathsome still does that thing voluntarily on this account.  
Actions and omissions may also be voluntary even if they are brought about 
only through a mistaken belief.  The person who shoots a friend, mistaking him 
for an enemy, does so voluntarily even though he may rightly point out that he 
did not mean to do it.106  It should also be noted that an omission may be 
voluntary not only if it is affirmatively motivated by the agent’s desires (e.g., 
the omission occurs because the agent is motivated to do something else), but 
also if it can be explained by the absence or weakness of her motivation to 
perform the relevant act (e.g., the omission occurs because, lacking concern 
about her duty, the agent lies around and does nothing at all).   
Unlike PAP, PAPB draws our attention to behavior and to the possibility 
of behaving differently.  I understand “behavior” to cover far more than 
voluntary actions and omissions.  “Behavior” also includes any non-voluntary 
motions of an agent’s body, as well as the absence thereof.  Twitches, snores, 
and movements made in sleep are a few familiar examples of behavior.  
Behavior also includes falling over as the result of a push, simply remaining 
motionless, and the rising and falling of one’s chest from breathing.  The fact 
that PAPB is addressed not only to what an agent does, but also to the rest of 
                                                
106 Thus, “voluntarily” is weaker than “intentionally.”  I suspect that an action will be 
voluntary under each of its descriptions if it is voluntary under any of them, whereas an action 
can be intentional under only those descriptions that the agent believes to apply. 
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her behavior does not mean that I suppose that a person is likely to be 
responsible for non-voluntary behavior.  Indeed, PAPB itself indicates that 
typically, if not always, non-voluntary behavior is not the sort of behavior for 
which we could be blameworthy.   
Now, to illustrate the difference between PAP and PAPB, imagine that 
Jane faces a choice.  She must decide whether to submit her dissertation 
tomorrow or to delay, perhaps indefinitely (i.e., not submit tomorrow).  
(Submitting today is not an option because Jane is in the wilderness on a 
camping trip.)  Normally, Jane will do one or the other:  submit or delay.  But it 
is also possible that before she does either of these things, Jane falls into a 
coma that lasts for weeks.  If so, then submitting her dissertation will not be 
among the things she does tomorrow, but it also will not be the case that she 
does otherwise.  There is nothing that she does once she falls into the coma.   
Of course, it would be correct to say that she does not submit her 
dissertation, but not if this is interpreted to mean that she does something 
other than submit her dissertation.  There is an implicit “voluntarily” here, and 
we must be careful about where it goes.  It is correct to say that Jane does not 
voluntarily submit her dissertation, but it would be wrong to say that Jane 
voluntarily does not submit her dissertation.   
So, while Jane is on her camping trip, still healthy and conscious, at 
least three courses of events seem possible:  she might voluntarily submit, she 
might voluntarily not submit, or there might be nothing that she does 
voluntarily.  The first two confront her as choices.  The third does not.  It arises 
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in a case where her agency is suspended, so to speak.  These three 
possibilities bring out the difference between PAP and PAPB.  PAP focuses 
our attention on only the first two options.  It suggests that if Jane is 
praiseworthy for submitting, then it must have been possible for her to delay 
(i.e., voluntarily not submit).  PAPB, on the other hand, asks us to consider all 
three possibilities.  According to PAPB, Jane may be praiseworthy as long as 
there is a possible scenario in which she fails to submit, whether this is 
because she voluntarily delays or because there is nothing she does at all.  
The claim that there is a third possibility not treated as relevant by the 
normal principle of alternate possibilities might seem surprising.  One might 
suggest that, in PAP, “could have done otherwise” is intended to cover the full 
range of possibilities, including the possibility of doing nothing voluntarily 
whatsoever.  After all, there is a loose sense in which a person’s non-voluntary 
behavior can be included among the things she “does.”  We might ask a 
person, “Do you realize what you did in your sleep last night?”  (Of course, we 
can talk this way about inanimate objects as well: “Watch what this thing 
does.”)  If one wishes to use “does” in this sense, I could concede that PAPB 
is merely a restatement of PAP that helps to bring out this third possibility.  But 
I do not believe that this is how “could have done otherwise” has normally 
been understood or that it is faithful to the supporters of PAP.  This is most 
clear on the traditional compatibilist interpretation of PAP.  Traditional 
compatibilists claim that “could have done otherwise” means something like 
“would have done otherwise, if she had so chosen.”  This interpretation makes 
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explicit the restriction of relevant alternatives to those in which the alternative 
is one that may be chosen, or in other words, to those in which the alternative 
involves voluntary behavior.  This restriction is often made explicit by those 
who reject the traditional compatibilist interpretation as well.  The customary 
rejoinder is that “could have done otherwise” means not only “would have 
done otherwise if she had so chosen” but in addition “. . . and nothing 
prevented her from so choosing.”  Furthermore, as I will argue below, if people 
had understood PAP to be satisfied by the possibility of not doing anything 
voluntarily, they should not have supposed that Frankfurt’s case presents a 
counterexample.  Therefore, I understand PAPB to be distinct from PAP. 
Two further refinements to PAPB should be made.  First, I should clarify 
the notion of behaving differently.  PAPB requires behavior that is different in 
kind, rather than numerically different.  So, PAPB is not necessarily satisfied 
by the possibility of a different token event.  PAPB, like PAP, is motivated by 
the idea that a person cannot be considered blameworthy unless we could 
reasonably have expected better, nor praiseworthy unless we could have 
reasonably expected worse.  Thus, PAPB requires not simply the possibility of 
a numerically different behavior event, an event that would be a wash, morally 
speaking, but behavior that is different in a morally significant way.  If the 
agent is blameworthy for her behavior, PAPB requires the possibility of 
behavior for which she would not be blameworthy, and if the agent is 
praiseworthy, PAPB requires the possibility of behavior for which she would 
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not be praiseworthy.107  So, the requirement of different possible behavior may 
be stronger than is immediately apparent from the statement of the principle 
above.  
Second, I will defend a compatibilist version of PAPB only.  
Compatibilist versions of PAP typically make use of some sort of volitional 
event.  They require that the person would have done otherwise, if he had so 
chosen or if he had so decided or if he had so willed.  This is not the approach 
I favor for PAPB.  The very point of PAPB is to take account of a third 
possibility, on which the agent does not act voluntarily or as the result of a 
volitional event.  Instead, PAPB should tie the possibility of behaving 
differently to certain relevant differences in motivation or moral concern.  The 
conception of blameworthiness developed in Chapter Two shows that 
blameworthiness for behavior requires that the behavior reveals that the 
agent’s motivation to act in accordance with the relevant normative 
                                                
107 It might be suggested that PAPB should only require the possibility of behavior for 
which a person is less blameworthy (or for praiseworthiness, the possibility of less 
praiseworthy behavior).  But consider the proposed counterfactual scenario, in which the 
agent behaves in a way for which she is less blameworthy.  Applying PAPB to this 
counterfactual blameworthy person, there would have to be yet another alternative scenario in 
which she would be still less blameworthy, and so on ad infinitum or at least until we find an 
alternative in which she is not blameworthy at all.  So, we should take PAPB to require, for 
blameworthiness, an alternative in which the person is not blameworthy for her behavior.  
One might worry that this rules out the possibility of situations in which a person is 
blameworthy no matter what she tries to do.  It seems as if there may be such situations, but 
we can make room for them if we suppose that what the agent is blameworthy for is getting 
into a situation in which she has only bad options.  Her blameworthiness for creating or 
permitting that situation may transfer and make her blameworthy regardless of the fact that 
she chooses the best option once she is in it.  If, on the other hand, she is not at fault for 
creating her dilemma, then I suspect that she will not be blameworthy for choosing what she 
reasonably concludes to be the least bad option.   
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considerations is weaker than we may reasonably expect of her.108  So, we 
should expect that if the blameworthy agent were more motivated to act in 
accordance with normative considerations, if she were as concerned and 
motivated as we might reasonably expect, then her behavior would be 
relevantly different.  With some slight changes, the same is true of 
praiseworthiness.  If a person is praiseworthy for behavior, it is because that 
behavior shows that her motivation to act in accordance with normative 
considerations is stronger than we might reasonably expect.  If her motivation 
were not this strong, then her behavior would be relevantly different.  
Therefore, the compatibilist version of PAPB should tie the possibility of 
behaving differently to relevant changes in the agent’s motivation to act in 
accordance with reasons.   
The compatibilist version of PAPB can be expressed most precisely as 
separate principles for blameworthiness and praiseworthiness: 
                                                
108 The idea of an agent’s motivation to act in accordance with relevant normative 
considerations is somewhat awkward and arguably over-intellectualized.  I have been tempted 
to rephrase the idea in simpler and more familiar terms, such as an agent’s concern to do the 
right thing or the best thing.  But I believe the phrase I have chosen allows some needed 
flexibility.  I suspect that there are many circumstances in which there are relevant normative 
considerations that we should be concerned about and motivated by, but there is no right thing 
to do.  I also suspect that there are situations in which we might praise, or withhold blame, 
based on a person’s concern to do some good, even if the person lacks a desire to do the 
right thing or the best thing.  Perhaps I should give more to charity and perhaps if I were less 
selfish I would, but I might still deserve some credit for being motivated to give as much as I 
do.  I do not know how much is the right amount to give, and in the end, that question does not 
drive my decisions about how much to give.  I give the amount that I do because I want to do 
some good, but I am not so strongly motivated to do the best thing that I possibly can.  I 
recognize that there are reasons to give, and I act on them, but I choose not to be concerned 
about doing the best thing I could do.  I do not know whether I should be considered 
praiseworthy or blameworthy for my giving, but in evaluating my blameworthiness or 
praiseworthiness, it should be relevant that I am motivated by normative considerations, even 
if I am not always motivated by a concern to do the right thing or the best thing.  
 190 
If a person is blameworthy for behavior, then if she 
were more motivated to act in accordance with 
normative considerations, she would have behaved 
in some other way for which she would not be 
blameworthy. 
If a person is praiseworthy for behavior, then if she 
had been less motivated to act in accordance with 
normative considerations, she would have behaved 
in some other way for which she would not be 
praiseworthy.  
We should now be in a position to see what can be said for this proposal. 
B. The Argument for PAPB: 
Now let us consider the basis for believing PAPB states a necessary 
condition for responsibility.  An argument for PAPB, as applied to 
blameworthiness, can be made out if we accept the following premise:   
If A is blameworthy for his behavior, then, during 
the relevant period prior to his behavior, A’s 
motivation to act in accordance with normative 
considerations was weaker than we may 
reasonably expect of him.   
I will have more to say about this premise below, but let me first say how it can 
be used to support PAPB.  If we accept it, then a second premise naturally 
follows through contraposition:   
If, during the relevant period prior to his behavior, 
A’s motivation to act in accordance with normative 
considerations had been as strong as we could 
reasonably expect, then A would not be 
blameworthy for his behavior.   
From these premises, I infer the following: 
If A is blameworthy for his behavior, then if, during 
the relevant period prior to his behavior, A’s 
motivation to act in accordance with normative 
considerations had been as strong as we could 
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reasonably expect, then A would not be 
blameworthy for his behavior. 
This is enough to establish PAPB as applied to blameworthiness, because, as 
I shall argue below, if in one scenario A would be blameworthy and in the 
second scenario he would not be, then his behavior in the two scenarios is 
different in kind.  In the two scenarios, I shall argue, A behaves in a different 
way.  With the necessary changes, the same premises could be used to 
establish PAPB as applied to praiseworthiness. 
The argument for PAPB only gets going if we accept my first premise.  I 
take that premise to follow from the conception of blameworthiness and 
praiseworthiness defended in Chapter Two.  There, I argued that 
blameworthiness for behavior requires that the behavior in question reveals an 
agent’s weak concern for normative considerations, and that praiseworthiness 
for behavior requires that the behavior in question reveals an agent’s strong 
concern for normative considerations.  The strength of an agent’s motivation to 
act in accordance with normative considerations is revealed by her behavior 
only if it figures among the causes or explanations of that behavior.  So, if a 
person is blameworthy for her behavior occurring at a particular time, then 
over some relevant period prior to that behavior, her concern or motivation to 
act on moral reasons was not as strong as we might reasonably expect. 
The argument follows naturally from this idea.  If we take an actually 
blameworthy agent, and then imagine her to be strongly and consistently 
motivated by normative reasons, then her behavior could no longer be of a 
kind for which she would be blameworthy.  In short, altering the features of her 
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will that are required to make her behavior blameworthy is sufficient to ensure 
that her behavior would be relevantly different.109  Similarly, praiseworthiness 
for behavior depends on behavior that reveals the agent’s strong concern for 
reasons.  If we take a praiseworthy agent and imagine her to be less 
concerned for reasons, her behavior could no longer be caused or explained 
by the strength of her concern for reasons.  Thus her behavior would be 
different.  It would no longer be the sort for which she could be praiseworthy.  
In either case, PAPB follows from the fact that moral responsibility for behavior 
depends upon the strength of the agent’s motivation to act in accordance with 
normative considerations.   
Contrast the foregoing rationale for PAPB from one that might be 
offered in support of PAP.  It is sometimes supposed that alternate possibilities 
requirements get their support from an idea that blame must be avoidable (i.e., 
that it would be unfair to blame a person unless she could have done 
something to avoid blame).  That is not the basis of my argument for PAPB.  I 
am not certain what to make of the idea that blame must be avoidable as a 
rationale for PAPB.  For one, the avoidability intuition does not explain why 
any requirement like PAP or PAPB should apply to praiseworthiness. One 
could certainly believe that a person only deserves praise for an action that he 
might have avoided.  But to praise where an action could not have been 
                                                
109 Alternatively, if we imagine this agent to be as strongly and consistently concerned 
about normative considerations as we could possibly demand and yet this makes no 
difference to her behavior, then this would show that, in the actual world, the weakness of her 
concern for reasons was not among the causes for her behavior and that she was not in fact 
blameworthy. 
 193 
avoided is not obviously a wrong to the recipient of the praise (or anyone else) 
in the same way that blaming can be a wrong to the recipient of blame.  
Perhaps, in some indirect way, undeserved praise could cause harm to the 
recipient, as spoiling or coddling can cause harm, but it would be difficult to 
make a compelling case that undeserved praise is always wrongful to the 
recipient.  As I understand it, the force of the avoidability intuition comes from 
this additional element:  that it is wrong or unfair to the recipient unless she 
had some opportunity to avoid it.  Without this additional element, the idea that 
praise is deserved only when it could be avoided seems to be just another way 
of stating that responsibility requires alternate possibilities. 
I also do not rely on the avoidability intuition because I am not 
convinced that the compatibilist can adequately satisfy this intuition.  Every 
compatibilist about determinism and moral responsibility must concede that 
blame is not avoidable in a fundamental and important sense.  He must 
concede that blame is “avoidable” only in a sophisticated, philosophical sense, 
typically expressed through counterfactuals.110  Some compatibilists might 
have a good story to tell about why this counterfactual sort of avoidability 
should do enough to satisfy our concerns about the fairness of blaming, but it 
becomes more difficult for the compatibilist to claim avoidability as a first 
principle that can support PAP or PAPB.   
The intuitions stated at the outset of this Chapter provide another 
                                                
110 For example, PAPB supports the following position:  blame can always be avoided 
simply by being better motivated.  If one deserves blame, then if one had only been more 
motivated to do the right thing, or more concerned to act in accordance with normative 
reasons, one could have thereby avoided being blameworthy. 
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source of support for PAPB.  I have claimed that in order for a person to be 
blameworthy for her behavior, it must be reasonable to expect that she 
behave better.  This is not the same as saying that she could have done 
otherwise or that blame must be avoidable, only that we could have 
reasonably expected something better.  The sense of “expect” here is 
normative.  We might also say that it must be reasonable to have demanded 
or asked better of her.   
What could we have reasonably expected of a person who acts badly?  
In some cases, it is simple:  we could have expected or demanded that she do 
the opposite of whatever it is she is blameworthy for doing.  For example, we 
may reasonably expect that a blameworthy liar should have told the truth.  But 
it will not always be the case that a person could have done the opposite of 
what she did.  In Chapter One, we saw that we may have the ability and 
opportunity to do something even though luck or other factors may prevent us 
from succeeding in some cases in which we exercise the ability.   For 
example, a lifeguard may have the ability and opportunity to rescue even if 
there is a chance that he might get a cramp while trying or even if there is a 
chance that the rescuee will choke and drown shortly before the lifeguard can 
get there.  A lifeguard who does not even attempt to rescue can be 
blameworthy even if, had he tried, one of these risks would have prevented 
him from succeeding.  We can still demand better of this lifeguard because we 
can demand that he should have tried to rescue.   
Of course, the alternative of trying is not always available.  Frankfurt 
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cases appear to show that, in some cases at least, we cannot even expect the 
blameworthy person to get as far as trying.  If we concede that a Frankfurtian 
intervener could step in before the agent even manages any effort to do 
otherwise, then we must concede that we cannot even demand that the 
blameworthy person try.  What we can demand in every case is that she had 
been more concerned or motivated to act in accordance with the relevant 
normative considerations.  If she were, then her behavior would have been 
different, regardless of whether or not bad luck or a Frankfurtian intervener 
prevents her from successfully doing what she ought to do.  Her behavior 
would have been different because this increased motivation or concern would 
figure in the explanation of that behavior.   
Could we also expect or demand that a person have better abilities or 
opportunities?  In some normal cases, we will feel that a person is 
blameworthy because she failed to cultivate better abilities, abilities that would 
have allowed her to overcome the obstacles to doing what he ought.  If John 
the lifeguard is out of shape, he may be blamed for failing to rescue even if he 
tries.  If an alcoholic puts herself in circumstances where she will be tempted 
to drink, she may be blameworthy for drinking.  But this does not show that 
blame can be deserved simply because we may demand better abilities or 
opportunities.  We may demand these things only to the extent that a person 
would be able to acquire them, if she had been more motivated to do so.  In 
other words, if we blame in these circumstances, we assume that if the person 
had been more motivated by the relevant normative considerations, she would 
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have cultivated stronger abilities or put herself in better circumstances.  Thus, 
even in these cases, the assessment of blameworthiness is ultimately 
grounded on a demand that the person should have been better motivated, 
that she should have been more motivated by reasons.  The same is true 
where a person’s behavior would have likely been better if she had cultivated 
better specific habits or dispositions.  Ultimately, it is her failure to be 
motivated by the reasons for cultivating these more specific habits that permits 
the assessment of blameworthiness.  At bottom then, all that we can 
reasonably demand is that the person be motivated to act in accordance with 
relevant normative considerations.  If she is so motivated, then she will do 
what we can reasonably demand to improve herself and her situation.  Thus, if 
she is blameworthy for her behavior, then it must be that her behavior reflects, 
in one way or another, the weakness of her motivation to act in accordance 
with normative considerations.   
Now consider praiseworthiness.  For a person to be morally 
praiseworthy for her behavior, that behavior must reflect a concern for reasons 
that meets or exceeds our reasonable expectations.  In such a case, it is 
typically quite reasonable to expect—now in a more predictive than normative 
sense—less of her.  We understand that human beings are imperfect moral 
agents.  They are subject to temptations of all sorts.  A person will often show 
concern that meets or exceeds our expectations where she does not give in to 
a normal and understandable temptation, either because she has a stronger 
desire to do what she ought or because, over time, she has cared enough 
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about doing the right thing to develop good habits and suppress bad desires.  
But we will not consider her to be morally praiseworthy if, instead, her behavior 
merely reflects good luck, including the strength of her innate abilities or the 
good circumstances in which she finds herself.   
Whether she will deserve praise when her behavior reflects a natural 
tendency to be kind, for example, is a more subtle question.  I believe that it 
may, but that the praise should be qualified if that tendency is not curbed by a 
general concern to do the right thing.  We will want to praise and encourage a 
tendency to be kind (or toward some other virtuous disposition) when it is 
exhibited in appropriate situations, but if a person is naturally disposed to be 
kind no matter what the situation, we may see that as a fault rather than an 
occasion for praise.  It is hard to doubt that there are situations in which simple 
kindness is inappropriate, and in which it is better to be firm, critical, or even 
harsh.  In extreme cases, where one is dealing with an abusive person, 
uncurbed kindness may result in serious harm to oneself and others as well.  
Thus, in general, I believe that a person deserves praise only to the extent her 
behavior reveals the strength of her concern to do the right thing.   
There is only one other point in this argument that may deserve further 
comment. The premises I have defended so far support the conclusion that if a 
person is blameworthy for her behavior, she would not have been 
blameworthy for her behavior if she had been more strongly motivated by 
normative considerations.  In contrast, PAPB provides that if a person is 
blameworthy for her behavior, then she would have behaved in a different way 
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if she had been more strongly motivated.  Thus, PAPB follows from my claims 
only if we accept that the actual behavior resulting from one’s actual motives 
and the hypothetical behavior resulting from the hypothetical motives are 
different ways of behaving, i.e., different in kind.  This additional premise 
reflects my view that it makes sense to sort behavior into kinds based on 
whether or not a person is blameworthy, praiseworthy or neither for that 
behavior.  My general view is that kinds, or at least behavioral kinds, are as 
varied as our interests, and that we may meaningfully sort behavior—just as 
we may sort other things—based on any properties that we care about.  For 
our purposes, behavior for which a person is blameworthy is very different 
than similar behavior for which a person could not possibly be responsible.  
For example, I believe that whipping a donkey because one wants to see it in 
pain is different behavior than whipping a donkey because one reasonably 
believes that it is the only way to get it to move to a place of safety.  I also 
believe that each of these behaviors is different than whipping a donkey 
because one is an automaton under the thoroughgoing control of an evil 
genius.     
 If one does not share my permissive view of behavioral kinds, there are 
still adequate grounds for insisting that it is meaningful and appropriate to 
distinguish kinds of behavior in terms of the attitudes or mental states that 
cause the behavior.  We very often sort behavior according to the motives and 
mental causes.  The criminal law is instructive here.  Systems of criminal law 
with origins in the British common law, including our own, rely extensively on 
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the mental states that explain and motivate that behavior in order to define 
categories of behavior.  First, to count as any sort of crime at all, the behavior 
at issue must be voluntary, in the weak sense identified above.  In addition, 
few crimes are defined simply in terms of overt acts, but in terms of the acts 
together with the mental state with which these acts are carried out.  For 
example, in the traditional common law, homicide is murder and houseburning 
is arson only if the requisite conduct is performed with “malice.”  If homicide is 
committed by the very same means and physical movements but in the heat 
of passion induced by one of a few recognized forms of provocation, then it is 
manslaughter instead of murder.  If committed by the same means, but as part 
of a reasonable response to a life-threatening attack, then it is not a crime at 
all.  In jurisdictions that have modified the traditional common law, the precise 
lines between the categories have shifted a bit, but the general point remains 
true.  Criminal acts and omissions are, like blameworthy and praiseworthy 
behavior, defined and categorized at least partly in terms of the mental states 
that motivate them.  It would defy common sense to insist that criminal 
behavior is not different in kind than similar non-criminal behavior or that 
murder is no different than manslaughter.  I find it similarly incredible to claim 
that blameworthy behavior is not different in kind from morally neutral or 
praiseworthy, but otherwise similar, behavior.     
Based on the foregoing considerations, there is a clear argument for 
PAPB that depends on the fact that desert of praise and blame requires 
behavior that reveals the quality of a person’s motives.  If a person is 
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praiseworthy for her behavior then that behavior is caused by the strength of 
her basic moral desires.  It follows then that if her desires were sufficiently 
different in this respect, then even if her behavior would be otherwise the 
same, it would not reveal the strength of her moral motivation.  Thus, it would 
not be behavior for which she could be praiseworthy.  Similarly, if a person is 
blameworthy for her behavior, then her behavior was caused by the weakness 
of her moral desires.  So, if her desires had been sufficiently different, then her 
behavior would have been different.  It would not be behavior for which she 
could be blameworthy.      
C. PAPB and Frankfurt Cases: 
PAPB is designed with Frankfurt-type cases in mind, and it concedes 
that a person could be morally responsible without any relevant possibility of 
doing otherwise.  So, it may be no great surprise that Frankfurt cases cannot 
be used to refute it.  Nonetheless, this is a fact that should be shown. 
Frankfurt’s main case against PAP is given in the following 
counterexample: 
Suppose someone—Black, let us say—wants Jones to 
perform a certain action.  Black is prepared to go to 
considerable lengths to get his way, but he prefers to 
avoid showing his hand unnecessarily.  So he waits until 
Jones is about to make up his mind what to do, and he 
does nothing unless it is clear to him (Black is an excellent 
judge of such things) that Jones is going to decide to do 
something other than what he wants him to do.  If it does 
become clear that Jones is going to decide to do 
something else, Black takes effective steps to ensure that 
Jones decides to do, and that he does do, what he wants 
him to do.  Whatever Jones’s initial preferences and 
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inclinations, then, Black will have his way.111   
It might be more accurate to call this a schema for a counterexample.  As 
Frankfurt says, the details of just how Black can predict what Jones will do 
and, if necessary, successfully intervene can be filled in various ways.  And 
other philosophers have crafted different versions of this general scenario in 
an effort to meet every possible concern and objection.  For the purposes of 
testing PAPB as a part of a compatibilist theory of responsibility, we need only 
focus on two broad kinds of Frankfurt cases.  The first is the general family of 
cases that get the most attention, those in which Black uses a device to 
manipulate Jones’s brain or directly controls his mind.  The second is rarely 
discussed but still faithful to Frankfurt’s description here.  These are cases in 
which Black does not interfere with Jones’s power to decide what to do when 
he intervenes.  Black simply ups the ante sufficiently to, as Frankfurt puts it, 
“ensure that Jones decides to do, and that he does do, what Black wants him 
to do.” 
 Let us begin with a direct manipulation case, in which Black has some 
sort of brain or mind control over Jones.  Suppose that Jones and Black are 
jurors in Red’s criminal trial.  The case against Red is very weak, but most of 
the jurors have an unreasonable prejudice against Red.  Nearly all of the 
jurors are overlooking the glaring holes in the case and will vote to convict on 
the basis of prejudice alone.  Black in particular is so determined to see Red 
convicted that he will take extraordinary measures to ensure a unanimous 
                                                
111 Frankfurt (1969) p.835 
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guilty verdict.  Jones is alone among the jurors in feeling conflicted.  He does 
not want to disagree with his fellow jurors, but he has much more than a 
reasonable doubt about Red’s guilt.  Black hopes that a little cajoling and peer 
pressure during deliberations are all that will be needed to prompt Jones to 
vote to convict, but if not, he is prepared to use a device to manipulate Jones’s 
brain long enough to have Jones’s vote cast for Red’s conviction.  If we 
suppose that Black can do this, then we might as well imagine that Black can 
also monitor Jones’s brain processes and, from them, accurately predict what 
Jones will do.  We may therefore assume that Black will intervene effectively in 
any situation in which Jones would vote to acquit and, thus, that Jones’s vote 
will be cast to convict no matter what.  But in fact Black never needs to 
intervene.  During deliberations in the jury room Jones expresses some 
misgivings, but when he looks around the table and sees everyone glaring at 
him, he caves.  Unwilling to stand up to them, he joins them in voting for a 
conviction regardless of his belief that Red has not been shown to be guilty. 
It should be quite clear that Jones is blameworthy for voting to convict.  
He has more than a reasonable doubt.  So, Jones has both a legal and a 
moral duty to vote to acquit.  Red’s liberty is at stake, after all.  Let us also 
grant that Jones could not do otherwise.112  If he had been inclined to hold out 
against conviction, Black would have intervened and taken control of Jones’s 
                                                
112 We could quibble a bit about this.  Perhaps he could have argued a bit more.  
Perhaps he could have begun to form an intention to vote to acquit.  If so, perhaps the 
example could be reformed to rule as much as possible of this out by having Black intervene 
earlier.  Then the search would be on for something else, however slight, that Jones might 
have done before Black intervened.  But I am not defending PAP here, and I need not go 
down this road. 
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brain and, thus, his body.  This does not contradict PAPB.  Though Jones 
could not have done otherwise, his behavior could have been significantly 
different.  If Jones had simply been a better person, if he simply had been 
more strongly motivated to do his duty, then he would have had adequate 
motivation to hold out.  If he had been so motivated, it is true that Black would 
have intervened and ensured that Jones’s vote is cast to convict, but Jones’s 
behavior still would have been different.  If Black intervenes in this sort of way, 
then Jones does not vote to convict.  He does not do anything at all.113  
Black’s intervention breaks the connection between Jones’s beliefs and 
desires—his will—and his behavior.  All that happens in the counterfactual 
scenario is that Jones’s body is made to move in ways that appear as though 
he votes to convict. This is quite different than what Jones actually does.  It is 
certainly not behavior for which Jones is blameworthy.  So, this case poses no 
threat to PAPB.   
Next suppose that the manipulation of Jones’s brain or his mind is not 
so direct.  Suppose that Black would intervene not by directly causing the 
behavior he wants, but by giving Jones new desires or by increasing the 
                                                
113 As noted above, there might be a weak sense in which Jones does vote.  If Black’s 
intervention interferes with Jones’s awareness of his own behavior, he may well want to know 
“what he did” while he was out of control.  Or if he remains aware but unable to control his 
behavior, then he may watch in horror at what he finds himself “doing.”  If one prefers to speak 
this way, then we need only note that though there is still something Jones does in the 
counterfactual scenario, it is dramatically different from what he does in the actual scenario.  
In the actual scenario he blamefully and voluntarily votes for conviction.  In the counterfactual 
scenario, he blamelessly and non-voluntarily is manipulated into voting for conviction.  But I 
have my doubts about saying even this.  I am inclined to say that voting is essentially 
voluntary, and so that Jones only appears to vote in the counterfactual scenario.  So, if one 
insists that Jones does anything in the counterfactual scenario, I think one can only say that 
he non-voluntarily makes other motions or words that appear to be voting for conviction. 
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strength of certain existing desires.  Perhaps we can imagine such a case.  In 
the actual case, Jones is actually motivated to vote for conviction because his 
fear and anxiety over confronting his fellow jurors is stronger than his concern 
to do his duty.  Suppose that it became clear that Jones would not be 
sufficiently moved by this anxiety, Black might intervene by manipulating 
Jones’s brain chemistry in such a way that his feelings of anxiety become 
overwhelming.  Perhaps one will claim that if this works to motivate Jones to 
vote to convict, then voting to convict is still something that Jones does.  I 
disagree.  The idea that this new, heightened anxiety and the desires that 
come with it are Jones’s is, to my mind, perverse.  Even if we should say that 
Black’s intervention gives rise to new desires in Jones, we should not say that 
these are Jones’s desires.114  So, the intervention still breaks the connection 
between Jones’s desires and his behavior and, as a result, prevents him from 
doing anything voluntarily.  Therefore, I am not inclined to suppose that this 
move permits us to say that Jones votes to convict in the scenario in which 
Black intervenes.   
                                                
114 As this makes clear, I am inclined to suppose that some sort of ownership 
requirement applies to one’s motives and desires.  I am not prepared to make this idea 
precise here, but I do not think I need to.  Whatever concept is defended would have to be 
sophisticated.  People can intentionally cause each other to have desires, and the created 
desires very often become a part of the agent’s desires.  Education and advertising make this 
clear.  In many cases, the bearer of the created desire need not knowingly and affirmatively 
consent before the desire becomes a part of his will.  However, there is likely a role for 
something like consent as well.  Medication may change our desires.  If the medication is 
secretly given to us without our consent, there is some reason to suppose that the new 
desires interfere with rather than change our wills, but if it is taken with informed consent such 
an argument becomes more tenuous.  In any case, without being able to give a full set of 
criteria, I think it is safe to say that if, without consent, one person interferes with desires of 
another as directly and as effectively as we must imagine that Black does, the created desires 
are not the second person’s desires, at least not immediately.   
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Even if this were not so, Jones would not be blameworthy in the 
counterfactual scenario, and thus, his behavior would have been different.  In 
the counterfactual scenario, Jones’s behavior is caused by an artificially 
stimulated and overwhelming desire, not by the weakness of his moral 
motivation.  By hypothesis, in the counterfactual scenario, Jones is as 
concerned and motivated to do the right thing as we could reasonably expect.  
This strong moral concern is simply overwhelmed by an artificially induced 
pathological desire to the contrary.  Thus, however we should characterize his 
behavior in the counterfactual scenario, it cannot support an attribution of 
blameworthiness.  Jones either does nothing at all because his behavior is not 
the product of his will, or he does something quite different than his actual 
behavior. 
While the literature is dominated by cases in which Black would 
intervene by using some extraordinary technology or magic to meddle with 
Jones’s brain, Frankfurt suggests that there are other ways of getting his 
schema to work.  Frankfurt himself proposes that Black might intervene by 
“pronounc[ing] a terrible threat, and in this way both force Jones[] to perform 
the desired action and prevent him from performing a forbidden one.”115  This 
method of intervening has the advantage of supporting some of the other 
things Frankfurt says about Black and Jones.  In particular, Frankfurt says that 
if Black must intervene, he may take steps to “ensure that Jones decides to 
                                                
115 Frankfurt (1969) p.835. 
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do, and that he does do, what [Black] wants him to do.”116  As I have just 
argued, in the typical brain manipulation cases, this description is not honored.  
In those versions, if Black intervenes, then Jones makes no decisions, and 
strictly speaking, he does nothing.  So, we should consider a case in which 
Black intervenes with threats and other coercive techniques.  If nothing else, 
consideration of such a case will provide another illustration of how PAPB 
works.   
Suppose that Jones is the single breadwinner in a poor family.  His frail 
son, Tiny Tom, is suffering from a persistent and worrying cough, and the gas 
company is threatening to turn off the heat.  Jones has just cashed his 
paycheck, and he is headed home, hoping he has enough money to keep the 
heat on and to buy a modest but hearty Christmas meal for the family.  Black, 
however, wants to get drunk, and knowing that Jones enjoys a drink when he 
can, Black thinks he might just be able to get Jones to buy a few rounds.  So, 
when Black sees Jones coming down the street, he proposes they stop in at 
the pub and spend just a little bit of his pay to celebrate.  The thought of 
putting his troubles out of mind for a moment appeals to Jones, and soon 
enough, amidst the fog of ale, he has spent nearly his entire pay on drinks for 
the two of them.  Jones never realizes just how desperate Black was.  Had 
Jones turned him down, Black was prepared to threaten Jones at gunpoint.  
He would have marched Jones right into the bar and ordered round after 
round, forcing Jones to pay.  So, either way Jones would have spent his check 
                                                
116  Frankfurt (1969) p.835 (emphasis added). 
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on drinks rather than on basic necessities for his family.  But in the actual 
case, Jones is blameworthy because he decided to do it for his own reasons, 
without being threatened. 
It may be clear why this sort of Frankfurt case has been of less interest 
in the debate over the principle of alternate possibilities.  Few defenders of 
PAP will concede that Black could really rule out the possibility of doing 
otherwise by intervening in this way.  After all, even if Black raises the stakes 
to the point where no reasonable man would resist, Jones still has a choice.  
He just has a bad choice.  Though it might be unreasonable to do so, Jones 
could always force Black’s hand and risk being shot.  So, in a case like this, a 
defender of PAP might concede that Jones probably would do what Black 
wants, but not that Jones could not, strictly speaking, do otherwise.   
But PAPB works somewhat differently PAP.  In the counterfactual 
scenarios relevant to PAPB, Black can virtually ensure that Jones goes to the 
bar.  PAPB asks us to consider a counterfactual scenario in which Jones is 
strongly motivated to do the right thing.  If we assume that this means he is 
strongly motivated to provide for his family, then it may be appropriate to 
assume that he also would not risk being shot when they are depending on 
him not just for this week’s pay but for years to come.  So, perhaps we should 
concede that Black can raise the stakes high enough to ensure that Jones will 
spend his check at the bar.  In this sort of case, Jones still does something in 
the counterfactual scenario.  He still goes to the bar and spends his pay.  
These acts are voluntary in the weak sense identified above.  But that is not to 
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say that he does the same thing that he does in the actual scenario.  There is 
a great difference between irresponsibly frittering away the family’s money in 
order to forget about reality and spending that money solely because a person 
has a gun to his back.  To appreciate the difference, one need only imagine 
how the family should feel in each of these scenarios.  In the actual scenario, 
Jones is blameworthy.  In the counterfactual scenario, he is not.  He is not 
responsible at all, or perhaps he might even be praiseworthy for his calm and 
reasonable response to the threat.  Thus, this case again illustrates the central 
point of PAPB.  If Jones’s moral motivation was stronger, then his behavior 
would have been different.    
In sum, Frankfurt cases do not present a counterexample to PAPB.  
Black’s counterfactual intervention can ensure that Jones’s counterfactual 
behavior is similar in some ways to his actual behavior, but that intervention 
also ensures that his behavior is different in the relevant respects.  By 
hypothesis, in the counterfactual scenario Jones is strongly motivated by the 
relevant reasons, and that entails that he is not blameworthy for whatever 
behavior Black manages to bring about.  Whatever similarities there are 
between his actual and counterfactual behavior, they are quite different in this 
respect.   
D.  The Relevance of Behaving Differently 
One might suppose that PAPB is true but uninteresting.  Some of 
Frankfurt’s supporters have been willing to concede that Frankfurt scenarios 
cannot rule out every sort of alternate possibility, but they have suggested that 
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these ineliminable alternate possibilities are insignificant and irrelevant to 
moral responsibility.  John Martin Fischer acknowledges that Frankfurt 
examples leave open alternatives.  Yet he claims to have arguments that 
“come extremely close to establishing that alternative possibilities are not 
required for moral responsibility.”117  Similarly Michael McKenna and Derk 
Pereboom have attempted to buttress Fischer’s claims by identifying specific 
criteria that distinguish relevant and irrelevant alternate possibilities.  
Generally, the targets of their arguments are attempts to save PAP, not 
attempts to defend PAPB.  Nonetheless it is worth considering what these 
arguments might show about PAPB.  I shall argue that they do not show that 
PAPB is false.   
However, their arguments may also evoke a deeper concern.  These 
arguments may be seen as giving voice to doubts about the significance of 
any sorts of alternatives left open in Frankfurt scenarios.  After all, there is no 
shortage of necessary conditions for responsibility (e.g., In order for A to be 
blameworthy for X, there must be something rather than nothing at all; in order 
for A to be morally blameworthy for X, there must be some moral truths).  Very 
few of these necessary conditions tell us anything interesting about 
responsibility in particular.  So, one may wonder whether PAPB states a 
condition that really shows us much about moral responsibility.  I will address 
this concern with a brief discussion of the significance of the principle and the 
alternatives it requires.   
                                                
117 Fischer (1994) p.147. 
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Fischer characterizes those who emphasize the importance of the 
alternatives left open in Frankfurt scenarios as “flicker of freedom” theorists.118  
He supposes that those who insist on the importance of these alternatives 
must be emphasizing the existence of a small flicker of freedom—such as the 
freedom to φ willingly or to φ unwillingly—and arguing that such freedom 
provides an adequate basis for moral responsibility.  Fischer’s use of 
“freedom” shows that his point is not aimed squarely at my position.  
Nonetheless, Fischer’s broad description of one version of the “flicker of 
freedom strategy” sounds a good deal like the position I have developed here.  
This version, Fischer says, emphasizes the difference between Jones acting 
on his own and Jones behaving as the result of Black’s intervention, and it 
insists that the existence of these alternatives are crucial to moral 
responsibility.119  Fischer does little more to develop this precise line of 
reasoning.  He does not directly say, for example, why, on the line of 
reasoning he is imagining, these sorts of alternatives are crucial or whether 
they constitute a sufficient or merely a necessary condition for responsibility.  
Nonetheless, Fischer’s rough sketch is reminiscent enough of my position that 
we ought to consider why he rejects it.  
Regarding such alternatives, and indeed regarding any variant of the 
“flicker of freedom” strategy, Fischer says that his “basic worry” is that Jones’s 
alternative to acting on his own “is not sufficiently robust to ground the relevant 
                                                
118 Id. p.134. 
119 Id. p.139. 
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attributions of moral responsibility.”120  Fischer restates this worry in a number 
of ways.  In places, he describes Jones’s alternative to acting on his own 
desires as “exiguous,” and in others, he describes it as “etiolated.”  A quick 
look in the dictionary confirms that these words mean “thin,” “weak,” and, one 
supposes, “not robust.”  This is impressive vocabulary, but is it an argument?  
The use of these terms is plainly metaphorical.  So, we should expect some 
explanation of the kinds of features that make alternatives either “robust” or 
“exiguous.”  Even if we were to concede that the alternative required by PAPB 
is “etiolated,” we need some explanation of why this matters.  Unfortunately, 
Fischer does not directly explain what makes alternatives robust or exiguous.   
We can glean some sense of what Fischer’s concern is from certain 
rhetorical questions he asks.  The “too thin” intuition is developed by asking, in 
various ways, “How could adding a set of alternatives in which Jones does not 
act freely make it the case that he actually acts freely?”121  As he restates and 
explains this question, Fischer repeatedly suggests that alternate possibilities, 
if relevant, must “ground” attributions of moral responsibility, and he complains 
that it could not be “in virtue of” these sorts of alternate possibilities that a 
person is morally responsible.122  None of these phrases (“make it the case,” 
“ground,” and “in virtue of”) is precise, but they all suggest that Fischer is 
working with an expectation that alternatives, if relevant, must constitute a 
sufficient condition for moral responsibility.  We would not normally say that A 
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makes B the case unless A is sufficient to bring about B or perhaps, if not 
sufficient on its own, an especially salient part of a sufficient condition that is 
otherwise satisfied.  We would not normally use any of these phrases unless 
we expected the existence of alternatives to be the key part of the explanation 
for moral responsibility.   
PAPB is stated as a necessary condition.  Thus, Fischer needs to show 
that the alternate possibilities left in Frankfurt cases, which PAPB exploits, are 
not required for moral responsibility, but he seems to be more focused on 
whether or not they are enough for moral responsibility.  For our purposes 
then, Fischer is asking the wrong question.  The question is not, “How does 
adding alternatives make it the case that a person is responsible?”  It should 
instead be, “How would the absence of alternatives make it the case that a 
person is not responsible?”  The argument for PAPB makes the answer to this 
question clear.  If a person’s behavior would remain the same no matter how 
much the strength of his moral motivation changed, then his behavior does not 
reveal anything relevant about his moral motivation and thus he could not be 
morally responsible for it.  In any case, even if PAPB did state a sufficient 
condition, it would be wrong to suppose that it is the alternatives themselves 
that somehow “ground” moral responsibility.  The alternatives might be said to 
be like symptoms of the relevance of moral motivation.  Their existence follows 
from the fact that behavior for which a person is responsible is behavior that 
reveals the strength of her moral motivation, not vice versa.  And it is this latter 
fact that “grounds” moral responsibility. 
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Perhaps McKenna’s or Pereboom’s elaborations of Fischer’s point will 
show us why robustness should concern us.  McKenna identifies two specific 
criteria for a robust, or relevant, alternative.  He writes that “a robust 
alternative requires two conditions”: 
(1) The alternative is morally significant.  It would tell us 
something (different than what we are told in the actual 
world) about the moral quality of the agent’s conduct 
were she to have so acted in this alternative scenario. 
(2) The alternative has to be within the control of the agent.123 
I have already argued that the alternatives required by PAPB are morally 
significant, and McKenna is prepared to concede this point.  He acknowledges 
that acting as the result of Frankfurt-type intervention does not reveal the 
same thing about one’s will as acting for one’s own reasons.  “Hence,” he 
writes, “the alternatives [left open in Frankfurt cases] are morally significant; 
they bear importantly different moral properties with regard to an evaluation of 
[the agent’s] conduct.”124  So, the interesting issue here is the second criterion, 
control.   
Control is not an easy concept to define.  To understand what McKenna 
means by control, we need to look to his argument that “prior sign” Frankfurt 
cases can be used to rule out all alternatives “within the control of the agent.”  
Prior sign cases are a class of Frankfurt-style cases in which Jones (or his 
equivalent) reliably and involuntarily displays some sign indicating what he will 
do before even he knows what he will do.  Sometimes these prior signs are 
                                                
123 McKenna (2003) p. 204 
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imagined to be simply extremely reliable poker “tells”—little bits of involuntary 
behavior that give Black advanced information about what Jones will decide.  
But it is also sometimes supposed that Black, a super-neuroscientist, has 
identified a brain pattern or signal that occurs just before Jones makes a 
decision and indicates what he will decide.  McKenna describes such a case.   
In McKenna’s case, Leslie (taking the place of Jones) has a plan to 
shoot Pat with a squirt gun, and Daphne (taking the place of Black) wants to 
make sure that she does it.  Daphne has been monitoring Leslie’s brain and 
has discovered that if Leslie is going to decide to shoot Pat, she will inevitably 
display a particular brain signal shortly beforehand.  So, Daphne knows that if 
Leslie does not display the brain signal by a certain point she is not going to 
decide to shoot Pat, in which case Leslie will intervene by making use of a 
“gizmo” that will cause Leslie to shoot Pat.  In the actual case, Leslie displays 
the brain signal and shoots Pat on her own.  (To ensure the case has some 
moral significance, we might imagine that Leslie knows the water in the squirt 
gun will ruin Pat’s treasured, one-of-a-kind outfit and make Pat very upset.) 
McKenna makes the following claim about the relevance of the 
counterfactual alternative in which Daphne intervenes:  
This alternative cannot be relevant to evaluating Leslie’s 
free will and moral responsibility with regard to her conduct 
in the actual world, the world in which she does shoot Pat 
on her own.  Why?  Because such an alternative, arising as 
it does prior to the locus of Leslie’s free will, was not within 
the scope of Leslie’s control.125 
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This description gives us our best hint as to what McKenna means by “within 
the agent’s control,” but we need to unpack this terminology to understand it.  
First, we have the suggestion that the alternative should be said to arise at a 
particular time.  This is perhaps natural enough, but we should make it a bit 
more explicit.  Presumably the alternative “arises” at the point where it 
diverges from the actual course of events.  In this case, this might occur at the 
time when Leslie displays the brain signal, for it is that point that we know the 
counterfactual scenario is supposed to diverge from the actual world.126  (It 
might be a bit more accurate to say this is the point at which the alternative 
becomes closed off.)  Second, and more boldly, we have not only the 
assumption that there is something meaningfully referred to as “Leslie’s free 
will” but also the assumption that it has a “locus,” apparently a temporal one.  
McKenna is clearly suggesting that this temporal locus is something that 
occurs after the time at which Leslie displays the relevant brain signal.  
Because we are to suppose that the brain signal is a reliable indicator that, 
moments later, Leslie will decide to shoot Pat, and because no other 
candidate events are mentioned, it is reasonable to infer that McKenna is 
supposing that the moment at which Leslie decides to shoot Pat is the “locus 
of her free will.”  So, I believe that the following captures McKenna’s claim in 
                                                
126 Note that, if we assume determinism, the idea that an alternative arises at this 
point, or at any other nearby point, may be a bit more controversial than I have suggested.  
Unless we suppose that minor, localized miracles are the proper way to evaluate 
counterfactuals in a deterministic world, then there is reason to suppose that in a deterministic 
world every counterfactual course of events diverges at the starting point of the universe (if 
there is one) and at every point since.  But this point raises issues far outside the scope of this 
dissertation. 
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plain terms:  any alternative left in this sort of Frankfurt case is not within the 
agent’s control because the matter of which alternative will occur is already 
settled before the agent decides what to do.  
In my view, the conception of control at work here reflects the grip of a 
fetish for decisions.  I doubt that decisions have anything like the significance 
that philosophers often attach to them.  For one, though it is true to say that 
we “choose” or “decide” to do pretty much anything that we voluntarily do, our 
voluntary behavior is very rarely preceded by any noticeable event of choosing 
or deciding.  When I am driving, every minor adjustment in steering, in braking 
and in accelerating that I make is something that I have decided or chosen to 
do, but I make these adjustments without any conscious thought and without 
any awareness of choosing or deciding.  When I am playing sports, I choose 
whether to pass or take a shot, whether to sprint downfield or backpedal 
slowly, whether to dodge left or right.  But I do these things spontaneously, 
without any conscious deliberation or decision.  Indeed, if I am to have any 
chance of playing well, I must simply react to what I see on the field and not 
deliberate and make conscious decisions.  As a result, although it is perfectly 
correct to say that I choose to do everything that I do in these contexts, I find it 
highly suspect to postulate countless, imperceptible volitional events that 
precede each bit of my voluntary behavior.127  Instead, in these contexts at 
                                                
127 Mele (2006) similarly recognizes that many intentions (followed by intentional 
actions) are formed without a decision.  Mele offers the example of intentionally unlocking his 
office door:  “since I am in the habit of unlocking my door in the morning and conditions . . . 
were normal, nothing called for a decision to unlock it. . . . [G]iven the routine nature of my 
conduct, there is no need to posit an act of intention formation in this case.  My intention to 
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least, it makes more sense to suppose that talk of one’s “choosing to x” or of 
“making a decision to x” is simply a way of saying that one did x voluntarily or, 
perhaps, intentionally.     
Of course, there are those times when we are conscious of deliberating 
and when we have the conscious experience of making a decision prior to our 
action, but even in these cases the significance of these moments may be 
more epistemic, than metaphysical.  In these cases, it typically seems as 
though any of a range of alternatives is open to us, that nothing prevents us 
from choosing any one of them, and then we know what it is that we will do.  It 
is fairly natural to suppose that something quite special has happened in that 
moment, that we have exercised some faculty of choice, that a switch has 
been flipped in the future’s garden of forking paths—provisionally closing off 
paths that were entirely open to us a moment ago.  It is a quaint and attractive 
idea, but not necessarily a plausible or coherent one.  There is certainly 
something wrong with this idea if the world is deterministic.  In a deterministic 
world, all but one of those paths are, in an important sense, already closed.  
We simply do not know which one remains open.  Therefore, in such a world, 
it would be quite plausible that what is special about these moments of 
conscious decision is not that they are moments in which we pick a path, but 
                                                                                                                                       
unlock the door may have been acquired without having been actively formed.”  Mele (2006) 
pp.14-15.  Mele’s example of routine, habitual action is a plausible one.  My examples show 
that I would extend the point to a wide range of actions that are less routine and that might 
seem to involve more active decision making of a kind. 
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moments in which we come to learn which path we are on.128 
In any case, we constantly rule out courses of action without making 
any decision to do so and prior to making any decision about what to do.  That 
does not show that it was not “up to us” or within the scope of our control to 
take those courses of action.  I have frequently had, and I will often have, the 
option of going outside and running through the streets flailing my arms up 
and down while shouting at the top of my lungs.  I have not done so, and I am 
unlikely to do so, though I cannot think of any time that I have decided against 
doing so.  So far, this option has been ruled out simply by the fact that I have 
not considered it, by my tendencies to be shy and reserved to a certain 
degree, and/or by my interests in doing other things.  But it would be strange 
to say that the option of doing so has not been within the scope of my control 
at any past time that I was deciding what to do.  Surely, if I had been 
sufficiently inclined to run through the streets flailing my arms wildly, I could 
have done so.  So, it has always been up to me, even if the alternative has 
been ruled out prior to each of my decisions about what to do next. 
Similarly, in McKenna’s prior sign case, which alternative occurs 
depends on what Leslie’s desires and beliefs are prior to her decision.  If she 
is mischievous and inconsiderate, she will shoot the gun voluntarily.  If she is 
not, she will not, and she will instead be made to shoot it involuntarily.  If her 
shooting did not depend on her desires in this way, then she could not be 
                                                
128 Admittedly, this is not all that happens.  We are not merely observers gaining 
knowledge.  In addition to forming a belief about what we will do, we form an intention. 
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responsible in the actual scenario.  The dependence of the outcome on her 
desires in this way is an excellent prima facie case for supposing that 
whichever of these two alternatives occurs is up to Leslie, or put another way, 
within the scope of her control.  The mere fact that a brain pattern shows what 
she will do prior to anyone’s awareness of her decision, allowing Daphne to 
start her intervention earlier, seems to me to cast no doubt on her control over 
her actions.129     
So, McKenna may be right that some form of control is a reasonable 
requirement for relevance of alternatives.  But the alternatives required by 
PAPB and left open by Frankfurt cases can meet such a requirement if we 
simply adopt a more plausible notion of control:  alternatives are within her 
control if they depend on which desires (within a relevant set that we could 
reasonably expect an agent to have) actually move the agent.  If a particular 
set of events will occur (or will not occur) no matter what an agent desires, 
then it is plausible to say that they are not within the scope of her control.  If 
some relevant change in that agent’s desires and preferences would be 
adequate to make X happen rather than Y, then the matter of whether X or Y 
occurs is within that agent’s control.  This is an idea that is as simple and as 
                                                
129 McKenna’s standard of control strikes me as problematic for another reason.  
McKenna contends that any alternative that “arises” prior to the agent’s decision is not within 
the scope of his control.  In his prior sign case, all alternatives are closed off prior to the 
agent’s decision, and so, what the agent will do is settled prior to her decision.  If this means 
that the alternatives are outside the scope of the agent’s control, one must ask why it does not 
also mean that her actual behavior is outside the scope of her control.  After all, just like the 
alternatives, the question of whether or not the actual behavior would occur was already 
settled prior to the “locus of her free will.”  There appears to be a double standard for control 
here. 
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familiar as any.  It should not be confused for an ideal of self-control, an ideal 
that is in no way required for responsibility.  Instead, it is a natural, minimal 
form of control that simply requires that what a person does depends on what 
he wants.   
Moreover, this form of control actually does what McKenna intends.  It 
rules out alternative possibilities that are actually irrelevant to moral 
responsibility.  There are always countless counterfactual scenarios in which 
Jones (or Leslie or whoever) avoids doing what the counterfactual intervener 
wants.  Perhaps a random contra-causal event occurs spontaneously wiping 
out Jones, Black or the entire world.  Perhaps Black’s gizmo has a technical 
failure.  Perhaps the rapture begins.  Or to take an example from Derk 
Pereboom, Jones might not engage in his blameworthy behavior, if instead he 
took a sip of coffee which unbeknownst to him, contains poison.  These 
counterfactual possibilities are clearly irrelevant because whether or not they 
occur does not depend on relevant changes to the agent’s desires.  Other 
types of alternatives, those that do depend on the strength of an agent’s moral 
motivation, are relevant to moral responsibility. 
Derk Pereboom also identifies a notion of “robustness”: 
For an alternative to be relevant per se to 
explaining an agent’s moral responsibility for an 
action it must satisfy the following characterization:  
she could have willed something other than what 
she actually willed such that she understood that 
by wiling it she would thereby have been precluded 
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from the moral responsibility she actually has for 
the action.130   
I am not sure what it means to “will” something, but I suspect that deciding to 
do something is closely related, if not necessary and sufficient, to willing it.  
Given what I have just said about decisions, and given that PAPB focuses on 
alternatives in which one need not actually will or decide to do anything, I see 
no argument and no reason to follow Pereboom in assuming that an 
alternative is relevant only if it involves an event of “willing.”  But what 
Pereboom’s condition adds to McKenna’s, and what does require further 
discussion, is an epistemic element.  Alternatives are only relevant, according 
to Pereboom, if the agent is aware of them and understands that they are 
such that the agent would, by choosing them, avoid the sort of moral 
responsibility she actually has.   
Pereboom motivates his requirement by relying on claims about the 
avoidability of blame:  “The main intuition underlying alternative possibility 
conditions is that if, for example, an agent is to be blameworthy for an action, it 
is crucial that she could have done something to avoid this 
blameworthiness.”131  Whether or not this intuition is needed to support PAP, it 
is not the intuition that I have invoked to support PAPB.  As noted above, any 
compatibilist about determinism and responsibility must hold that, at a 
fundamental level, responsibility may not be avoidable.  PAPB has two related 
bases.  First, desert of praise and blame depends on the strength of a 
                                                
130 Pereboom (2001) p.26 
131 Pereboom (2005), Pereboom (2001) p.1. 
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person’s moral motivation relative to our reasonable expectations.  Second, a 
person cannot deserve praise or blame unless it is reasonable to have 
expected something different (worse or better, respectively) from them.  It is 
not certain that either of these ideas requires or implies that the person could 
have avoided responsibility.   
Suppose we grant Pereboom’s point for the sake of argument.  If one 
believes that blame must be avoidable, and if that is one’s reason for requiring 
alternative possibilities, then an epistemic condition might seem to follow.  
Pereboom supposes that an alternative would not ensure or support the 
avoidability of blame unless the agent is aware that it would allow him to avoid 
responsibility.   
This is a bit too quick.  It may be true that the agent must have some 
belief about an alternative, but we should be careful not to impose a 
requirement of accurate knowledge about his alternatives.  The avoidability 
intuition should be satisfied in at least some, if not all, cases where an 
alternative exists in which the agent would avoid blame (the “real alternative”), 
the agent has a mistaken belief about the existence of an alternative in which 
she would avoid blame (the “imagined alternative”), and if she were 
adequately motivated to bring about the imagined alternative, this would in fact 
bring about the real alternative.  To illustrate, suppose that Fred’s house is on 
fire and he believes that his wife is unconscious inside and that he could with 
little risk to himself get her out.  Unmoved by the idea of his wife’s peril, Fred 
stands by and watches the house burn.  In fact, Fred’s wife is not inside, but 
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unbeknownst to him, his daughter is.  If Fred had tried to save his wife, he 
would have found his daughter and been able to rescue her instead.  Is Fred 
blameworthy for failing to rescue his daughter?  You’d better believe it.132  Is 
the fact that he was not aware that there was an alternative in which he saves 
his daughter relevant?  Ask his (soon to be ex-) wife, if you must.  Mistaken 
though he was, Fred knew everything he needed to know about his 
alternatives in order to avoid blame.  
So, even if we accept intuitions requiring the avoidability of blame, we 
should not accept any requirement of accurate knowledge or understanding 
about what will happen if the agent wishes to avoid blame.  At most all that is 
required is (a) that the agent does believe or should believe that there is an 
alternative in which she avoids blame and (b) that if she were motivated to 
pursue that alternative she would in fact avoid blame in one way or another.  
This condition is satisfied in the Frankfurt cases.  To take my jury example, 
Jones presumably believes that he can hold out and vote to acquit and that by 
doing so he would be fulfilling his duty, thus avoiding blameworthiness.  If he 
                                                
132 Pereboom could argue that Fred is blameworthy for something a bit less specific, 
such as failing to rescue a person, rather than failing to rescue his daughter.  I am not certain 
that our assessments of blame are so sophisticated.  I find it intuitive to think that he is 
blameworthy under either description of his failure.  He is also blameworthy for failing to try to 
rescue his wife, and perhaps for a number of other things.  I do not think this is incompatible 
with him also being blameworthy for failing to rescue his daughter.  In any case, I also do not 
think the possibility of a more generic description of his failure helps to save any sort of 
knowledge requirement for alternatives.  In the case I am imagining, Fred does not have 
knowledge or awareness of an alternative in which he saves a person.  He has a mistaken 
belief that there is an alternative in which he saves his wife.  It is not as though, in the 
hypothetical situation, Fred could claim, “I knew that I would save somebody if I went in there.”  
That might be the case if Fred had heard cries from within, or if someone had shouted, 
“There’s someone trapped inside,” and Fred had mistakenly inferred that it was probably his 
wife.  But in the case I am imagining, Fred’s false, specific belief about his wife does not imply 
a true, generic belief about someone or other. 
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were more strongly motivated to do his duty than he actually is, he would fail 
because of Black’s intervention, but he would still succeed in avoiding blame.  
Thus, the alternative in these cases meets the relevant requirement. 
Thus, although Fischer, McKenna, and Pereboom seek to identify a 
notion of robustness as a criterion for alternatives that are relevant to moral 
responsibility, their arguments cannot be used to show that the possibility of 
behaving differently, as identified by PAPB, is not necessary to moral 
responsibility.  Given the affirmative argument for PAPB above, it would be 
quite surprising if they could have.  Nonetheless, some of the claims made by 
Fischer and other defenders of a robustness requirement express a more 
general impression that the alternatives remaining in Frankfurt scenarios are 
of little relevance to moral responsibility.  To address any lingering remnants of 
this feeling, I will close this section with a brief review of the positive 
significance of these ineliminable alternative scenarios.   
 First, the argument for PAPB connects the possibility of behaving 
differently to an important, and non-obvious, conceptual truth about moral 
responsibility.  Such possibilities must exist not because of some accidental, 
yet-to-be-corrected flaw in the Frankfurt examples, but because their presence 
follows from the fact that one is responsible for behavior only when that 
behavior reveals that the strength of that agent’s moral concern falls below or 
exceeds our reasonable expectations.  Thus, far from being irrelevant, the 
presence of these alternatives tracks an important condition of moral 
responsibility for behavior.   
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 Second, the principle is not trivial in its application.  It can be used to 
identify a non-empty set of actions, omissions and other behaviors that are not 
grounds for moral praise or moral blame.  First, non-voluntary behavior, 
behavior prompted by the direct manipulation of others, and actions that have 
no clear connection with moral considerations can, in general, be shown by 
PAPB to be behavior for which an agent is not responsible.  If the strength of 
an agent’s moral concern had nothing to do with the occurrence of a bit of 
non-voluntary behavior, then it is difficult to see how increasing or decreasing 
the strength of that moral concern would lead to relevantly different behavior.  
Second, actions that turn out badly, but which reveal only strong moral 
concern and innocently mistaken beliefs are also shown to be not deserving of 
blame.  For if there has been no weakness in the agent’s motivation to do 
what is right, then no reasonable improvement to the agent’s moral motivation 
would produce a different result.  Third, behavior prompted by compulsion or 
by a pathological desire is also ruled out as potentially responsible behavior.  
No reasonable change to the strength of the agent’s moral motivation would 
produce a different result.  PAPB and the truths underlying it help to provide us 
with a clear explanation of why these types of situations do not support 
responsibility. 
 Finally, PAPB helps validate and explain the usefulness of 
counterfactual reasoning as a tool in evaluating a person’s responsibility.  
Some Frankfurtian compatibilists have suggested that Frankfurt cases show 
that how an agent would have behaved in other possible scenarios is not 
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relevant to moral responsibility.  For example, Fischer has said,  
The Frankfurt-type examples . . . point us to 
something both remarkably pedestrian and 
extraordinarily important:  moral responsibility for 
action depends on what actually happens.  That is 
to say, moral responsibility for actions depends on 
the actual history of an action and not upon the 
existence or nature of alternative scenarios.133 
It is not clear how far Fischer means to take this claim, as he has also 
expressly given an account of moral responsibility that depends on 
counterfactuals (just not the sort of counterfactuals suggested by PAP).134  
Fischer’s suggested distinction between theories that focus on the actual 
history and those that focus on counterfactuals is a dubious one.  But in any 
case, PAPB confirms that an effort to focus on the “actual history” without 
considering what else the agent might have done would be a mistake.  Even if 
one could develop an accurate account of the conditions of moral 
responsibility that focuses entirely on what actually happens and does not rely 
on considerations about alternative possibilities, to abandon counterfactual 
tests would be to abandon the way that people actually reason when 
assessing responsibility.  When we take a moment to reflect critically on a 
praising or blaming reaction, we naturally ask how easy or how difficult it 
would have been for the agent under consideration to have behaved 
otherwise.  When we think about this question we imagine how much different 
                                                
133  Fischer (1994) p.158.    
134 See, for example, Fischer (1994) pp.166-67 (explaining the requirement of weak 
reasons-responsiveness in terms of alternate possible worlds); Fischer & Ravizza (1998) 
pp.63, 69-82 (explaining the requirements of weak and moderate reasons-responsiveness in 
terms alternate possible worlds and counterfactuals about the “mechanism” which produced 
the agent’s actual behavior).    
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things would have to be in order for the person to have behaved differently.  If 
it is clear that a more virtuous person in their position would also have done 
the same thing, we will (or at least we should) revise our initial instinct to 
blame.   
While I have not tried to formulate PAPB as anything more than a 
necessary condition on responsibility, it is not difficult to see how the 
hypotheticals it has us consider can be tinkered with and modified to provide, if 
not a sufficient condition, a useful and important practical tool.  PAPB applied 
as a necessary condition has us ask whether an improvement in the agent’s 
desires would result in relevantly different behavior.  It will not always be 
immediately obvious how much of a change it might be reasonable to expect.  
Sometimes we might be aware that a vast improvement to the person’s will 
might have changed his behavior for the better, but we may be left with the 
sense that this is too much to expect.  The fact that a person with a heroic 
work ethic might not have dawdled at all is not necessarily enough to show 
that the person deserves blame for dawdling just a little bit.  Thus, if we start 
from this approach, the next natural question is what sorts of possible 
improvements to the will is it fair to expect of that particular person and 
measure him against.  We might ask not just whether a person would have 
behaved differently if he were a hero, but whether he would have done so if he 
were more like other people of his age, his experience, his upbringing, and so 
on.  Very often, we will ask, “Well would I have done any better in his 
situation?”   
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As PAPB and the argument for it indicate, it is no coincidence that such 
counterfactual reasoning can help guide our judgments about responsibility.  If 
used properly, the effect of these questions is to show with increasing 
precision whether the agent’s behavior reveals desires that we could 
reasonably expect him to have.  Thus, while there is some truth to Fischer’s 
claim that moral responsibility depends on what actually happens, PAPB 
reminds us that judgments about moral responsibility also depend on what 
might have happened instead.  Therefore, I conclude that PAPB states a 
significant and interesting condition for moral responsibility. 
III.  “Ought” Implies “Can” and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities:  
I want to close this Chapter by addressing an issue of internal 
consistency.  In Chapter One, I argued for a particular version of the principle 
that “ought” implies “can.”  In this Chapter, I have suggested that the principle 
of alternate possibilities may be conceded to the Frankfurt examples, arguing 
only for PAPB instead.  David Copp has argued that the principle of alternate 
possibilities, at least as it applies to blameworthiness, can be derived from 
“‘ought’ implies ‘can.’”  Thus, Copp’s argument raises a possible issue of 
internal consistency.  This section takes a close look at Copp’s argument.  I 
argue that one of its key premises is just as susceptible to the Frankfurt 
examples as PAP is.  So, if Frankfurt examples do undermine PAP, they also 
undermine Copp’s argument deriving PAP from “‘ought’ implies ‘can’.” 
Copp’s argument is fairly restated in step by step form as follows: 
1) Suppose that a particular agent is morally 
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blameworthy for doing something. 
2) If an agent is morally blameworthy for doing 
something, then it was wrong for her to have 
done that thing. 
3) If it was wrong for an agent to have done 
something, then she ought to have done 
something other than what she did. 
4) So, our particular agent ought to have done 
something other than what she actually did. 
5) If an agent ought to have done something, then 
that agent could have done that thing. 
6) So, our particular agent could have done 
something other than what she actually did. 
7) So, if an agent is morally blameworthy for doing 
something, then that agent could have done 
something other than what she actually did.135 
This statement of the argument makes each of the steps explicit, but 
the idea can be summed up more simply.  In addition to the idea that “ought” 
implies “can,” the argument really requires only one assumption:  the idea that 
if a person is blameworthy for doing something then she ought to have done 
something else.  In Copp’s argument, this step is presented as premises 2 and 
3, mediated by an additional step through the concept of wrongfulness.  We 
should keep that in mind, but by leapfrogging over that step we can see the 
simplicity and appeal of the argument in the following brief summary:  If a 
person is blameworthy for doing something, then she ought to have done 
something else, and if she ought to have done something else, then she could 
have done something else.  So, if she was blameworthy for doing something, 
                                                
135 See Copp (2003) p.270 and Copp (1997) p.445. 
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then she could have done something else.  
Copp’s argument makes no mention of which senses of “can” and 
“able” are relevant, but of course, the version of “‘ought’ implies ‘can’” that I 
have defended involves a very specific sense of “can.”  In Section VII of 
Chapter One, I identified three distinct factors that make it possible for an 
agent to perform an action: whether the agent has the ability, whether she is in 
a situation constituting an opportunity to exercise that ability; and whether she 
is sufficiently motivated to exercise the ability.  Given these distinct factors, I 
argued “ought to φ” implies “can φ” only in the sense that φ-ing is compatible 
with the agent’s abilities and opportunities, but not necessarily with her 
motivation.  This fact affects the conclusion of the argument, but it does not 
appear to affect the validity.  We can make the proper understanding of 
“‘ought’ implies ‘can’” explicit in Copp’s argument with a simple revision to the 
last three steps of the argument: 
5*) If an agent ought to have done something, then 
that agent could have done that thing, in the 
sense that she had the ability and the 
opportunity to do that thing. 
6*) So, our particular agent could have done 
something other than what she actually did, in 
the sense that she had the ability and the 
opportunity to do so. 
7*) So, if an agent is morally blameworthy for doing 
something, then that agent could have done 
something other than what she actually did, in 
the sense that she had the ability and 
opportunity to do so. 
It is fair to call this conclusion a version of the principle of alternate 
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possibilities, at least for blameworthiness.   
Without more controversial assumptions, Copp’s argument cannot be 
extended to support PAP for praiseworthiness.  If a person is praiseworthy for 
doing something, then she presumably did what she ought to have done.  So, 
the fact that “ought” implies “can” cannot be used to show that she could have 
done anything else.  Instead, we would need something like the principle that 
“ought” implies “can do otherwise.”  Some philosophers do accept this 
principle.136  But it is neither as intuitively compelling nor as widely accepted 
as “‘ought’ implies ‘can’.”  I have not argued for it at any point.  So, I shall 
focus on the limited version of PAP supported directly by Copp’s argument, a 
version limited to blameworthiness.  
Is there a problem with accepting this modified version of Copp’s 
argument?  I have argued in favor of an alternative to PAP, but I have not, 
thus far, given PAP itself much of a chance.  One might suppose that the 
version of PAP derived from my version of “‘ought’ implies ‘can’” can survive 
the Frankfurt examples.  The distinctions between abilities, opportunities, and 
motivation help to distinguish three kinds of causally relevant factors.  Abilities 
are powers of a sort, generally grounded in certain properties of the agent, 
though not only intrinsic properties.  They are also commonly grounded in the 
role a particular agent plays in a social structure or in things that agent 
                                                
136 See  Haji (1999).  Hare (1963) also provides one possible basis for thinking that 
“ought”  implies “can do otherwise.”  Hare argues that the question of what an agent “ought” to 
do only arises when there is what he calls a “practical issue,” a question of what to do.  One 
could argue that there is only an issue about how to act if there is more than one way of acting 
open to the agent.  The action the agent “ought” to perform is simply the most favorable of the 
ones that are open to him, implying that there is some other way of acting that is open to him. 
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possesses.  Opportunities have more to do with the agent’s circumstances 
and environment.  They exist when the conditions are appropriate for the 
exercise of an ability.  Motivation, obviously, has to do with the agent’s 
desires.  It determines whether or not the agent will attempt to exercise an 
ability.  So divided, it could be argued that the Frankfurt examples assure that 
an agent will not do otherwise only by ensuring that he will not be adequately 
motivated to do otherwise.  By intervening, in the counterfactual situation, in 
the neurological and psychological processes, Frankfurt’s interveners ensure 
that Jones will not be motivated enough to exercise an ability to do anything 
else.  So, one might suppose that the Frankfurt cases are cases in which 
responsible agents are unable to do otherwise only in the sense that they 
cannot become adequately motivated to do otherwise.  They do not, on this 
view, interfere with the agent’s ability or opportunity to do otherwise.   
I do not think this suggestion can be sustained, at least not without a 
more restrictive account of abilities and opportunities than the one I favor.  
While it is true that Frankfurtian interveners typically prevent agents from 
becoming sufficiently motivated, it is also very intuitive to suppose that they 
prevent the agent from having an opportunity to do otherwise.  It seems odd to 
say that an agent has a opportunity to φ when a super-powered meddler 
stands by, ready, willing, and able to do anything necessary to prevent the 
agent from φ-ing, even if the meddler’s plan is to interfere primarily with one’s 
motivation.  In addition, there is nothing about my account of abilities and 
opportunities that suggests otherwise.  What constitutes an opportunity to φ on 
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my account depends on the fully specified content of the ability to φ, and the 
fully specified content of an ability is virtually unlimited.  It can contain 
countless conditions that we have never had any reason to notice or consider 
before.  So, if it is natural to say that one lacks the opportunity to φ when a 
Frankfurtian intervener is prepared to prevent one from φ-ing, then we have 
every reason to suppose that the absence of a Frankfurtian intervener is a 
condition included in the fully specified content of the ability to φ.   
Assuming then that the conclusion of Copp’s argument is false, how do 
we avoid the inference that “‘ought’ implies ‘can’” is also false?  In the short 
form version of the argument I offered above, there is only one premise other 
than the principle that “ought” implies “can”:  the claim that if an agent is 
blameworthy for doing φ then she ought to have done not-φ.  This premise is 
as susceptible to Frankfurt cases as the conclusion, PAP.  Frankfurt cases 
have made it implausible to suggest that if a person is blameworthy for doing 
something, then she could have done otherwise.  For just the same reasons, 
they make it implausible to suggest that if a person is blameworthy for doing 
something, then she ought to have done otherwise.  All that is required for 
blameworthiness is that the agent would have behaved differently if her moral 
motivation was stronger.  There is no reason to infer from blameworthiness 
anything more than that the agent ought to have been better motivated.  
Under the analysis in Chapter One, this is not the sort of “ought to do” claims 
that imply “can.”  A claim about how one ought to be motivated does not entail 
any particular claim about what one ought to do.    
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Recall that, as Copp presents the argument, the inference from 
blameworthiness to “ought to have done otherwise” takes two steps.  First, he 
claims that if one is blameworthy for doing something, then it was wrong for 
the agent to have done it, and second, he claims that if it was wrong for an 
agent to have done something, then he ought to have done something else.  It 
is the second of these two specific steps that is implausible.137  Recall Jones’s 
decision to vote to convict Red.  It was wrong for Jones, out of reluctance to 
stand up to his peers, to vote to convict Red without adequate evidence of 
guilt.  But what else was Jones supposed to do?  Surely he should have been 
more principled or more concerned to do the right thing, but if he were, Black 
would have ensured that Jones did nothing at all.  So, from the fact that a 
person acted wrongly, we cannot safely infer that she should have done 
something else.  From the fact that it was wrong of a person to do φ, the only 
safe inference is that she should have been better motivated, i.e., more 
                                                
137 Gideon Yaffe has objected to this idea as well, similarly pointing out that in some 
circumstances a person might discharge an obligation not to X by doing nothing at all, e.g., 
when he is knocked unconscious just before the opportunity to X occurs.  Yaffe (1999).  
Yaffe’s approach (and by implication, my own approach) is criticized in Fischer (2003).  
Fischer’s rejection of Yaffe’s approach turns on an assertion that if one ought not to X, then 
one must have “genuine access” to a possible world in which one does not X, where “genuine 
access” means that the possible world has the same laws and history as the actual world.  
Fischer appears to believe that “ought implies can” can be squared with common sense moral 
claims about what a person ought to do only if indeterminism is true.  Granting his assumption, 
we could only say that A should not have tortured B as he did if there was a possible world 
with the very same laws and history in which A did not torture B.  This would require 
indeterminism, or perhaps, miracles.  Fischer offers no discernible argument for this very bold 
and controversial assumption, except to repeatedly say that it “seems to [him]” that anyone 
accepting “ought implies can” should believe this and that it somehow follows from the 
“motivation” behind “ought implies can.”  Fischer does not explain what he sees as the 
“motivation” behind the principle or why it might support his bold assertion.  Fischer concludes 
by rejecting “ought implies can” – not surprisingly, given his assumptions about the principle.  I 
have defended a version of “ought implies can” and explained the motivation behind it.  It 
provides no support for Fischer’s assumption.      
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disposed to do her duty.  But being better motivated guarantees no more than 
that she will not voluntarily do what she actually did.  It does not ensure that 
she has the opportunity to do anything different, and so we should not 
automatically assume that she should do anything different.  
I do not dispute that if a person is blameworthy for doing something or if 
it was wrong of her to do it, then we can and should expect her to have 
behaved better.  But Copp’s argument assumes that this means that the agent 
should have done something else.  In most cases, this is a fairly safe 
assumption.  In most cases, we may safely assume that there is no 
counterfactual intervener waiting in the wings, and so all that would be needed 
for her to do something else is for her to have cared enough to do it.  But there 
are exceptional cases, and these exceptional cases show the limits of what 
blameworthiness requires.  A person can be blameworthy for what she did 
even though she could not have done otherwise.  In these cases, the intuition 
that we may demand or expect better of the agent is satisfied by the fact that 
her will should have been better and by the fact that had her will been better, 
her behavior would have been different.  Therefore, Copp’s argument does not 
show any inconsistency between my defense of “‘ought’ implies ‘can’” and my 
rejection of PAP in favor of PAPB. 
IV.   Epilogue:  Determinism and Reasonable Expectations for Moral 
Motivation 
In explaining and defending PAPB, I have relied in various places on a 
notion of reasonable expectations, but thus far, I have avoided addressing 
questions about this idea.  As I noted at the end of Chapter Two, the idea that 
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a person might be reasonably expected to have stronger (or weaker) moral 
motivation might be problematic, particularly in a deterministic world.  I cannot 
answer all of the questions one might ask about reasonable expectations, but I 
want to say a bit about their role in PAPB and then at least outline the 
problems they raise. 
PAPB incorporates the idea that it is reasonable to expect a person to 
be differently motivated in some respects, that it is reasonable to demand that 
she be more concerned about reasons or to be unsurprised if she had been 
less concerned.  I have invoked reasonableness as a limitation on what we 
can expect of an agent in terms of moral motivation, and this limitation is 
crucial to constraining the range of cases in which we will find a person to be 
blameworthy or praiseworthy.  In the case of blameworthiness, the relevant 
reasonable expectations are normative.  They specify the amount of moral 
motivation that we believe a particular person ought to have, but they are 
reasonable in so far as they take appropriate account of human capacities for 
moral motivation.  In a particular case, it might be that a person would have 
behaved differently if she had a superhuman commitment to moral reasons, 
but it is not reasonable to say she deserves blame because she lacks this 
superhuman commitment.  Nor will we suppose that a person deserves blame 
if he is too immature, insane, or mentally deficient.  It is unreasonable to 
expect a person who cannot even grasp moral concepts to be concerned and 
motivated by moral reasons.  And it can also be unreasonable to expect as 
much moral concern from those who have not received an adequate moral 
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education as we can expect from those who have.  Though PAPB would still 
state a necessary condition for responsibility without this reasonableness 
limitation, it is a more interesting and informative principle with it.  It does a 
better job of tracking blameworthiness. 
In the case of praiseworthiness, reasonable expectations play a limiting 
role in a different way.  A praiseworthy agent is one who has met or exceeded 
our reasonable normative expectations for moral motivation.  But I have 
suggested that it also must be reasonable, in some other sense, to expect 
worse of the agent.  It is certainly not the case that we might have a normative 
expectation of less moral motivation, and it need not be the case that we have 
grounds for an actual, all things considered, prediction for less.  Instead, the 
point is that it would be reasonable to expect less, in a predictive sense, given 
our experience with the temptations to which she and other human beings are 
normally susceptible.  On the basis of this information, we may not literally 
believe that she will succumb to these temptations, but we believe that it would 
be understandable (either for her or for people in general) if she did.  Only if 
we can see that behaving otherwise would satisfy some other desires of hers, 
or some other desires that she would be likely to have if she were not such a 
good person, will we suppose that the behavior displays the sort of strong 
moral concern that merits praise.  This limits the cases in which a person will 
be praiseworthy, as it means that a person will not merit praise for avoiding the 
sorts of bad acts that neither she nor any other normal person would have 
ever been tempted to perform in the first place.   
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But one might ask why it is ever reasonable to expect a person to have 
different moral motivation at all.  Determinism can make this question seem 
particularly pressing.  (This is not to say that the question would be any easier 
to answer if indeterminism were true.)  If determinism is true, then a person 
can be no more and no less concerned than the laws of nature and the past 
entail.  She is always as concerned about doing the right thing as she possibly 
can be.  What makes it reasonable to expect any more?  One might also ask 
what makes moral motivation different than the other kinds of changes that we 
cannot reasonably demand of a person?  I have argued above that we take 
abilities, opportunities, and impulses to be, to a certain extent, given.  We do 
not expect or demand that a person has different natural talents than those 
that are given to her in the natural lottery, so to speak.  We might expect her to 
develop those talents, but only to the extent that she could, if she cared to.  
She cannot be expected to develop talents that exceed her natural potential.  
So, why is moral motivation not also treated as part of the natural lottery, 
something that is simply given to her and that we must simply accept and work 
with?  If determinism is true, one’s potential for moral motivation is no less 
determined than anything else.  Why can we expect more than what an agent 
has, given the laws of nature and history?  
We could note that our reasonable expectations of moral motivation are 
“ought to be” claims:  a blameworthy person ought to be more concerned to do 
the right thing.  As “ought to be” claims they do not imply that the person can 
be more concerned, at least not according to the principle discussed in 
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Chapter One.  But this point is purely negative.  It rules out an argument 
against the appropriateness of these expectations, but it does not affirmatively 
show why it is reasonable to have them.  Moreover, while these expectations 
may not trigger the “ought” implies “can” principle, they do reflect a sensitivity 
to what is possible or realistic.  As I have just pointed out, it is unreasonable to 
demand superhuman commitment or to expect moral motivation from a person 
with no capacity for understanding moral concepts.  So why are they not also 
sensitive to the limits that determinism imposes?  
 We might also point out that it seems essential to moral realism to 
believe that people should be concerned to do the right thing.  To see the 
world in moral terms is to believe that people ought to be concerned and 
motivated to do the right thing and promote valuable states of affairs.  To 
accept that there is good and bad, right and wrong, is to accept that people 
ought to be concerned about these facts.  Thus, the reasonableness of 
expecting moral concern and moral motivation is, arguably at least, a 
stipulation of the moral world view.  Therefore, to question the propriety of 
expecting moral concern may simply be to ask whether it makes sense to see 
the world in moral terms.  And that may not be a question that we can answer 
based on moral principles about whether people do or do not deserve to be 
held responsible.  But I do not find this response to be altogether satisfying 
either.  Without questioning whether expectations of greater moral concern 
ever are reasonable, one could reasonably demand some account of when 
and why they are.  This should be part of a full account of moral responsibility.  
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Further, it is one thing to believe that people ought to be more motivated to do 
the right thing.  It is another to demand that they be more motivated and to 
hold them accountable if they are not.  We may still ask what makes this 
demand, backed by blame, reasonable.  That is not to ask whether it makes 
sense to see the world in moral terms, but only whether it makes sense to hold 
people responsible.    
 So, if we accept PAPB as a necessary condition for responsibility, we 
might still demand an explanation of when and why it is reasonable to expect 
a person to have any particular degree of moral motivation other than what 
they actually have.  For my own part, I am inclined to believe that if a person is 
a competent, mature agent who has had some basic moral education 
(providing a basic appreciation of the difference between right and wrong, 
fostering a feeling of concern and sympathy for others, etc.), it is 
presumptively fair and, therefore, reasonable to demand a good degree of 
moral motivation.  I see no clear reason for supposing that this should not be 
so, but I also cannot now offer a positive account of why it should be so.  My 
purpose in this Chapter has been to argue for a necessary condition for moral 
responsibility that links responsibility with alternate possibilities without 
entailing that determinism and responsibility are incompatible.  My purpose 
has not been to address every concern about moral responsibility and 
determinism, or to provide a positive explanation for why the two are 
compatible.  Having done so, and thus having defended a position on which 
the argument from PAP to incompatibilism fails, it seems fair to conclude that 
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we should not accept incompatibilism about determinism and responsibility 
unless there is some other argument for that conclusion.  At the same time, it 
is also fair to ask for a more satisfying positive explanation of why determinism 
and responsibility are compatible, but that must remain work for another 
occasion. 
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